State v. Nodes

• Decision Date: 06 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. A13–1772.,A13–1772.
• Citation: 863 N.W.2d 77
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Carl Lee NODES, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

863 N.W.2d 77

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant

v.Carl Lee NODES, Respondent.

No. A13–1772.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 6, 2015.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and John J. Muhar, Itasca County Attorney, Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant Itasca County Attorney, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Saint Paul, MN, for respondent.

OPINION

LILLEHAUG, Justice.

Appellant Carl Lee Nodes pleaded guilty to two counts of criminal sexual conduct arising from separate behavioral incidents with separate victims. At Nodes's sentencing hearing, the district court adjudicated Nodes guilty of both charges but held that Nodes was not subject to lifetime conditional release under Minn.Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 7(b) (2014), because the two convictions were entered at the same hearing. The State appealed, arguing that a “prior sex offense conviction,” as defined by Minn.Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 1(g) (2014), includes a conviction arising from a separate behavioral incident that is entered during the same hearing as a second conviction. The court of appeals affirmed. We granted review. Because we conclude that the definition of “prior sex offense conviction” unambiguously includes a conviction for an offense committed during a separate behavioral incident but entered before a second conviction at the same hearing, we reverse and hold that Nodes is subject to lifetime conditional release.

I.

On March 19, 2013, a Grand Rapids police officer was dispatched to a residence in response to a report of a possible sexual assault of S.R.W., a 3–year–old girl. The officer encountered respondent Nodes, who said that he was the one to whom she needed to speak. Nodes said that he “did it,” and when the officer asked whether he did something to S.R.W., Nodes said “yes.” The officer then spoke to S.R.W.'s mother and grandmother. The grandmother reported that S.R.W. told her that Nodes had licked her vaginal area. The mother and grandmother told the officer that they confronted Nodes about sexually touching S.R.W., and Nodes admitted he had done so.

In a subsequent interview with police, Nodes admitted that he had touched and licked S.R.W.'s vaginal area, and that he had made her touch his penis. He also admitted that, after that incident, he touched 5–year–old J.J.D.'s vagina with his hand. The State charged Nodes with three counts of criminal sexual conduct. Count one charged Nodes with criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2014), for his conduct with S.R.W.; count two charged Nodes with criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2014), also for his conduct with S.R.W.; and count three charged him with criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a), for his conduct with J.J.D.

Nodes pleaded guilty to count one (involving S.R.W.) and count three (involving J.J.D.), pursuant to a plea agreement that called for a 172–month sentence for count one and a concurrent 72–month sentence for count three, with stays of execution for both sentences. The district court did not formally accept the pleas at the plea hearing, but ordered a presentence investigation and a sex offender evaluation.

At Nodes's sentencing hearing, the district court formally accepted the guilty pleas, adjudicated Nodes guilty of the two offenses to which he pleaded guilty, and dismissed count two. The district court stated:

I will now formally accept the pleas, and on count one adjudicate him guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, a felony, in violation of Minnesota Statute 609.342, [s]ubd. 1(a) and [s]ubd. 2(a), on or about February 26, 2013, and also on count three, criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, a felony, in violation of Minnesota Statute 609.343, [s]ubd. 1(a) and [s]ubd. 2(a) on or about March 19, 2013.

The court stayed execution of the sentences.¹

Near the end of the sentencing hearing, the State suggested that, should Nodes's sentences be executed, he would be subject to a 10–year conditional-release period on count one, and lifetime conditional release on count three. The district court disagreed, stating, “being sentenced on two of them on the same day doesn't get you the lifetime.” The court therefore set the conditional-release period at 10 years for each count.

The State appealed, arguing that Nodes's conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under count one was a “prior sex offense conviction” for the purpose of determining the length of the mandatory conditional-release period for his sentence for second-degree criminal sexual conduct under count three. As a result, the State argued, Nodes would be subject to mandatory lifetime conditional release under Minn.Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 7(b), as part of his sentence for count three. The court of appeals affirmed the district court, concluding that when multiple convictions are entered on the record at the same time, those convictions are “simultaneous” and neither is a “prior” conviction with respect to the other. Because both of Nodes's convictions were “present” convictions rather than a “past” and a “present” conviction, the court of appeals reasoned, he was not subject to mandatory lifetime conditional release. State v. Nodes, 849 N.W.2d 85, 87 (Minn.App.2014). We granted the State's petition for review.

II.

Nodes pleaded guilty to two sex offenses under Minn.Stat. §§ 609.342 and 609.343. The offenses were committed in two distinct incidents separated in time. When an offender is committed to the custody of the commissioner of corrections for a violation of section 609.342 or section 609.343, Minn.Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2014), requires that the defendant serve a mandatory 10–year conditional-release term upon release from prison. Subdivision 7, however, requires that

when the court commits an offender to the custody of the commissioner of corrections [for such a violation] and the offender has a previous or prior sex offense conviction, the court shall provide that, after the offender has been released from prison, the commissioner shall place the offender on conditional release for the remainder of the offender's life.

Minn.Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 7(b).²

The parties agree that Nodes is subject to mandatory conditional release for each of the convictions if his sentence is executed. The issue before us is whether, when a defendant is adjudicated guilty in a single proceeding of two qualifying sex offenses arising from separate behavioral incidents, the earlier-occurring offense constitutes a “prior sex offense conviction” with respect to the later-occurring offense. This dispute requires us to interpret the meaning of “prior sex offense conviction,” as that phrase is used in Minn.Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 1(g).

Statutory interpretation is a question of law that is subject to de novo review. Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Minn.2013). First, we must determine whether the statute is ambiguous. State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn.2014). A statute is ambiguous “when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn.2012). If a statute is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning. State v. Nelson, 842 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Minn.2014).

Under the statutory definition, an offender has a “ ‘prior sex offense conviction’ if the offender was convicted of committing a sex offense before the offender has been convicted of the present offense, regardless of whether the offender was convicted for the first offense before the commission of the present offense, and the convictions involved separate behavioral incidents.” Minn.Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 1(g). By contrast, the definition of the phrase “previous sex offense conviction” requires that the offender be “convicted and sentenced for a sex offense before the commission of the present offense.” Minn.Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 1(f). In construing the meaning of the phrase “prior sex offense conviction,” we must consider the meanings of “convicted,” “before,” and “present offense.”

A.

Minnesota Statutes § 609.02, subd. 5 (2014), defines the term “conviction” as “any of the following accepted and recorded by the court: (1) a plea of guilty; or (2) a verdict of guilty by a jury or a finding of guilty by the court.” In order to determine whether Nodes was convicted on count one “before” he was convicted on count three, we must decide at what point Nodes's guilty pleas were officially “accepted and recorded by the court.” There is no dispute that Nodes's guilty pleas were each formally “accepted” at the sentencing hearing.

As to the requirement that a plea be “recorded” before it is a conviction, Nodes argues, based on State v. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759 (Minn.1999) and State v. Hoelzel, 639 N.W.2d 605 (Minn.2002), that a plea is not recorded until the district court has prepared and filed a written judgment. In Pflepsen, we addressed the meaning of “conviction” in the context of Minn.Stat. § 609.04 (2014), the lesser-included-offense statute, and stated that “we typically look to the official judgment of conviction, which generally appears as a separate entry in the file, as conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally adjudicated.” 590 N.W.2d at 767. Similarly, in Hoelzel, in determining whether the district court had formally adjudicated the defendant guilty of a felony offense, we said that the “general practice, and a practice to which district courts should adhere, is to have the conviction recorded and appear in a judgment entered in the file.” 639 N.W.2d at 609.

But in Pflepsen and Hoelzel, we decided whether the defendant had been formally convicted of a particular offense, not when that conviction occurred. Moreover, the statements on which Nodes relies were simply descriptions of best practices. More recently, in addressing the...