State v. Jefferson

Decision Date01 November 2018
Docket NumberNO. 94853-4,94853-4
Parties STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Tyree William JEFFERSON, Petitioner.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Lise Ellner, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 2711, Vashon, WA 98070-2711, for Petitioner.

Michelle Hyer, Pierce County Prosecutor, 930 Tacoma Avenue S., Room 946, Tacoma, WA 98402-2102, for Respondent.

Lila Jane Silverstein, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Avenue, Suite 610, Seattle, WA 98101-3647, Taki V. Flevaris, Pacifica Law Group LLP, 1191 2nd Avenue, Suite 2000, Seattle, WA 98101-3404, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law & Equality, Legal Voice, Loren Miller Bar Association and Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Peter B. Gonick, Washington Attorney General's Office, P.O. Box 40100, Olympia, WA 98504-0100, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State Attorney General.

GORDON McCLOUD, J.

¶ 1 Tyree Jefferson was convicted of attempted murder in the first degree, assault in the first degree, and unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree following a jury trial. He challenges the State’s use of a peremptory strike against the only African-American juror (Juror 10) on the jury venire, arguing that the strike was exercised in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of Batson v. Kentucky ).1 Additionally, Jefferson challenges the current Batson test; he argues that it fails to adequately address racial discrimination injury selection.

¶ 2 We hold that the trial court sustainably ruled that there was no purposeful discrimination in the peremptory strike of Juror 10 under Batson .

¶ 3 However, "our Batson protections are not robust enough to effectively combat racial discrimination during jury selection."2 In fact, the Batson framework "make[s] it very difficult for defendants to prove discrimination even where it almost certainly exists."3 We need to do better to achieve the objectives of protecting litigants’ rights to equal protection of the laws4 and jurors’ rights to participate injury service free from racial discrimination.5 For those reasons, we now modify our three-step Batson test by replacing Batson ’s current inquiry at step three with a new inquiry. If a Batson challenge to a peremptory strike of a juror proceeds to that third step of Batson's three-part inquiry, then the trial court must ask whether an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory strike. If so, then the strike must be denied and the challenge to that strike must be accepted.

¶ 4 We apply this new standard today and find that race could have been a factor in Juror 10’s dismissal. We therefore reverse and remand.

FACTS

¶ 5 On February 14, 2013, Jefferson was involved in a fight over a pair of designer sunglasses. The fight ended with the shooting of Rosendo Robinson. Jefferson was subsequently charged with attempted murder in the first degree, assault in the first degree, and unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 40-42. His defense was that someone else pulled the trigger. 11 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (May 19, 2015) at 1282-84.

¶ 6 Voir dire began on May 4, 2015. 2 VRP (May 4, 2015) at 106. On the second day of voir dire, the State exercised a peremptory strike against Juror 10, the last African-American in the jury pool. 3 VRP (May 5, 2015) at 238. Jefferson challenged this strike with a Batson motion. Id. After going through the three-step Batson analysis, the trial court denied the Batson motion and ruled that the State had provided a nondiscriminatory explanation for its peremptory challenge of Juror 10. Id. at 239-47. The trial proceeded; it lasted approximately 10 days.

¶ 7 The jury convicted Jefferson of attempted murder in the first degree, assault in the first degree, and unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree. 13 VRP (May 20, 2015) at 11-13. The court entered judgment on the attempted murder and unlawful possession of a firearm convictions only. Jefferson was sentenced to 337.5 months of incarceration. CP at 409.

¶ 8 Jefferson appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. State v. Jefferson, 199 Wash.App. 772, 784, 401 P.3d 805 (2017), review granted, 189 Wash.2d 1038, 409 P.3d 1052 (2018).

¶ 9 Jefferson then petitioned for review on three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the Batson motion to deny the State’s peremptory strike of Juror 10 under the current Batson test, (2) whether this court should revisit the Batson test, and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying Jefferson’s motion for mistrial. We granted review.

ANALYSIS
1. The trial court’s ruling that the State did not violate Batson by exercising purposeful racial discrimination in jury selection was not clearly erroneous

¶ 10 During Jefferson’s trial, the State used a peremptory strike against the only remaining African-American member of the venire. 3 VRP (May 5, 2015) at 238. The State provided three reasons for the strike: first, that Juror 10 indicated that voir dire was a "waste of time"; second, that Juror 10 had specific knowledge of the movie 12 Angry Men; and third, that Juror 10 had brought outside evidence into jury deliberations as a juror in a previous trial. Jefferson argues that the State’s reasons for striking Juror 10 were pretextual and that the trial court should have granted Jefferson’s Batson challenge. Id. at 242-45.

¶ 11 Washington cases apply the three-part Batson test to determine whether a peremptory strike was impermissibly racially motivated. This test replaced the " ‘crippling burden of proof’ " previously required under Swain v. Alabama6 when attempting to prove a racially motivated strike. State v. Saintcalle, 178 Wash.2d 34, 43-44, 309 P.3d 326 (2013) (plurality opinion) (quoting Batson , 476 U.S. at 92-93, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ). Under Batson , the defendant must first establish a prima facie case that "gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) ). As of 2017, in Washington, this first step of the Batson test also includes a bright-line rule that the trial court must recognize a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose when a party strikes the last member of a racially cognizable group. Erickson, 188 Wash.2d at 734, 398 P.3d 1124. Second, "the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a [race-]neutral explanation for [the challenge] ...." Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. If the State meets its burden at step two, then third, "the trial court then [has] the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination." Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712.

¶ 12 We review Batson challenges for clear error and defer to the trial court to the extent that its rulings are factual. Saintcalle, 178 Wash.2d at 41, 309 P.3d 326 (citing State v. Hicks, 163 Wash.2d 477, 486, 181 P.3d 831 (2008) (quoting State v. Luvene, 127 Wash.2d 690, 699, 903 P.2d 960 (1995) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) ) ) ).

A. Jefferson established a prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose

¶ 13 In the first step of a Batson challenge, the challenger—in this case, Jefferson—must establish a prima facie case giving rise to the inference of discriminatory purpose. Batson , 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712.

¶ 14 Juror 10 was the only African-American juror remaining on the venire. 3 VRP (May 5, 2015) at 238. Although Jefferson’s trial occurred prior to Erickson, the trial court employed an equivalent bright-line rule. Id. at 239-41. Under both the trial court’s pre-Erickson rule and the Erickson bright-line rule, "[t]he trial court must [when the sole remaining member of a racially cognizable group has been struck from the jury] then require an explanation from the striking party and analyze, based on the explanation and the totality of the circumstances, whether the strike was racially motivated." Erickson, 188 Wash.2d at 734, 398 P.3d 1124 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; Saintcalle, 178 Wash.2d at 42, 309 P.3d 326 ). Thus, even though this trial occurred before Erickson was decided, the trial court determined that the defense made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. 3 VRP (May 5, 2015) at 241.

B. The State provided a race-neutral justification for its use of a peremptory strike

¶ 15 After concluding that Jefferson established a prima facie case, the trial court gave the State an opportunity to explain its use of the peremptory strike. The State argued, "[I]n this instance, each of the jurors that I struck so far, in this case, I went through the same identical analysis. Each of them I have asked to stand, and I asked them questions." Id. The State then listed several reasons for the peremptory strike. First, when asked about the utility of voir dire, Juror 10 stated, "No, I don’t think you should waste time.... Well, I mean that’s up to you, but for me, personally, it’s a waste of time ...." 2 VRP (May 4, 2015) at 176. Second, the State expressed concern with Juror 10’s response to defense counsel’s question about 12 Angry Men, stating, "[Juror 10] seemed to be very enthusiastic about the movie." 3 VRP (May 5, 2015) at 244. Third, according to the State, Juror 10’s responses to the defense counsel’s voir dire indicated that in a prior jury service stint, Juror 10 had "[brought] in things that were irrelevant to the case." Id. at 244-45. Thus, the State provided a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strike.

C. The trial court analyzed the State’s reasons for the peremptory strike and found no purposeful discrimination

¶ 16 The trial court then took the third step of a Batson analysis and analyzed the State’s reasons for the peremptory strike. It concluded that the State’s reasons sufficed and denied the Batson motion:

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