State v. Gooden

• Decision Date: 21 September 1990
• Citation: 570 So.2d 865
• Parties: STATE of Alabama v. Pamela J. GOODEN; Lloyd Crawford; and Joyce R. Crawford. CR 89-384.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 865

570 So.2d 865

STATE of Alabama v. Pamela J. GOODEN; Lloyd Crawford; and Joyce R. Crawford.

CR 89-384.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Sept. 21, 1990.

William Prendergast, Sharon E. Ficquette and Stephen K. Simpson, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellant.

Ron W. Wise, Montgomery, for appellee Pamela Gooden.

David B. Byrne, Jr., Montgomery, for appellees Lloyd and Joyce Crawford.

BOWEN, Judge.

In October 1989, Lloyd V. Crawford; his wife, Joyce Ruth Crawford; and their attorney, Pamela Gooden, were separately indicted for "advertis[ing] that [they] would adopt children and/or ... hold[ing] out inducements to a parent ... to part with her infant child" in violation of Ala.Code 1975, § 26-10-8. The defendants filed separate motions to dismiss, challenging the constitutionality of the statute. These motions were consolidated, and a hearing was held on January 10, 1990.

At that hearing, the State was represented by assistant attorneys general from the Office of the Alabama Attorney General and the Alabama Department of Human Resources. The Attorney General's Office had "problems with the vagueness" and "some reservations about the constitutionality of the statute as it now stands." The attorneys from DHR felt "that the statute is sound."

On January 17, 1990, the circuit court entered the following order:

"On January 10, 1990, the Court set all pending motions filed by the Defendants for hearing. Among the motions argued were the Defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that § 26-10-8, Code of Alabama (1975), was unconstitutionally vague.

"The right to due process is guaranteed to the citizens of Alabama under the Alabama Constitution of 1901, Article 1, Sections 6 and 13. This constitutional right to due process applies in civil actions as well as criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court of Alabama has found that this right is violated when a statute or regulation is unduly vague, unreasonable, or overbroad. Ross Neely Express, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Environmental Management, 437 So.2d 82 (1983); Kahalley v. State, 254 Ala. 482, 48 So.2d 794 (1950).

"In this case, the statute, § 26-10-8, Code of Alabama (1975), is constitutionally defective because it fails to set forth sufficient guidance to those who would be law-abiding or advise a defendant of the nature and cause of an accusation.

"This Court does not in any way condone the brokering of adoptions or the buying and selling of infant children. That is not to say that this Court is of the opinion that the Defendants were involved in such; the Court has not heard any evidence in this case. However, this Court finds that the statute, sub judice, fails to meet constitutional muster. During oral argument, the State of Alabama, by and through its Assistant Attorney General, expressed with commendable candor reservations about the constitutionality of the statute. The tacit agreement regarding the unconstitutionality of the statute is also highlighted by legislation which has been prefiled in the upcoming regular session of the Alabama Legislature; the bill is known as the Revision of Alabama Adoption Laws, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and is incorporated herein by reference. [That exhibit is omitted from this opinion.]

"The Court finds that this bill is a comprehensive and complete revision of Alabama's adoption laws including the criminal statutes and sanctions thereunder. In the opinion of the Court, the revisions comport with constitutional due process; accordingly,

"It is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the indictments in Case Nos. 89-2172, 89-2120, and 89-2119 be and the same are hereby dismissed."

The State appeals from this order as authorized by Ala.Code 1975, § 12-22-91. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court declaring § 26-10-8 unconstitutional.

Section 26-10-8 states:

"It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, organizations, hospitals or associations which have not been licensed by the state department of human resources to advertise that they will adopt children or place them in foster homes or hold out inducements to parents to part with their offspring or in any manner knowingly become a party to the separation of a child from its parent, parents or guardian except through the commitment of a court having jurisdiction."

The penalty for violating this section is a fine of not more than $100 or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than three months, or both. § 26-10-9.

"It is a well recognized rule of law that in the enactment of statutes reasonable precision is required. Indeed, one of the prime requisites of any statute is certainty, and legislative enactment may be declared by the courts to be inoperative and void for uncertainty in meaning." Opinion by the Justices, 249 Ala. 88, 91, 30 So.2d 14, 17 (1947).

" 'As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' Kolender v. Lawson, U.S. , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (citations omitted). A statute challenged for vagueness must therefore be scrutinized to determine whether it provides both fair notice to the public that certain conduct is proscribed and minimal guidelines to aid officials in the enforcement of that proscription. See Kolender, supra; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). If the statute 'either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,' it is void for vagueness. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)."

McCorkle v. State, 446 So.2d 684, 685 (Ala.Cr.App.1983). "Under Article 1, Section 6, [of the Alabama Constitution of 1901] the right of the accused to demand the nature and cause of the accusation is a fundamental component of the right to due process; the defendant must fully and intelligently understand the charge to adequately prepare a defense. Young v. State, 348 So.2d 544 (Ala.Crim.App.1977). Furthermore, because the charge is derived from a criminal statute, the statute itself must be sufficiently definite and certain to pass constitutional muster." Newberry v. State, 493 So.2d 995, 996-97 (Ala.1986).

"It is also settled law that 'In enacting a criminal statute, there is an obligation on the State to so frame it that those who are to administer it and those to whom it is to be administered may know what standard of conduct is intended to be required and legislation may run afoul of the due process clause because of a failure to set up any sufficient guidance to those who would be law-abiding, or to advise a defendant of the nature and cause of an accusation he is called on to answer, or to guide the courts in the law's enforcement.' Kahalley v. State, 254 Ala. 482, 483, 48 So.2d 794, 795....

"And a person is not required to speculate as to the meaning of a statute at the peril of his freedom. Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888. The intent of the legislature must appear from the face of the statute."

Bolin v. State, 266 Ala. 256, 260, 96 So.2d 582, 585-86 (1957). See also, Carter v. State, 243 Ala. 575,...