State v. Hopkins

• Decision Date: 06 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–1103.,13–1103.
• Citation: 860 N.W.2d 550
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Shaunta Rose HOPKINS, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

860 N.W.2d 550

STATE of Iowa, Appellee

v.Shaunta Rose HOPKINS, Appellant.

No. 13–1103.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 6, 2015.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney General, Brianna Shriver, Student Legal Intern, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Stephanie L. Cox, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Opinion

CADY, Chief Justice.

In this appeal from a resentencing for numerous drug convictions following the reversal of one conviction in a prior appeal, we consider claims of abuse of discretion by the sentencing court and ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to the use of the original presentence investigation report in resentencing. On our review, we affirm the sentence of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Shaunta Hopkins and her boyfriend, along with four other individuals, were arrested following a multiple-location drug raid by the Des Moines Police Department. The State charged Hopkins with assorted drug offenses. Her case proceeded to trial with one other codefendant in October 2011. Following a jury trial, Hopkins was found guilty of six crimes: conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance (crack cocaine), a class “B” felony under Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b )(3) (2011); possession of a controlled substance (crack cocaine), a class “C” felony under section 124.401(1)(c )(3) ; conspiracy to deliver a simulated controlled substance (ecstasy), a class “C” felony under section 124.401(1)(c )(8) ; possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (ecstasy), a class “C” felony under section 124.401(1)(c )(8) ; failure to possess a tax stamp, a class “D” felony under sections 453B.3 and 453B.12; and possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a serious misdemeanor under section 124.401(5). The jury found Hopkins's codefendant not guilty on all charges.

At the sentencing hearing, the court reviewed a presentence investigation (PSI) report, which included information on her educational and employment history, criminal history, family support, history of substance abuse and relationships, and a sentencing recommendation. Hopkins was twenty-three years of age. The court sentenced Hopkins to serve one twenty-five-year sentence with a one-third mandatory minimum, two ten-year sentences with one-third mandatory minimums, two five-year sentences, and a six-month sentence. All six sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Hopkins appealed and began serving her sentence of incarceration.

During her imprisonment, Hopkins completed various classes, earned her high school diploma, and earned a career readiness certificate. Hopkins also entered a treatment program for substance abuse. She was employed in the prison kitchen and laundry room and supervised other inmates in solitary confinement.

On November 15, 2012, the court of appeals reversed Hopkins's conviction and sentence for the class “C” felony, conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance (ecstasy) in violation of section 124.401(1)(c )(8). All other convictions were affirmed. State v. Hopkins, No. 11–2083, 2012 WL 5537213, at *3 (Iowa Ct.App. Nov. 15, 2012).

Following the appeal, Hopkins sought and eventually received a resentencing hearing before the district court on the five convictions that were not reversed. At the hearing, the State and Hopkins informed the court they had reviewed the PSI report from the December 2011 sentencing hearing and did not know of any corrections or deletions to be made. A new PSI report was not prepared. Instead, Hopkins supplemented the old PSI report by submitting documents and evidence at the sentencing hearing, including the classes she had taken, her rehabilitative efforts while in prison, and the support system that would be in place should she be released into the community. The State requested the court impose the same sentence as originally imposed for the five convictions that were not reversed on appeal. Hopkins requested a deferred judgment or a suspended sentence on all convictions.

The district court imposed five concurrent sentences: one twenty-five-year sentence, two ten-year sentences, one five-year sentence, and one six-month sentence, with one-third mandatory minimums for the three longer sentences. The only difference between the new sentence and the original sentence was that the district court did not impose one of the five-year sentences as a result of the court of appeals' reversal of the single conviction. The new sentence otherwise was the same as the original sentence.

Hopkins appealed. She claims the district court abused its discretion in imposing the same sentences of incarceration for the five convictions. She also claims her attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the use of her original PSI report for the resentencing. The court of appeals affirmed the new sentence. We granted further review.

II. Standard of Review.

We review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion or defect in the sentencing procedure. State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa 2014). “An abuse of discretion will only be found when a court acts on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208, 216 (Iowa 2006). We give sentencing decisions by a trial court a strong presumption in their favor. State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 1995).

Due to their constitutional implications, we review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v. Velez, 829 N.W.2d 572, 576 (Iowa 2013). Counsel is presumed to have acted competently. Ennenga v. State, 812 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Iowa 2012).

III. Analysis.

When one of several convictions are reversed on appeal, the judgment and sentence for the conviction that was reversed can be severed and the remaining sentence for the convictions that were not reversed can stand or the case can be remanded for resentencing. See State v. Keutla, 798 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa 2011) (“Generally, in criminal cases, where an improper or illegal sentence is severable from the valid portion of the sentence, we may vacate the invalid part without disturbing the rest of the sentence. We are not, however, required to do so and may remand for resentencing.” (Citation omitted.)). In this case, the court of appeals did not direct a specific outcome, and the parties sought resentencing on the remaining convictions before the district court without objection. Accordingly, we proceed to address the claims of error based on the new sentence imposed for the five convictions not disturbed on appeal.

A. Abuse of Discretion. When a sentence imposed by a district court falls within the statutory parameters, we presume it is valid and only overturn for an abuse of discretion or reliance on inappropriate factors. State v. Washington, 832 N.W.2d 650, 660 (Iowa 2013). “To overcome the presumption [of validity], we have required an affirmative showing the sentencing court relied on improper evidence.” Id. On our review, we do not decide the sentence we would have imposed, but whether the sentence imposed was unreasonable. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002) (“[Judicial decisions] deal in differing shades of gray, and discretion is needed to give the necessary latitude to the decision-making process. This inherent latitude in the process properly limits our review.”).

Hopkins claims the district court failed to properly consider her age, her rehabilitation while incarcerated, and the impact of the dismissed charge on her culpability, while placing undue weight on the nature of her convictions.¹ We have said that the relevant factors when imposing sentence include “ ‘the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, defendant's age, character and propensities and chances of [the defendant's] reform.’ ” State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1999) (quoting State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979) ). The legislature has also specified factors including:

a. The age of the defendant.

b. The defendant's prior record of convictions and prior record of deferments of judgment if any.

c. The defendant's employment circumstances.

d. The defendant's family circumstances.

e. The defendant's mental health and substance abuse history and treatment options available in the community and the correctional system.

f. The nature of the offense committed.

g. Such other factors as are appropriate.

Iowa Code § 907.5(1) (2013). Postconviction rehabilitation efforts are included among the other appropriate factors under section 907.5(1)(g ) for courts to consider in imposing sentence. See id. § 907.5(1)(g ). Rehabilitation is a fundamental goal of sentencing. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724. Thus, it is proper to consider at resentencing a change in circumstances that occurs between the time of the original sentence and the time of the resentencing. These circumstances not only include all the circumstances supporting rehabilitation, but also a reduction of the number of convictions associated with the resentencing. See State v. Harrington, 805 N.W.2d 391, 394–96 (Iowa 2011) (explaining and adopting an aggregate approach to sentencing that encourages a consideration of changed circumstances on resentencing). Although circumstances relating to rehabilitation tend to mitigate punishments, rehabilitation efforts remain only one of many relevant factors to consider at resentencing. See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 121 (Iowa 2013) (adopting the U.S. Supreme Court requirement from Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2030, 176 L.Ed.2d 825, 845–46 (2010), that “ ‘demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ ” be considered in juvenile resentencing hearings). Resentencing following an appeal does not necessarily require a different sentence for those convictions not reversed on appeal. The new circumstances are...