State v. Mason

• Decision Date: 02 September 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84SC313,84SC313
• Parties: STATE of Colorado; Colorado Board of Parole; Gordon W. Heggie, Individually and as Chairman of the Colorado Board of Parole; Daniel Grove, Individually and as Vice-Chairman of the Colorado Board of Parole; Richard A. Sutton and John M. Zapien, Individually and as members of the Colorado Board of Parole, Petitioners, v. Marilyn A. MASON, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael D. Mason, Deceased, and as next friend of Christopher Lee Mason, a minor, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1289

724 P.2d 1289

STATE of Colorado; Colorado Board of Parole; Gordon W Heggie, Individually and as Chairman of the Colorado Board of Parole; Daniel Grove, Individually and as Vice-Chairman of the Colorado Board of Parole; Richard A. Sutton and John M. Zapien, Individually and as members of the Colorado Board of Parole, Petitioners, v. Marilyn A. MASON, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael D. Mason Deceased, and as next friend of Christopher Lee Mason, a minor, Respondent.

No. 84SC313.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Sept. 2, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 29, 1986.

David R. Brougham, Alan Epstein, Hall & Evans, Denver, for petitioners.

Jim Leventhal, Leventhal & Bogue, P.C., Denver, for respondent.

DUBOFSKY, Justice.

We granted certiorari in Mason v. State, 689 P.2d 199 (Colo.App.1984), to consider whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the state of Colorado and the Colorado Board of Parole (parole board) may be held liable in a case in which the individual members of the parole board have official immunity, and, if so, what standard of care is to be applied by a trial court in determining its liability. The court of appeals held that despite the plaintiff's concession that the individual members of the parole board were immune from suit, the parole board as an entity enjoyed no official immunity and the state of Colorado was liable under a theory of respondeat superior. Because we determine that the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity applies to the parole board and the state of Colorado, as well as to the individual members of the parole board, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

I.

On December 3, 1976, the parole board granted parole to Larry Smith, who had been incarcerated in the Colorado State Reformatory since 1974, serving an indeterminate to thirty-year term for aggravated robbery. ¹ On February 3, 1978, during the course of an armed robbery in Texas, Smith killed twenty-six-year-old Michael Mason, the husband of the plaintiff Marilyn A. Mason and the father of Christopher Lee Mason.

On October 17, 1979, Marilyn A. Mason filed a complaint in her individual capacity, as representative of Michael D. Mason's estate, and as next friend of Christopher Lee Mason, alleging that the parole board carelessly and negligently granted Smith parole on December 3, 1976. The defendants--the state of Colorado, the parole board, and the individual members of the parole board--moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they were immune from suit under the doctrine of official immunity. The Chaffee County District Court granted the motion, ² ruling that the individual members of the parole board enjoyed immunity for their discretionary acts and that this immunity transferred to the parole board as an entity and to the state of Colorado under section 24-10-106(2), 10 C.R.S. (1982). ³ The district court determined that the parole board members were absolutely immune for their discretionary acts as board members and that the state and the parole board could not "be made to answer for actions for which the individual employees were granted immunity."

In the court of appeals the plaintiff conceded on the basis of that court's decision in Cooper v. Hollis, 42 Colo.App. 505, 600 P.2d 109 (1979) that the individual members of the parole board were immune from suit. However, the court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint against the parole board and the state of Colorado, ruling that the official immunity of the individual members of the parole board did not extend to the parole board as an entity or to the state of Colorado because official immunity is only applicable to individuals. The court of appeals believed that this court's abrogation of sovereign immunity in Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971), would be rendered meaningless if every governmental entity could enjoy the official immunity of its members. The court also denied the parole board and the state of Colorado official immunity under a theory of respondeat superior because the parole board may act only as an entity; two parole board members must agree in order to parole an inmate. Finally, the court of appeals ruled that sovereign immunity did not bar the plaintiff's suit against the parole board or the state because both entities had waived sovereign immunity by purchasing insurance. § 24-10-104(1), 10 C.R.S. (1982).

II.

The question before us is whether the rationale for granting parole board members quasi-judicial immunity, a form of official immunity, ⁴ also entitles the parole board as an entity and the state of Colorado to quasi-judicial immunity. Judges traditionally have been immune from suit for their judicial acts because of the importance of an independent judiciary in which a judge may act without apprehension of the personal consequences. See Bradley v. Fischer, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) and in claims based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), courts have granted judges absolute judicial immunity and those who have comparable functions absolute quasi-judicial immunity in order to promote independent decision making free from undue influence, to prevent unfounded litigation, and to protect against disabling threats. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967).

In Higgs v. District Court, 713 P.2d 840 (Colo.1985), we noted that the United States Supreme Court has adopted a functional approach in resolving official immunity questions under section 1983. The Supreme Court has held that prosecutors pursuing duties intimately associated with the criminal judicial process and federal administrative officials who initiate and participate in administrative proceedings performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity from damage claims for their participation in the proceedings because their actions are quasi-judicial. See Butz, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (federal administrative officials); Imbler, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (prosecutors); see also Harlow, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (executive officials have only qualified immunity). In Higgs, 713 P.2d 851 n. 15, 851-53, we determined that a prosecutor's advocatory activity, which is quasi-judicial in nature, is entitled to absolute immunity because of the importance of the prosecutor's role as an advocate in the judicial system and the potential effect of a threat of liability on a prosecutor's judgment in deciding which cases to prosecute.

When parole board members decide whether to deny, grant, or revoke parole, they perform a function that is essentially judicial in nature. Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906, 908-09 (9th Cir.1983); Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102, 102 S.Ct. 678, 70 L.Ed.2d 644 (1981). Although the Arizona Supreme Court granted parole board members only qualified immunity in Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977), federal courts under section 1983, almost without exception, have found that parole board members are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity ⁵ because, like judges, parole board members must render impartial decisions in cases that excite strong feelings, because parole board members face the risk of unfounded suits by those disappointed by their decisions, and because of the importance of allowing parole board members to make decisions free from the fear of litigation. Sellars, 641 F.2d at 1303; see also Anderson, 714 F.2d at 909 (absolute quasi-judicial immunity protects parole boards against distorting influences). The importance of impartial decision making, the possibility of unfounded suits and the need for freedom from fear of litigation support providing the protection of absolute quasi-judicial immunity to parole board members. ⁶

At the time of Smith's parole, the parole board consisted of four members appointed by the governor. § 17-2-201(1), 8 C.R.S. (1978), ⁷ and it acted as an entity because any action by the board required the concurrence of at least two members. See § 17-2-201(9)(a), 8 C.R.S. (1978). If the fact that the parole board acts as an entity has significance, the same concerns that require that the individual members of the parole board be immune to suit also require that the parole board as an entity and the state of Colorado be immune. See Pate v. Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, 409 F.Supp. 478 (M.D.Ala.1976). If the parole board and the state of Colorado are subject to suit when the individual members of the parole board are immune, the parole board's adjudicatory process will be hampered. Whether the State of Colorado, the parole board as an entity, or the individual members of the parole board are sued, the members face the prospect of devoting time to being deposed and testifying in court for each grant, refusal, or revocation of parole, leaving parole board members less time to perform the difficult task of determining when a person is ready for release from institutional custody and whether release is compatible with the welfare of society. ⁸ Other courts have held that parole boards, as entities, enjoy quasi-judicial immunity. See Pate, 409 F.Supp. 478; cf. Recent Developments--Torts--Parole Board Members Have Only Qualified Immunity to Release Prisoners, 46 Fordham L.Rev. 1301, 1314 (1978) ("[m]ost courts which have considered the question have found parole board members (or the governmental unit) absolutely immune on the grounds that such decisions involve the exercise of discretion"). The...