State v. Golden

• Decision Date: 30 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. 20223-2-III.,20223-2-III.
• Citation: 47 P.3d 587,112 Wash.App. 68
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. George Samuel GOLDEN, Respondent.

47 P.3d 587

112 Wash.App. 68

STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. George Samuel GOLDEN, Respondent.

No. 20223-2-III.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3, Panel One.

May 30, 2002.

Kevin M. Korsmo, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Spokane, for Appellant.

John H. Whaley, Assistant Public Defender, Spokane, for Respondent.

SWEENEY, J.

Superior courts of this state have general jurisdiction to decide any justiciable controversy so long as jurisdiction is not vested in another court. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; RCW 2.08.010. Here, George Golden collaterally attacked his juvenile disposition, eight and one-half years after the fact, in superior court. The primary question presented here is whether the superior court had jurisdiction to grant collateral relief. We conclude that it did and affirm the exercise of jurisdiction by the superior court.

FACTS

George Golden was 10 years old in 1992 when he pleaded guilty in juvenile court to one count of arson. The juvenile court entered a disposition and imposed community supervision and restitution of $164,620. The disposition order extended juvenile court jurisdiction over Mr. Golden until age 21 to supervise the restitution.¹ Mr. Golden turned 18 on November 19, 1999.

After he turned 18, the State charged Mr. Golden with an unrelated adult offense in superior court. The State also notified him that it intended to include the juvenile arson conviction in his offender score. Mr. Golden filed a motion in superior court for permission to withdraw the juvenile plea, relying on CrR 7.8(b)(5), which empowers the court to vacate a judgment in the interests of justice. The motion was addressed to the juvenile division, and filed under the 1992 case number. But the superior court did not invoke the retained juvenile jurisdiction in granting the motion.

The superior court concluded that it had general jurisdiction to entertain the motion and entered an order granting the motion to withdraw the 1992 plea. The court also found that the juvenile court had entered no written finding of capacity, and that the juvenile records contained no evidence that a capacity hearing was ever held.

The court also found that the juvenile court never informed Mr. Golden of his right to collaterally challenge the conviction or of the one-year time limit prescribed by chapter 10.73 RCW.

Mr. Golden's trial lawyer cited an unpublished opinion of this court. The court read the unpublished opinion in the course of its deliberations. The court decided that eight and one-half years was not an unreasonable delay in seeking relief from judgment and granted the motion to withdraw the plea.

The State appeals. Its primary complaint is that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief from a juvenile disposition. It also contends the motion was time-barred under RCW 10.73.090. It disputes the court's finding that eight and one-half years is a reasonable time within which to seek relief from judgment under CrR 7.8(b). Finally, the State assigns error to the court's consideration of the unpublished opinion.

I. SUPERIOR COURT JURISDICTION TO COLLATERALLY REVIEW A JUVENILE DISPOSITION

Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a cause or proceeding. State v. Hampson, 9 Wash.2d 278, 281, 114 P.2d 992 (1941). Jurisdiction is a question of law which we review de novo. Crosby v. Spokane County, 137 Wash.2d 296, 301, 971 P.2d 32 (1999).

The State contends that no Washington court has jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Golden's CrR 7.8 motion for relief from judgment, because the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings that relate to a charge filed against a defendant under age 18, and the juvenile court loses that jurisdiction when the juvenile turns 18. We disagree.

The Washington Constitution establishes courts and invests them with the power to hear and determine every justiciable cause and proceeding. The superior courts have broad residual jurisdiction to hear all causes and proceedings over which jurisdiction is not vested exclusively in some other court. WASH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 5, 6; RCW 2.08.010. Any discussion of state court jurisdiction proceeds from this fundamental premise. State v. Werner, 129 Wash.2d 485, 492, 918 P.2d 916 (1996); State v. Pritchard, 79 Wash.App. 14, 19-20, 900 P.2d 560 (1995).

Complete jurisdiction has three components: (1) Jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; and (3) power to render the particular judgment. Werner, 129 Wash.2d at 493, 918 P.2d 916. We apply each in order to the facts here.

A. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The superior court has original subject matter jurisdiction over all felony criminal proceedings and all proceedings generally, unless jurisdiction has been vested exclusively in some other court. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; RCW 2.08.010; Werner, 129 Wash.2d at 492, 918 P.2d 916.

It is well settled that the juvenile court is simply a division of the superior court, not a separate constitutional court. Werner, 129 Wash.2d at 492, 918 P.2d 916. The designation of a particular superior court department as the "juvenile department" does not diminish the jurisdiction of the other superior court departments to proceed in juvenile court matters. State ex rel. Campbell v. Superior Court, 34 Wash.2d 771, 775, 210 P.2d 123 (1949). The legislative creation of the juvenile courts by statute was not intended to vest exclusive jurisdiction in a court other than the superior court. The juvenile court is still a part of superior court. Werner, 129 Wash.2d at 492, 918 P.2d 916; Dillenburg v. Maxwell, 70 Wash.2d 331, 341, 413 P.2d 940 (1966) (juvenile court is "`really the superior court or a department thereof'") (quoting State v. Ring, 54 Wash.2d 250, 253, 339 P.2d 461 (1959)).

The Legislature did not intend Title 13 RCW to establish an independent court or to take away the superior court's general jurisdiction. Pritchard, 79 Wash.App. at 18, 900 P.2d 560. And even if the Legislature had intended to divest the superior court of its constitutional powers, we would not recognize such a restriction. The legislation would be a nullity. Werner, 129 Wash.2d at 496, 918 P.2d 916; City of Seattle v. Hesler, 98 Wash.2d 73, 77, 653 P.2d 631 (1982).

The juvenile court's jurisdiction is derivative then, not original. The statutory jurisdiction exercised by the juvenile division derives from the general constitutional jurisdiction of the superior court.

B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

RCW 9A.04.030(1) establishes the superior court's personal jurisdiction over all individuals, including juveniles, who commit crimes in this state. Werner, 129 Wash.2d at 493, 918 P.2d 916; State v. B.P.M., 97 Wash. App. 294, 299, 982 P.2d 1208 (1999).

The Legislature gave the juvenile division of the superior court exclusive initial jurisdiction to proceed against juveniles charged with crimes. RCW 13.04.030(1)(e); Pritchard, 79 Wash.App. at 20, 900 P.2d 560. A juvenile is a person under the age of 18 years. RCW 13.40.020(14). At age 18, juvenile status terminates. And therefore the juvenile court's exclusive jurisdiction ends. State v. Sharon, 100 Wash.2d 230, 231, 668 P.2d 584 (1983).

A juvenile court has jurisdiction over a particular proceeding based on the date of that proceeding, not the date of the original charge or the date of the plea. Sweet v. Porter, 75 Wash.2d 869, 870, 454 P.2d 219 (1969); State v. Bushnell, 38 Wash. App. 809, 811, 690 P.2d 601 (1984). So even if charges are filed and a plea is entered in juvenile court, the general jurisdiction of the superior court automatically takes over when the offender turns 18. Bushnell, 38 Wash.App. at 811, 690 P.2d 601. All of this is, of course, absent some request for an extension.

The State relies on State v. Calderon for the proposition that the offender's age on the date charges are filed determines juvenile status. State v. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d 348, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984). But Calderon is consistent with the general rule. In Calderon, the defendant was under 18 when the offense was committed, but over 18 when charges were filed. The court held that the date proceedings were commenced was the effective date for determining juvenile status. Because Mr. Calderon was over 18 when the charge was filed, the juvenile court never had jurisdiction. Id. at 351-52, 684 P.2d 1293. From this, the State reasons that, if a defendant is under 18 when the charge is filed, only the juvenile court ever has jurisdiction. But once the person comes under the jurisdiction of the adult court, at any age, that person is no longer a juvenile. Sharon, 100 Wash.2d at 231, 668 P.2d 584.

The State relies on State v. Mora and State v. Norby for its contention that a new charge had to be filed to establish superior court personal jurisdiction over Mr. Golden. State v. Mora, 138 Wash.2d 43, 977 P.2d 564 (1999); State v. Norby, 122 Wash.2d 258, 858 P.2d 210 (1993).

Mora says that, when the juvenile court undertakes proceedings against a juvenile under its exclusive jurisdiction, the superior court can acquire jurisdiction over the prosecution only if the juvenile jurisdiction is declined, either in the court's discretion after a hearing, or automatically if the specific nature of the charge mandates it. This refers to the automatic decline provisions of RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v) for juveniles 16 or 17 years old charged with certain serious violent offenses. Mora, 138 Wash.2d at 48-49, 977 P.2d 564. Mora does not overrule those cases recognizing the constitutional jurisdiction of the superior court in matters not expressly vested in the jurisdiction of another court.

Norby merely states that no court may exercise criminal jurisdiction in the absence of any charge. Norby, 122 Wash.2d at 269, 858 P.2d 210. Here, we have both a charge and a disposition order.

Mr. Golden was charged in 1992 with committing the crime of arson in the state of Washington. This gave the superior court jurisdiction over his...