State v. Northcutt
Decision Date | 28 February 1978 |
Parties | STATE of Tennessee, Appellant, v. John Leburn NORTHCUTT, Appellee. 568 S.W.2d 636 |
Court | Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals |
Brooks McLemore, Jr., Atty. Gen., Robert A. Grunow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pat Apel, Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellant.
Vincent E. Wehby, Nashville, for appellee.
This is an appeal by the State from the judgment of the Criminal Court of Davidson County sustaining the defendant-appellee's Motion to Dismiss an indictment for second-degree murder on the grounds that there has been a denial of a speedy trial. The Motion to Dismiss states that the appellee's speedy trial rights under T.C.A. § 40-2102 and his guarantee of a speedy trial by the United States and Tennessee Constitutions have been denied. The judgment of the Criminal Court is reversed.
On 28 February 1976, an affidavit was sworn to and a warrant was issued by the General Sessions Court charging that on that day, the appellee committed second-degree murder. A preliminary hearing was set for 2 March 1976, but continued until 13 April 1976, to enable the State to procure its witnesses. After the preliminary hearing of 13 April 1976, the General Sessions Judge dismissed the warrant for lack of probable cause. No further action was taken in the case until 27 July 1977, when the Grand Jury returned an indictment charging the appellee with second-degree murder. The motion to dismiss was filed 2 September 1977, and, as stated, it was sustained.
It is the contention of the appellee that when T.C.A. § 40-2102 is construed in pari materia with T.C.A. § 40-2001, it must be concluded that he has been denied a statutory right to a speedy trial. T.C.A. § 40-2001 guarantees "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to a speedy trial . . ." This code section is derived from Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution and gives the appellee no rights that are not already guaranteed to him by the Federal and State Constitution; it does not alter the expressed intent of § 40-2102.
T.C.A. § 40-2102 provides as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
In construing this code section, we are bound by rules of statutory construction that are firmly established and often cited. Unambiguous statutes must be construed to mean what they say; they cannot be given another meaning by judicial construction. Montgomery v. Hoskins, 222 Tenn. 45, 432 S.W.2d 654 (1968); Henry v. White, 194 Tenn. 192, 250 S.W.2d 70 (1952). A statute should be construed as a whole and it should be assumed that the legislature used each word purposely and that those words convey some intent and have a meaning and a purpose. It is our duty to construe the statute so that no part will be inoperative, superfluous, void or insignificant. Tidwell v. Collins, 522 S.W.2d 674 (Tenn.1975); Tidwell v. Servomation-Willoughby Co., 483 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn.1972).
In applying these rules, we cannot ignore the phrase "to which he has been bound." The statute is clear and unambiguous. By its expressed terms it is applicable only when a defendant "has been bound" to the action of the Grand Jury and is not applicable when he is not so bound. 1
The purpose of the statute is to prevent an accused from being detained in jail or under bond for a prolonged period of time. This oppression cannot arise when the accused is dismissed at the preliminary hearing.
The protection of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is not engaged by the arrest followed by a prompt discharge of the person arrested at the preliminary hearing. The invocation of the speedy trial provision requires both an arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge, or a formal indictment or information. Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971).
In dealing with an analogous situation, the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Martin, 543 F.2d 577, 579 (1976), said:
The actual restraints imposed by the arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge, or formal indictment or presentment is required to invoke the speedy trial provisions of Article I, Section 9, Constitution of Tennessee. Boswell v. State, 528 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn.Cr.App.1975); State v. McCullough,4 Tenn.Cr.App. 272, 470 S.W.2d 50 (1971); State v. Gossage, 4 Tenn.Cr.App. 222, 470 S.W.2d 30 (1971).
Moreover, there is no showing of any prejudice on the part of the appellant and under the circumstances of this case, prejudice cannot be...
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...140 (Tenn.Crim.App.1979) (refusing to dismiss an indictment that was based upon inadmissible hearsay testimony); State v. Northcutt, 568 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Tenn.Crim.App.1978) (refusing to dismiss an indictment because of a question asked of a witness by the foreman of the grand jury); Gammon......
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...a grand jury is not subject to judicial review. State v. Gonzales, 638 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Northcutt, 568 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). "[I]f an indictment is valid on its face, it is sufficient to require a trial to determine the guilt of the accuse......
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...requiring a formal grand jury action or the actual restraints of an arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge. State v. Northcutt, 568 S.W.2d 636 (Tenn.Crim.App.1978); Boswell v. State, 528 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn.Crim.App.1975).3 Pharm v. Hatcher, 984 F.2d 783 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U......
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State v. Wilson, No. M2004-00110-CCA-R3-CD (TN 2/4/2005)
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