State v. Coristine

• Decision Date: 09 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 86145–5.,86145–5.
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Brandon S. CORISTINE, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

177 Wash.2d 370

300 P.3d 400

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Brandon S. CORISTINE, Petitioner.

No. 86145–5.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

Decided May 9, 2013.

Lisa Elizabeth Tabbut, Attorney at Law, Longview, WA, for Petitioner.

Mark Erik Lindsey, Andrew J. Metts, III, Spokane County Pros. Offc., Spokane, WA, for Respondent.

STEPHENS, J.

[177 Wash.2d 373]¶ 1 This case asks us to determine whether the trial court violated petitioner Brandon Coristine's constitutional rights by offering an affirmative defense instruction over his objection. Coristine argues that offering the instruction to the jury violated his right to control his defense. We hold that where a defendant chooses not to argue or invoke an affirmative defense, offering an instruction on the defense over the defendant's objection violates the Sixth Amendmentto the United States Constitution. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for a new trial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Coristine was charged with rape in the second degree arising out of events during a house party at his residence in Spokane, Washington. To prove rape in the second degree, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with someone who was incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated. RCW 9A.44.050(1)(b).

¶ 3 At trial, the State presented testimony that Coristine's alleged victim, L.F., drank heavily at the party and went to sleep and that some time later Coristine came into her room and had sexual intercourse with her as she lay on her stomach coming in and out of consciousness. Coristine and two other defense witnesses—Coristine's wife and his sister-in-law—testified that L.F. consumed alcohol at the party but did not appear to be intoxicated. Coristine also testified that L.F. initiated the sexual intercourse and was an active and willing participant.

¶ 4 After the close of evidence, the trial court held an instruction conference at which the sole contested issue was whether to read a jury instruction on the statutory affirmative defense of “reasonable belief.” SeeRCW 9A.44.030(1). Coristine's counsel objected to the instruction, arguing that Coristine's defense was simply that the State failed to prove L.F. was incapacitated. 3 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 397. The prosecutor argued in favor of giving the instruction, asserting the court was required to give the instruction if Coristine “bolster[ed]” his case by offering “any additional evidence” that the victim was not incapacitated, including witness testimony. 3 VRP at 395. The trial court was skeptical at first, noting that Coristine was free to choose his own defense, but eventually accepted the State's argument. 3 VRP at 395–99. Over Coristine's objection, the court read the following pattern instruction to the jury:

It is a defense to a charge of rape in the second degree that at the time of the act the defendant reasonably believed that [L.F.] was not mentally incapacitated or physically helpless. The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance of the evidence means that you must be persuaded, considering all of the evidence in the case, that it is more probably true than not true. If you find that the defendant has established this defense, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty as to this charge.

3 VRP at 409–10; see 11 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 19.03, at 296 (3d ed. 2008). After the instructions were given, each side presented closing argument. Coristine reiterated his failure-of-proof defense, arguing that testimony from defense witnesses about L.F.'s alcohol consumption and behavior at the party cast doubt on the State's allegation that L.F. was physically helpless or mentally incapacitated during sexual intercourse. Neither side mentioned the affirmative defense of reasonable belief.

¶ 5 The jury deliberated for two days and found Coristine guilty of rape in the second degree. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. State v. Coristine, 161 Wash.App. 945, 252 P.3d 403 (2011). We granted discretionary review. State v. Coristine, 172 Wash.2d 1014, 262 P.3d 63 (2011).

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 In order to further the truth-seeking aim of a criminal trial and to respect individual dignity and autonomy, the Sixth Amendment gives the accused the right to present a defense. Consistent with this right, the Sixth Amendment requires deference to the defendant's strategic decisions.

¶ 7 Because an affirmative defense is one the defendant may raise, the Sixth Amendment requires courts to honor an intelligent and voluntary choice to forgo an affirmative defense. Instructing the jury on an affirmative defense over the defendant's objection violates the Sixth Amendment by interfering with the defendant's autonomy to present a defense.

A. The Sixth Amendment Protects a Defendant's Autonomy

¶ 8 The Sixth Amendment guaranties of compulsory process, confrontation, and the assistance of counsel help ensure fair trials. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818–21, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). These assurances safeguard the truth-seeking function of criminal trials. In putting the State to its proof, a defendant may call witnesses, cross-examine the State's witnesses, and have the assistance of counsel, thereby guarding against a wrongful conviction. See, e.g., Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975) ( “[P]artisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.”).

¶ 9 Presenting one's own defense also affirms individual dignity and autonomy. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (noting that the Sixth Amendment right to conduct one's own defense “exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused”); see also Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 76, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that a “defendant's Sixth Amendment right ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him’ ... reflects respect for the defendant's individual dignity and reinforces the presumption of innocence”).

¶ 10 To further the truth-seeking function of trial and to respect the defendant's dignity and autonomy, the Sixth Amendment recognizes the defendant's right to control important strategic decisions. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177, 104 S.Ct. 944 (“[T]he primary focus must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his own way.”); State v. Jones, 99 Wash.2d 735, 742, 664 P.2d 1216 (1983) (defendant's fundamental right to make decisions about the course of the defense is mandated by “ ‘respect for [his or her] freedom as a person’ ” (quoting Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 376 (D.C.1979))).

B. Courts Must Respect a Defendant's Right To Forgo an Affirmative Defense

¶ 11 The Sixth Amendment right to control one's defense encompasses the decision to present an affirmative defense. We first recognized this principle in Jones, 99 Wash.2d 735, 664 P.2d 1216. In Jones, the trial court entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity over the defendant's objection and allowed the introduction of evidence of insanity after the defense presented its case. Id. at 739, 664 P.2d 1216. The jury found the defendant to be insane at the time he committed the crime. Id. at 738, 664 P.2d 1216.

[177 Wash.2d 377]¶ 12 We granted the defendant a new trial. Relying on Faretta, we observed that “a defendant has a constitutional right to at least broadly control his own defense.” Jones, 99 Wash.2d at 740, 664 P.2d 1216. In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment grants criminal defendants the personal right to self-representation at trial. 422 U.S. at 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525. We noted that Faretta stands for “ ‘the conviction that a defendant has the right to decide, within limits, the type of defense he wishes to mount.’ ” Jones, 99 Wash.2d at 740, 664 P.2d 1216 (quoting United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir.1979)); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 33, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (quoting Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F.Supp. 569, 570 (D.D.C.1961) ( “[Courts] should not ‘force any defense on a defendant in a criminal case.’ ”)).

¶ 13 In line with Faretta and Alford, we reasoned that “ ‘respect for a defendant's freedom as a person mandates that he or she be permitted to make fundamental decisions about the course of proceedings.’ ” Jones, 99 Wash.2d at 742, 664 P.2d 1216 (quoting Frendak, 408 A.2d at 376). Such respect demands that “courts do not impose ... defenses on unwilling defendants.” Id. at 743, 664 P.2d 1216. Imposing a defense on an unwilling defendant impinges on the independent autonomy the accused must have to defend against charges. As the Court proclaimed in Faretta in upholding the right to self-representation, “[u]nless the accused has acquiesced ..., the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821, 95 S.Ct. 2525. We concluded that the court must honor the intelligent and voluntary choice of a competent defendant to forgo an insanity defense. Jones, 99 Wash.2d at 746, 664 P.2d 1216.

¶ 14 Our reasoning in Jones was followed in State v. McSorley, 128 Wash.App. 598, 116 P.3d 431 (2005). There, the State requested an instruction on an affirmative defense to the charge of child luring, an instruction to which the defendant “most strenuously” objected. Id. at 603, 116 P.3d 431. Nevertheless,the trial court granted the State's motion, instructing the jury that “ ‘[i]t is a defense to a charge of luring that ... [t]he defendant's actions were reasonable under...