State v. Ross
| Decision Date | 23 March 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-0364.,05-0364. |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Charles Edward ROSS III, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
The appellant, Charles Edward Ross III, challenges his sentences on two counts of robbery in the second degree as a habitual offender. He claims the court was without authority to impose a fine because neither the robbery statute nor the habitual-offender statute provide for a fine, a claim with which the State agrees. Ross's second challenge to his sentence focuses on the court's imposition of a period of imprisonment "as provided by Iowa Code section[] . . . 902.12," which requires a defendant to serve a minimum of seventy percent of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole. He claims this statute does not apply to sentences imposed on habitual offenders.
The defendant's appeal was transferred to the court of appeals. That court vacated the defendant's sentences in part, holding the district court was without authority to impose a fine. The court of appeals refused to address the defendant's challenge to the applicability of section 902.12, holding error had not been preserved.
We granted further review. We agree the district court had no authority to impose a fine on the charges of second-degree robbery as a habitual offender. We disagree, however, with the court of appeals' disposition of the defendant's challenge to the mandatory minimum aspect of his sentences. Finding no error preservation problem and addressing this claim on the merits, we conclude section 902.12 does apply, and the court properly sentenced the defendant to serve a minimum of seventy percent of his sentence. Accordingly, we vacate the court of appeals' decision, vacate that portion of the defendant's sentences imposing a fine, and affirm the balance of the sentences imposed by the district court.
Ross pled guilty as a habitual offender to two counts of second-degree robbery. See Iowa Code §§ 711.1, 711.3, 902.8 (2003). The defendant waived his right to file a motion in arrest of judgment and requested immediate sentencing. The district court found the defendant guilty and imposed concurrent sentences "for a period not to exceed fifteen years as provided in Iowa Code sections 902.3, 902.9 and 902.12." The defendant was ordered to pay restitution, court costs, a law-enforcement-initiative surcharge, attorney fees, and a $5000 fine for each offense.
On appeal, the defendant's counsel made one argument: the court was without authority to impose a fine. In a pro se brief, the defendant raised several additional issues, none of which were raised in the district court. As we discuss below, one of these issues—the question of the legality of imposing a mandatory minimum sentence—is not subject to the normal error preservation rules. Consequently, we will address that claim on its merits. The other issues raised in the defendant's pro se brief were not preserved, and therefore, we give them no consideration.1
In determining the proper standard for review, we focus on the nature of the defendant's claimed error. The defendant contends his sentences were not authorized by statute. A sentence not permitted by statute is illegal. See State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 17 (Iowa 2001). "[T]he sentence is illegal because it is `beyond the power of the court to impose.'" State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Iowa 1998) (quoting State v. Wilson, 294 N.W.2d 824, 825 (Iowa 1980)).
The issues raised by the defendant are, therefore, essentially questions of statutory interpretation. Kress, 636 N.W.2d at 17. Consequently, our review is for correction of errors of law. Id.
The defendant asserts the district court was without authority to impose a fine because neither the robbery statute nor the habitual-offender statute provides for a fine. The State agrees, and so do we.
Second-degree robbery is a class "C" felony. See Iowa Code § 711.3. Section 902.9(4) provides that a "class `C' felon, not a habitual offender, . . . shall be sentenced to a fine of at least one thousand dollars but not more than ten thousand dollars." Id. § 902.9(4) (emphasis added). The sentencing statute for a habitual offender simply provides that an "offender shall be confined for no more that fifteen years." Id. § 902.9(3). Therefore, the applicable statutes do not authorize a fine as part of the sentence for a habitual offender convicted of second-degree robbery.
A sentence not permitted by statute is illegal and void. See State v. Woody, 613 N.W.2d 215, 217 (Iowa 2000). Accordingly, the unauthorized fines imposed as part of the defendant's sentences must be vacated.
A. Error preservation. As noted above, the defendant did not challenge the district court's application of the mandatory minimum sentence set forth in section 902.12 until this appeal. For this reason, the court of appeals held error had not been preserved. Our cases do not support this conclusion. We stated in Woody:
An illegal sentence is void and "not subject to the usual concepts of waiver, whether from a failure to seek review or other omissions of error preservation." Because an illegal sentence is void, it can be corrected at any time.
613 N.W.2d at 217 (quoting State v. Ohnmacht, 342 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Iowa 1983)). Thus, we proceed to consider this issue on the merits.
B. Issue. The defendant argues that the minimum sentence requirements for habitual offenders is that set forth in Iowa Code section 902.8, which provides: "A person sentenced as an habitual offender shall not be eligible for parole until the person has served the minimum sentence of confinement of three years." The district court relied on Iowa Code section 902.12(5) in sentencing the defendant to serve seventy percent of his sentence. That statute provides:
A person serving a sentence for conviction of the following felonies shall be denied parole or work release unless the person has served at least seven-tenths of the maximum term of the person's sentence:
. . . . 5. Robbery in the first or second degree in violation of section 711.2 or 711.3.
Iowa Code § 902.12(5) (Supp.2003). We must interpret these statutes to determine whether section 902.12 applies to this defendant.
C. Governing legal principles. "`When a minimum sentence is prescribed . . . the legislature ordinarily requires a judicial determination of its applicability.'" State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 2000) (quoting State v. Wilson, 314 N.W.2d 408, 409 (Iowa 1982)). Whether section 902.12(5) applies to a habitual offender must be considered in light of well-established principles of statutory interpretation:
"When the text of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, the court should not search for meaning beyond the express terms of the statute . . . ." However, where the language of a statute is ambiguous, so that reasonable minds would differ on the meaning, we turn to our rules of interpretation. The polestar of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislative intent of a statute. We "consider the objects sought to be accomplished and the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied, seeking a result that will advance, rather than defeat, the statute's purpose." . . . [W]e will not construe a statute in a way [that] creates an impractical or absurd result, nor will we speculate as to the probable legislative intent beyond what the language clearly states.
State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa 2005) (quoting State v. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1999)); see also State v. Allen, 708 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Iowa 2006) .
"[W]e `construe statutes that relate to the same or a closely allied subject together so as to produce a harmonious and consistent body of legislation.'" Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d at 578 (quoting State v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 587 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Iowa 1998)). "In addition, the legislative history of a statute is instructive and we may consider it when ascertaining legislative intent." Allen, 708 N.W.2d at 366.
D. Discussion. The defendant argues the mandatory minimum sentence applicable to his crime is the three-year mandatory minimum for habitual offenders established in section 902.8. He claims the district court erred in imposing the seventy-percent mandatory minimum sentence provided for persons convicted of robbery in the second degree as authorized by section 902.12.
Although we have never addressed this precise question, we considered a similar issue in State v. Burgs, 479 N.W.2d 323 (Iowa 1992). In that case, the defendant, Nathan Burgs, was convicted of a class "D" theft and sentenced as a habitual offender subject to the parole restrictions of Iowa Code section 902.11. Burgs, 479 N.W.2d at 323. Section 902.11 provides that forcible felons who have a prior forcible felony conviction must serve at least one-half of their term of imprisonment before being eligible for parole. Id. (citing Iowa Code § 902.11). Burgs claimed on appeal that section 902.11 did not apply because the parole restrictions of section 902.11 conflicted with the parole restrictions of section 902.8, which stated that habitual offenders were not eligible for parole...
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