State v. Intercontinental, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 01 September 1984
• Docket Number: No. 63,63
• Citation: 486 A.2d 174,302 Md. 132
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. INTERCONTINENTAL, LTD. et al. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 132

302 Md. 132

486 A.2d 174

STATE of Maryland v. INTERCONTINENTAL, LTD. et al.

No. 63, Sept. Term, 1984.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 9, 1985.

Dale P. Kelberman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on brief), for appellant.

Arnold M. Weiner and D. Christopher Ohly, Baltimore (Kaye A. Allison and Melnicove, Kaufman, Weiner & Smouse, P.A., Baltimore, on brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY and COUCH, JJ., and JAMES C. MORTON, Jr., Associate Judge of the Court of Special Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

The issue in this case is whether Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1984 Cum.Supp.), Article 27, § 551(a) authorizes a Maryland judge to issue a warrant to search for and seize evidence which, although located within the judge's territorial jurisdiction, pertains to violations of another state's penal laws. Section 551(a) provides in pertinent part:

"Whenever it be made to appear to any judge of any of the circuit courts in the counties of this State, or to any judge of the District Court, by written application signed and sworn to by the applicant, accompanied by an affidavit or affidavits containing facts within the personal knowledge of the affiant or affiants, that there is probable cause, the basis of which shall be set forth in said affidavit or affidavits, to believe that any misdemeanor or felony is being committed by any individual or in any building, apartment, premises, place or thing within the territorial jurisdiction of such judge, or that any property subject to seizure under the criminal laws of the State is situated or located on the person of any such individual or in or on any such building, apartment, premises, place or thing, then the judge may forthwith issue a search warrant directed to any duly constituted policeman, or police officer authorizing him to search such suspected individual, building, apartment, premises, place or thing, and to seize any property found liable to seizure under the criminal laws of this State ...."

I

In a twenty-one page application for a search warrant, the affiants--a Maryland State Trooper and a New Jersey State Police Detective--alleged that probable cause existed to believe that Intercontinental Limited, a company with offices in Baltimore County, and its President, Sigmund Kassap, were engaged in unlawful activities violative of New Jersey criminal statutes relating to conspiracy, theft by deception and unlawful employment under the New Jersey Casino Control Act. The application also set forth detailed allegations from which the affiants concluded that probable cause existed to believe that evidence of such crimes, in the form of various specified records, was located upon Intercontinental's Baltimore County premises.

A District Court judge sitting in Baltimore County issued the search warrant; it recited that probable cause existed to believe that Intercontinental and Kassap were violating the criminal laws of New Jersey and that evidence of such violations was located at Intercontinental's offices in Baltimore County. The warrant was subsequently executed and resulted in the seizure of Intercontinental's records.

Intercontinental and Kassap (hereafter collectively referred to as Intercontinental) filed petitions in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, seeking the return of the seized records. The petitions claimed that the search warrant was void because Maryland judges were without power to authorize searches and seizures for evidence of alleged criminal offenses committed in other states. The trial judge (Fader, J.) agreed with Intercontinental and ordered that all records seized under the warrant be returned. The court said:

"[T]he legislative directive [is] that it is only Maryland crimes or property subject to seizure under Maryland law with which the authority [to issue a search warrant] must be associated.

"New Jersey law cannot be violated within the jurisdiction of this court. There is no property subject to seizure under the criminal laws of Maryland."

The State appealed; it contended that nothing in the statute limited the issuance of a search warrant to offenses committed under the law of Maryland. We granted certiorari prior to decision by the Court of Special Appeals to consider the issue of first impression raised in the case.

II

A search warrant is in the nature of criminal process; its primary purpose is to aid in the detection and suppression of crime and to obtain evidence for use in criminal prosecutions. Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956); People v. York, 29 Ill.2d 68, 193 N.E.2d 773 (1963); State v. Buxton, 238 Ind. 93, 148 N.E.2d 547 (1958); State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 917, 87 S.Ct. 876, 17 L.Ed.2d 789 (1967); 1 Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 147 (12th ed. 1974). The issuance of a search warrant is collateral to a criminal prosecution; its execution may or may not result in placing a charge against the individual in whose possession the seized property is found. 1 J. Varon, Searches, Seizures and Immunities, ch. 5, at 274-75 (2nd ed. 1974); Bevington v. United States, 35 F.2d 584 (8th Cir.1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 721, 50 S.Ct. 237, 74 L.Ed. 1140 (1930); Sugar Valley Land Co. v. Johnson, 17 Ala.App. 409, 85 So. 871 (1920).

Search warrants were recognized at common law; however, their use, as in Maryland, was limited to searching for stolen property. Griffin v. State, 232 Md. 389, 194 A.2d 80 (1963); Gattus v. State, 204 Md. 589, 105 A.2d 661 (1954); In Re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md.App. 149, 458 A.2d 820 (1983). Statutory authority was generally required to issue search warrants for property other than stolen goods. Griffin, supra; Givner v. Cohen, 208 Md 23, 116 A.2d 357 (1955); Sugarman v. State, 173 Md. 52, 195 A. 324 (1937); In Re Special Investigation No. 228, supra.

Section 551(a) was enacted by ch. 306 of the Acts of 1939. To ascertain and effectuate the actual legislative intention in enacting any statute is, of course, the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation. Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 481 A.2d 192 (1984). In this regard, the primary source of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. Blum v. Blum, 295 Md. 135, 453 A.2d 824 (1983). Where the statutory provisions are unambiguous, no construction is required, In Re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515, 471 A.2d 313 (1984), so that a plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to extend or limit the scope of its operation. Guy v. Director, 279 Md. 69, 367 A.2d 946 (1977). But where a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning, construction is required; in such circumstances, courts may consider not only the literal or usual meaning of words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment. Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983); State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975). Considering the particular use and association of words in § 551(a), we think a doubt or ambiguity exists as to the exact application and reach of the statute's provisions. Thus, in construing § 551(a), we may take into account the principles of law in force at the time of the statute's passage. Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 172 A. 354 (1934); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Md. 369 (1868). And we may also consider the consequences of a proposed construction and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense. Bailey v. Woel, 302 Md. 38, 485 A.2d 265 (1984) [No. 111, September Term, 1983, decided December 26, 1984]; Frank v. Baltimore County, 284 Md. 655, 399 A.2d 250 (1979).

We have said that under § 551(a) a search warrant may issue only to search individuals, places and things "within the territorial jurisdiction" of the issuing judge. See Dow v. State, 207 Md. 80, 113 A.2d 423 (1955); Asner v. State, 193 Md. 68, 65 A.2d 881 (1949); Frank v. State, 189 Md. 591, 56 A.2d 810 (1948). To justify the issuance of such a warrant, the statute appears to require that probable cause first be shown that "any misdemeanor or felony" is being committed; that it is being committed by a person, or in a place or thing within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing judge; and that in connection therewith "property" subject or liable to seizure "under the criminal laws of this State" is located upon the individual or at the place or thing to be searched. See Gattus v. State, 204 Md. 589, 105 A.2d 661 (1954); Salmon v. State, 2 Md.App. 513, 235 A.2d 758 (1967).

The State maintains that the jurisdictional predicate for the issuance of a search warrant is not the location of the crime alleged, but the location of the person, place or thing to be searched, which must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing judge. It says that the phrase "within the territorial jurisdiction of such judge" in § 551(a) modifies the individual, place or thing to be searched, rather than the "any misdemeanor or felony" language of the statute. Intercontinental, on the other hand, urges us to conclude, as did the lower court, that § 551(a) authorizes the issuance of a search warrant only upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the "criminal laws of the State" have been or are being violated. It says that § 551(a) "begins and ends with the laws of this State, and not with the law of any other."

In 1939, when § 551(a) was enacted, the right to search for and seize property under a search warrant was subject to the "mere evidence rule," which required the State to establish a superior property right in the evidence sought to be seized. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647 (19...