State v. Jones, No. 3-966/03-0913 (Iowa App. 12/24/2003)
| Decision Date | 24 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-966/03-0913.,3-966/03-0913. |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAULINE EVA JONES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, Stephen C. Gerard, II, Judge.
Pauline Jones appeals her conviction for operating while intoxicated. AFFIRMED.
Timothy McCarthy, II of McEnroe, McCarthy & Gotsdiner, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, and Brent Heeren, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Eisenhauer, JJ.
On January 13, 2002, shortly after midnight, Reserve Officer Zach Zeutenhorst noticed a car driving twenty miles per hour in a thirty-mile-per-hour zone in Tama, Iowa. As Zeutenhorst approached in a marked police car from the opposite direction, the car turned into a golf course parking lot. The car drove the length of the lot, then turned and came back through the parking lot and out to the street. The golf course and club house were closed at that time. At the street, the car turned and continued driving in the same direction it had originally been going, still at a slow speed.
Zeutenhorst turned around and began following the car. He noticed the car "was just weaving in its own lane, but it was still driving slowly, weaving back and forth in its own lane." He testified he observed,
Zeutenhorst stopped the vehicle, which was driven by Pauline Jones. Zeutenhorst noticed Jones had an odor of alcohol. Subsequent testing showed Jones's blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit. Jones was charged with operating while intoxicated, in violation of Iowa Code sections 321J.2(1) and (2)(a) (2001).
Jones filed a motion to suppress, claiming Zeutenhorst did not have reasonable cause to stop her vehicle. The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding, "In this case, the hour of the night, the slow driving, the turn into the parking lot of the closed business, combined with the weaving within its own lane provided justification for the stop." The case proceeded to a bench trial on the stipulated minutes of testimony. Jones was found guilty as charged and was sentenced. Jones appeals, claiming the district court should have granted her motion to suppress.
In considering a constitutional challenge, our review is de novo. State v. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d 537, 541 (Iowa 2003). We make an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001). We give deference to the district court's findings of fact due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by those findings. Id.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires reasonable cause to stop a person for investigation. State v. Heuser, 661 N.W.2d 157, 161 (Iowa 2003). To justify an investigatory stop, an officer must be able to point to "specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)), overruled on other grounds by Turner, 630 N.W.2d at 606 n.2.
An investigatory stop of a vehicle is constitutionally permissible only if the officer making the stop has specific and articulable cause to reasonably believe criminal activity is afoot. State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002). "Circumstances raising mere suspicion or curiosity are not enough." Id. It is sufficient, however, if the officer believes criminal activity may be afoot. Id. at 642. The principle function of an investigatory stop is to resolve the ambiguity as to whether criminal activity is taking place. Id. (citing State v. Richardson, 501 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Iowa 1993)).
Zeutenhorst's observation of Jones's car weaving back and forth within her own lane is a factor to consider in determining whether the officer had reasonable cause to stop Jones's car. See State v. Otto, 566 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Iowa 1997); see also State v. Tompkins, 507 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) ().
As the district court pointed out, there were other factors in this case as well. Time of day is a factor for courts to consider in determining whether there are grounds for an investigatory stop. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 646. Slow driving is another factor which may be considered. State v. Mahoney, 515 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994); State v. Varvel, 436 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Iowa Ct. App. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial