State v. Nichols, A96A2213

• Decision Date: 04 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. A96A2213,A96A2213
• Citation: 225 Ga.App. 609,484 S.E.2d 507
• Parties: , 97 FCDR 1127 The STATE v. NICHOLS.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 507

484 S.E.2d 507

225 Ga.App. 609, 97 FCDR 1127

The STATE v. NICHOLS.

No. A96A2213.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 4, 1997.

Reconsideration Denied March 20, 1997.

Certiorari Denied June 6, 1997.

Gerald N. Blaney, Jr., Scott A. Drake, Lawrenceville, Richard E. Thomas, Simi Valley, for appellant.

Clark & Towne, David E. Clark, Lawrenceville, for appellee.

POPE, Presiding Judge.

Defendant William Keith Nichols was arrested in his father's home, and was subsequently charged with driving under the influence; driving with a suspended license; driving with an open container; driving without proof of insurance; and improper backing. Defendant moved to suppress all evidence stemming from his arrest, arguing that the arrest, made without either an arrest warrant or a search warrant, was illegal. The trial court agreed and granted the motion to suppress. Because the officer had seen defendant violate the law and was in "hot pursuit" when defendant entered the residence, however, we conclude he was justified in entering the house and arresting defendant there. We therefore reverse the trial court's suppression of evidence resulting from the arrest.

At about 11:00 p.m., Officer G.L. Bowen was exiting a church parking lot across from a residential street. He saw a van coming toward him on that street, but as the van approached, it abruptly stopped in the middle of the roadway. The van then quickly backed up, with tires screeching. It turned into a driveway and continued backing at a high rate of speed, until it crashed into a parked vehicle. Officer Bowen pulled into the driveway behind the van, activating his blue lights. At that point, the van's driver was getting out of his vehicle. Officer Bowen ordered the driver to stop, but the driver looked at him and walked off toward the house. And when Officer Bowen ordered him to stop a second time, the driver sped up and ran into the house. The officer followed the driver into the house and arrested defendant there. The officer discovered defendant's license was suspended, and based on defendant's appearance and behavior, he suspected defendant was under the influence of alcohol as well. After arresting defendant for DUI (among other charges), Officer Bowen looked in the van, where he discovered one empty beer can, one partially empty beer can, and two full beer cans in a cooler.

1. The State argues that the warrantless arrest of defendant in his father's home was justified, and we agree.

(a) An officer may arrest a suspect without an arrest warrant if an offense has been committed in his presence. OCGA § 17-4-20. And while an officer must generally have a search warrant or consent to enter a home to make an arrest, an officer can enter a home to arrest a suspect when he or she has followed the suspect there in "hot pursuit." Brown v. State, 163 Ga.App. 209, 210(1), 294 S.E.2d 305 (1982). "[A] suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place ... by the expedient of escaping to a private place." United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 2410, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976). Accord Duitsman v. State, 212 Ga.App. 348(1), 441 S.E.2d 888 (1994); Brock v. State, 196 Ga.App. 605, 606(2), 396 S.E.2d 785 (1990).

As the Supreme Court explained in Santana, "hot pursuit" need not involve a high speed chase through public streets. Indeed, in Santana the "pursuit" began with the defendant standing in the doorway of her house; ¹ she saw the police and then retreated inside the house. Id. at 40, 96 S.Ct. at 2408. Rather, the key to "hot pursuit" is that the defendant is aware he is being pursued by the police, and is therefore likely to disappear or destroy evidence of his wrongdoing if the officer takes the time to get a warrant. In other words, the "hot pursuit" provides the exigent circumstances necessary to justify the failure to obtain a warrant. Id. at 42-43, 96 S.Ct. at 2409-10.

We applied this doctrine in Brown, an obstruction case. There, the officer saw someone driving without headlights at night and pursued him to a house. The driver emerged from the car, looked at the officer, and ran into the house. Under these circumstances, we held it was lawful for the officer to arrest the driver in the house for driving without headlights and attempting to elude. Brown, 163 Ga.App. at 209-210, 294 S.E.2d 305.

The circumstances in this case are very similar to those in Brown. Although the pursuit in Brown was longer than the pursuit in this case, that distinction is irrelevant; the crucial similarity is that, like the driver in Brown, defendant (while still outside the house) looked right at the uniformed officer in his marked car, ignored his orders to stop, and ran into the house. Thus, the officer was justified in following him into the house to arrest him for improper backing (OCGA § 40-6-240(a)).

Defendant's argument that the "hot pursuit" doctrine applies only to felonies is also belied by Brown, in which the driver was driving without headlights, a misdemeanor analogous to improper backing in terms of its seriousness. His reliance on Hamrick v. State, 198 Ga.App. 124(1), 401 S.E.2d 25 (1990), in which we rejected the State's argument based on "hot pursuit," is misplaced; although we noted that the offenses involved in Hamrick were misdemeanors rather than felonies, the decisive factor in that case was that the defendant, who had entered the house before the officers arrived, was voluntarily coming out to talk to them in response to their knock, so entry into the house to make the arrest was unnecessary. Id. at 126(1), 401 S.E.2d 25.

(b) On appeal from a trial court's grant or denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court's findings of fact are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous, but its interpretation and application...