State v. Daniel

• Citation: 665 So.2d 1040
• Decision Date: 28 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 84486,84486
• Parties: , 20 Fla. L. Weekly S497 STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Alan DANIEL, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1040

665 So.2d 1040

64 USLW 2271, 20 Fla. L. Weekly S497

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Alan DANIEL, Respondent.

No. 84486.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 28, 1995.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 4, 1996.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Stephen R. White, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Abel Gomez, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

KOGAN, Justice.

We have for review a district court decision certifying the following question to be of great public importance:

DOES THE RULING IN KEHOE V. STATE, 521 SO.2D 1094 (FLA.1988), REQUIRE SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE STOP OF A MOTOR VEHICLE FOR A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION WHERE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE STOP WAS PRETEXTUAL, BUT THE STATE FAILS TO AFFIRMATIVELY ESTABLISH BY EVIDENCE THAT A REASONABLE POLICE OFFICER WOULD HAVE ROUTINELY STOPPED A MOTOR VEHICLE FOR THE SAME VIOLATION?

Daniel v. State, 647 So.2d 220, 221-22 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

Alan Daniel was arrested in Jacksonville on May 10, 1992, for possession of cocaine and paraphernalia. Sergeant Bobby Lawrence Deal said he made the initial stop of Daniel based on his observation that Daniel's windshield had a large crack and a windshield wiper stuck directly across the driver's view. Sergeant Deal said he intended to give Daniel a warning, but he made the arrest after Daniel was unable to produce a driver's license--a violation of Florida traffic laws. Deal said standard procedure called for arrest in that circumstance, although Deal conceded the arrest occurred in an area known for prostitution and drug peddling. During a subsequent pat-down search, cocaine and a crack pipe were found in Daniel's clothing. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Daniel pled no contest, reserving his right to appeal. On appeal, the First District reversed.

The present case poses an issue that has resulted in a three-way split of authority among jurisdictions of the United States: how to determine what constitutes an impermissible pretextual traffic stop for Fourth Amendment purposes. ¹ While we are bound by any apposite holdings of the United States Supreme Court on Fourth Amendment issues, Perez v. State, 620 So.2d 1256 (Fla.1993), it is not entirely clear which of the competing approaches to this issue the Court would favor. We therefore must begin by examining each in light of what we know of the Court's views on similar subjects.

The First District Court of Appeal of California has ably outlined the competing approaches, which may be described in the following terms. The first approach is the "subjective test," which attempts to inquire into the actual subjective reasons why the officer made the stop. The second is the "objective test," which ignores subjective matters and asks only if the officer was objectively authorized and legally permitted to make the stop in question without regard to any pretextual motive. And the third approach is the "reasonable officer test," which refines the objective test by also asking whether the stop--if occasioned by a minor infraction--was of a kind falling within the usual practices of the same or similar agencies. People v. King, 34 Cal.App.4th 1576, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 368 (1994).

We agree with the California appeals court, id., that the United States Supreme Court most probably has disfavored the "subjective test" in its policy statements on Fourth Amendment law. In Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-38, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978), the Court stated:

[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.

(Emphasis added.) Although this statement arose from a factually distinguishable case, we nonetheless consider it as a statement of policy underlying the Fourth Amendment. Elsewhere we have noted that policy statements from the United States Supreme Court will serve as a polestar in choosing among competing and unreconciled views of Fourth Amendment issues. Johnson v. State, 20 Fla.L.Weekly S347 (Fla. July 13, 1995). Moreover, a subjective inquiry into the thought processes of police is too nebulous a standard. It would tend to authorize the courts, through cold scholarly inquiry, to second-guess decisions that often must be made in the heat of stressful and rapidly changing events on the streets of our cities and counties.

This conclusion is further supported by policy statements in yet another factually distinguishable case from the nation's high Court. In Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985), the Court quoted its own opinion in Scott in making the following remarks:

Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred "turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time," Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1722, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978), and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken. Id., at 138 and 139, n. 13, 98 S.Ct., at 1724, n. 13.

(Emphasis added.) This language clearly disfavors a subjective test. Ironically, this quotation has been cited by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals as the authority mandating the reasonable officer test, United States v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448, 1450 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708-09 (11th Cir.1986), even as other courts have cited it in support of the competing objective test. King, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d at 369.

The confusion evident in the case law is perhaps understandable: Both the "objective test" and the "reasonable officer" test are objective in the sense that they resort solely to provable facts. And the United States Supreme Court seems to have said little more than that an objective test of some variety is required. Accordingly, we now turn to a comparison between the objective and reasonable officer tests, considering them in light of Fourth Amendment policy considerations.

The objective test has great appeal because of its simplicity. Under this test, the sole question is whether the law permitted the stop in question for any reason. In sum, could the officer make the stop? If any lawful reason exists to say "yes," then courts following this test inquire no further. Id. at 368. We ourselves, however, have noted the major flaw in this simplistic test:

We decline to adopt the ... "could arrest" approach. Although it is the easiest test to follow, the fourth amendment constraints on intrusive unlimited searches and seizures transcend other concerns. Allowing the police to make unlimited stops based upon the faintest suspicion would open the door to serious constitutional violations. It is difficult to operate a vehicle without committing some trivial violation--especially one discovered after the detention.

Kehoe v. State, 521 So.2d 1094, 1097 (Fla.1988). In sum, the objective test would authorize stops for the slightest infractions, however unrelated those infractions may be to the true motive for the stop.

We also find that the language in Macon, quoted above, is more consistent with the reasonable officer test than the objective test. Under Macon, the court's duty is to make an objective assessment of officers' actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them at the time of a stop. Macon, 472 U.S. at 470-71, 105 S.Ct. at 2783. We find that this language contemplates a more individualized approach than is possible under the objective test. It is difficult to say that the reviewing court has conducted an assessment of officers' actions in light of the relevant facts and circumstances if that court is merely looking for any legal justification for the stop, even where a pretext may be transparently obvious.

The reasonable officer test is better suited for an individualized inquiry because it also asks whether the usual police practice would be to effect a stop when confronted with a particular kind of minor infraction. In sum, would the officer have effected the stop absent any improper motive? If the answer is "yes," then the stop was lawful even if a pretextual motive may have influenced the officer's actions. As is obvious, this test by definition would never bar a stop where there is probable cause to suspect more serious offenses, including felonies or crimes involving harm or the threat of harm to others, or where exigent circumstances exist. More serious offenses always will provide independent justification, however pretextual the stop may be. Rather, the reasonable officer test applies exclusively where a stop is justified solely by a minor infraction, generally those that are purely regulatory in nature and that do not address conduct potentially harmful to other persons or property.

Admittedly, the contours of this test have not been worded with much precision in the past, which undoubtedly has led to some of the criticisms leveled at it. Those who read the test apart from its application to facts have been tempted to dismiss it as a misguided effort to elevate ever-changing "usual police practices" to the status of law. One court, moreover, has opined that the reasonable officer test--carried to its logical conclusion--"would invalidate a traffic stop that departs from routine practices even where there is no allegation or evidence of a pretextual purpose." King, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d at 369.

We frankly find these criticisms incorrect. A close reading of the facts and outcomes of the "reasonable officer" cases shows they are wholly focused on the problem of stops for minor infractions that are solely and...