State v. Zinski

• Decision Date: 15 May 2019
• Docket Number: A17-0136
• Citation: 927 N.W.2d 272
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Danny Lee ZINSKI, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

927 N.W.2d 272

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant,

v.Danny Lee ZINSKI, Respondent.

A17-0136

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: May 15, 2019

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

The question presented in this case is whether the district court committed reversible error when the court did not, sua sponte, give a limiting instruction regarding the proper use of relationship evidence admitted under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (1996).¹ The State charged respondent Danny Lee Zinski with first-degree burglary and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. At trial, the district court admitted 634.20 evidence² without sua sponte instructing the jurors on the proper use of that evidence. On appeal, Zinski argued that the district court committed an error that was plain when the court failed to sua sponte instruct the jurors on the proper use of 634.20 evidence. The court of appeals agreed with Zinski and held that the district court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jurors on the proper use of 634.20 evidence was an error that was plain. Although we announce a new rule that clarifies the law, the relevant law was unsettled at the time of appellate review, and, therefore, the court of appeals erred when the court concluded that Zinski had established an error that was plain. Accordingly, we reverse.

FACTS

The State charged Zinski with burglary in the first degree under Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (1996), and criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree under Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(c) (2018), in connection with conduct involving D.S. Zinski and D.S. had been in a romantic relationship, but D.S. had ended the relationship just before the incident that gave rise to the charges.

Zinski pleaded not guilty, and the matter proceeded to trial.³ At trial, the district court admitted 634.20 evidence.⁴ Specifically, D.S. testified that Zinski had repeatedly verbally and physically abused her during their relationship. Two neighbors and friends of D.S. testified that they had seen Zinski verbally abuse D.S. And L.S., who is D.S.’s son, testified that Zinski verbally and physically abused D.S.

Zinski did not ask for, and the district court did not give, a limiting instruction on the proper use of 634.20 evidence, either when the evidence was introduced or in the final jury instructions. The jury found Zinski guilty on both counts.

On appeal, Zinski argued that the district court committed an error that was plain when it failed to sua sponte instruct the jurors on the proper use of 634.20 evidence. In support of his argument, Zinski cited State v. Word , 755 N.W.2d 776, 785 (Minn. App. 2008), for the proposition that the failure to sua sponte instruct the jurors on the proper use of 634.20 evidence is an error that is plain. While Zinski’s appeal was still pending in the court of appeals, the court of appeals issued its opinion in State v. Melanson , 906 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. App. 2018). In Melanson , the court of appeals held that "the district court did not plainly err in failing to provide a limiting instruction sua sponte to the jury regarding the admission of [634.20] evidence." Id. at 568.

Despite the apparent conflict between Word and Melanson , the court of appeals held that the district court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jurors on the proper use of 634.20 evidence in Zinski’s case was a plain error that entitled him to a new trial. We granted the State’s petition for review.

ANALYSIS

Because Zinski did not ask the district court to instruct the jurors on the proper use of the 634.20 evidence and did not object to the court’s final jury instructions, he has forfeited appellate review of the jury-instruction issue. See State v. Goodloe , 718 N.W.2d 413, 422 (Minn. 2006) ("Failure to request specific jury instructions or to object to instructions given generally results in forfeiture of the issue on appeal."). But, under the plain-error doctrine, an appellate court has the discretion to consider a forfeited issue if the defendant establishes (1) an error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected his substantial rights.⁵ Id. ; see State v. Matthews , 779 N.W.2d 543, 548 (Minn. 2010). Under our precedent, "[a]n error is plain if it ‘contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.’ " State v. Hayes , 831 N.W.2d 546, 555 (Minn. 2013) (quoting State v. Ramey , 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006) ).

On appeal, the State asks us to reverse the court of appeals’ conclusion that the district court’s plain error entitles Zinski to a new trial. According to the State, relevant precedent was unclear at the time of Zinski’s appeal on whether a limiting instruction was required concerning 634.20 evidence, and so the district court’s failure to give the instruction cannot have been an error that was plain. For his part, Zinski relies on case law as it existed at the time of his trial and argues that we should affirm the court of appeals. We agree with the State.

I.

Turning to the first prong of the plain-error analysis, the State argues that the district court did not err in failing to sua sponte give a limiting instruction. Zinski disagrees. Even if we assume that the district court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jurors on the proper use of 634.20 evidence, Zinski is not entitled to relief because he failed to establish that the alleged error was plain.⁶

A plain error is an error that "contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct." Ramey , 721 N.W.2d at 302. According to Zinski, the district court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jurors on the proper use of 634.20 evidence clearly contravened relevant case law. We disagree. Based on our review of the relevant decisions issued by our court and the court of appeals, we conclude that the law at the time of appellate review does not clearly require a district court to sua sponte instruct the jurors on the proper use of 634.20 evidence.

In urging us to reach a different conclusion, Zinski relies on State v. Bauer , 598 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. 1999). But that reliance is misplaced because it is unclear whether our analysis in that case even dealt with 634.20 evidence. In Bauer , the defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error by failing to sua sponte give the jurors any limiting instructions regarding the use of "relationship evidence." Id. at 365. In addressing the defendant’s argument, we said, "[a]s a general rule, even absent a request by the defense, such instructions should be given prior to the admission of 404(b) evidence and again at the end of trial to help ensure that the jury does not use the evidence for an improper purpose." Id. (emphasis added). At no point in Bauer did we ever cite, much less discuss, section 634.20. Id. at 365–66. Instead, Bauer uses the term "relationship evidence" interchangeably with the term "404(b) evidence." Id. For example, in deciding that the district court’s failure to give a limiting instruction was not plain error, we noted that "in its closing argument, the [S]tate prefaced its summary of the relationship evidence by pointing out that the evidence was relevant to show motive , a permissible use." Id. (emphasis added). Rule 404(b) specifically states that "proof of motive" is a permissible use. Section 634.20, by contrast, does not list permissible uses because the evidence is presumptively admissible unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by other concerns. Accordingly, because Bauer referred to "relationship evidence" and "404(b) evidence" interchangeably, Bauer did not create a clear requirement for a district court to sua sponte instruct the jurors on the proper use of 634.20 evidence.

Moreover, even if Bauer had clearly dealt with 634.20 evidence, as Zinski contends, the guidance we provided in Bauer was equivocal. After noting "that the trial court did not provide any limiting instructions to the jury regarding the use of the relationship evidence," we stated that "[a]s a general rule , even absent a request by the defense, such instructions should be given prior to the admission of 404(b) evidence and again at the end of trial to help ensure that the jury does not use the evidence for an improper purpose." Id. at 365 (emphasis added). Our use of the words "general rule" and "should" can hardly be read as creating a clear requirement that a district court sua sponte give a limiting instruction to the jurors for any type of relationship evidence.

Zinski’s reliance on State v. Williams , 593 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1999), is misplaced for the same reason. In Williams , we discussed the failure of the district court to give limiting instructions as to the proper use of evidence of the defendant’s past abuse. Id. at 236. Williams addressed relationship evidence that was admitted under Rule 404(b) —and refers to it as "404(b) evidence"—but we acknowledged in a footnote that the evidence was also relevant under section 634.20. See id. at 236-37, 236 n.1. We stated that "although the failure to give limiting instructions [for relationship evidence] in certain circumstances may constitute plain error, we hold that it does not do so in this case." Id. at 237. Like Bauer , Williams cannot be read as creating a clear requirement that a district court sua sponte give a limiting instruction for 634.20 evidence.⁷

The parties also rely on decisions from the court of appeals. But the case law from the court of appeals at the time of appellate review also does not clearly require a district court to sua sponte instruct the jurors on the proper use of 634.20 evidence. In some cases, the court of appeals has held that a district court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jurors on the proper use of 634.20 evidence is an error that is plain. See State v. Barnslater , 786 N.W.2d 646, 654 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating that "[i]n light of [its] decisions in Word and Meldrum , the district court’s error in failing to instruct the jury regarding the proper use of [634.20] evidence was plain" but concluding that this error did...