State v. Umphress

• Decision Date: 10 January 2022
• Docket Number: A21-0590
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
• Parties: State of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Angelo Oshea Umphress, Respondent.

State of Minnesota, Appellant,
v.
Angelo Oshea Umphress, Respondent.

No. A21-0590

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

January 10, 2022

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-19-19216

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Kassius O. Benson, Fourth District Public Defender, Paul J. Maravigli, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.

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LARKIN, Judge

The state challenges the district court's order granting a stay of adjudication after respondent pleaded guilty to a criminal-sexual-conduct offense. Because there was no clear abuse of the prosecutorial charging function under existing caselaw, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

FACTS

In August 2019, appellant State of Minnesota charged respondent Angelo Umphress with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. According to the complaint, Umphress sexually abused his younger half-sister periodically between 2007 and 2009, when Umphress was 14 to 15 years old. The victim was four to six years old when the abuse occurred. The sexual abuse included touching the victim all over her body and forcing her to perform oral sex. The victim told her mother about the sexual abuse in 2018, but her mother did not report it to the authorities. The victim told her father about the abuse in March 2019, and he reported it to the police. The police interviewed Umphress, and he admitted the allegations. The police described him as "extremely remorseful." In January 2021, Umphress pleaded guilty as charged, without the benefit of a plea bargain.

A presentence-investigation report (PSI) was prepared for sentencing. The PSI described Umphress's childhood as "very disruptive," noting that he was exposed to drug trafficking, gang activity, violence, prostitution, and pornography in his home. Despite his exposure to drugs and gang activity during his childhood, Umphress did not engage in such activity. Umphress had no prior criminal history, other than an arrest for domestic assault

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in 2018, which did not result in a criminal charge. The PSI indicated that Umphress's mother once walked into the room while Umphress was sexually abusing his half-sister. Although his mother did not report his actions, Umphress realized that his behavior was wrong and did not sexually abuse his half-sister again. The PSI recommended that the district court stay an adjudication of guilt.

The district court ordered a stay of adjudication over the state's objection. In doing so, the district court concluded that there had been an abuse of the prosecutorial charging function. The district court ordered that entry of judgment be stayed for five years, placed Umphress on probation, required him to complete sex-offender treatment as a condition of probation, and required him to register as a predatory offender. The state appeals.

DECISION

A stay of adjudication is a procedure in which "the district court, upon a defendant's guilty plea or a fact-finder's determination of guilt, does not adjudicate the defendant guilty but imposes conditions of probation." State v. Martin, 849 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn.App. 2014) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 24, 2014). "If a district court orders a stay of adjudication, and if the defendant successfully completes probation, the defendant avoids a criminal conviction." Id. (quotation omitted). We review de novo "a district court order that precludes adjudication of a defendant's guilt." Id. at 105.

I.

As a preliminary matter, the state contends that it is unclear whether the district court convicted Umphress at the plea hearing. The state argues that it is therefore unclear whether the district court could stay adjudication at the sentencing hearing. The state asks

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this court to clarify whether a district court should always postpone its acceptance of a guilty plea whenever it considers a stay of adjudication, so as to avoid inconsistency in the law.

If a defendant tenders a valid guilty plea, the district court may either "accept the plea on the terms of the plea agreement, reject the plea, or defer its decision to accept or reject the plea pending completion of a presentence investigation." State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 62 (Minn. 2011). A conviction occurs when a guilty plea is "accepted and recorded by the court." Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 5(1) (2020). As the state points out, caselaw is inconsistent regarding the precise words that a district court must use to accept and record a guilty plea. The supreme court has noted that the words "convicted" and "I accept your plea" are not "magic words that will always result in a conviction for double jeopardy purposes." Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 63. It also has stated that a formal judgment of conviction may satisfy the requirement to record a guilty plea, but that method is not the only method to do so. Id. Instead, a conviction occurs "when the district court accepts the guilty plea and the acceptance is on the record." State v. Nodes, 863 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. 2015).

Here, the district court told Umphress, "I am going to find that you made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of your trial rights and that you gave me a sufficient factual basis to find you guilty, so I am going to accept your guilty plea. We will schedule this for sentencing." The district court did not use any words indicating that it was adjudicating guilt at that time. Nor did it enter a formal judgment of conviction. Moreover, at the plea

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hearing, defense counsel told the district court that Umphress was seeking a stay of adjudication, and the district court indicated that it would consider that issue at sentencing.

On this record, it is clear that the district court did not convict Umphress at the plea hearing. Thus, it is not necessary for this court to settle any inconsistencies in the law regarding when a conviction occurs.

II.

The state contends that the district court erred by staying adjudication over the state's objection. The legislature has provided that, except under statutes not applicable here or based on the agreement of the parties, "a court may not refuse to adjudicate the guilt of a defendant who tenders a guilty plea . . . or who has been found guilty by a court or jury following a trial." Minn. Stat. § 609.095(b) (2020). A district court may not order a stay of adjudication over a prosecutor's objection unless there has been "a clear abuse of discretion by the prosecutor in the exercise of the charging function." State v. Lee, 706 N.W.2d 491, 492 (Minn. 2005). "Generally, a prosecutor has broad discretion in the exercise of the charging function and ordinarily, under the separation-of-powers doctrine, a court should not interfere with the prosecutor's exercise of that discretion." State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 540 (Minn. 1996).

History of the Standard

The Minnesota Supreme Court first considered a district court's authority to stay an adjudication of guilt over the state's objection in State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1996). In Krotzer, the state charged the defendant with third-degree criminal sexual conduct after he engaged in consensual sex with his 14-year-old girlfriend when he was 19

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years old. 548 N.W.2d at 253. Both the girlfriend and the girlfriend's mother opposed the criminal prosecution. Id. at 253 n.2. The district court stayed adjudication over the state's objection. Id. at 253. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the stay of adjudication, noting that there were "special circumstances" in the case, including that the district court "strongly disagreed with the prosecutor's decision to file charges" and "felt that justice would not be served by giving [the defendant] a criminal record as a predatory sex offender." Id. at 254. The supreme court concluded that a stay of adjudication was within the district court's inherent judicial power and was "necessary to the furtherance of justice." Id. at 254-55.

Shortly after Krotzer, the supreme court decided Foss and clarified that "mere disagreement by the [district] court with the prosecutor's exercise of the charging discretion" does not constitute "special circumstances." Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 541. Instead, the supreme court held that the district court can use its inherent judicial authority to stay adjudication "sparingly and only for the purpose of avoiding an injustice resulting from the prosecutor's clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function." Id. The supreme court later decided Lee and explained that the mere existence of "special circumstances" did not permit a district court to stay adjudication. 706 N.W.2d at 496.

Here, the district court reached its decision in part by comparing the facts of this case to those of Krotzer. The state argues that Krotzer is factually distinct and that Foss and Lee have called its validity into question There is merit to the state's argument that Krotzer is no longer good law See Id. at 497 (Page, J, concurring) (stating that in Foss, "we effectively overruled Krotzer"). Because the district court cannot order a stay of

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adjudication over the state's objection unless there has been a clear abuse of the prosecutorial charging function, the principal reasons listed in Krotzer-"special circumstances," strong disagreement with the decision to charge, and the interests of justice-do not justify a stay of adjudication. We therefore apply the standard from Foss and Lee: there must be a clear abuse of the prosecutorial charging function.

Caselaw provides guidance regarding circumstances that do not demonstrate a clear abuse of...