State v. Schaaf
| Decision Date | 28 January 1968 |
| Citation | 743 P.2d 240,109 Wn.2d 1 |
| Parties | , 56 USLW 2231 STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Timothy Leland SCHAAF, B.D. 0 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Washington Appellate Defender, Anna-Mari Sarkanen, Scott J. Engelhard, Neil M. Fox, Seattle, for Dixon, Schaaf, Bolton, Webb & McNeely.
Seattle-King County Public Defender Ass'n, Janet Ainsworth, Seattle, for Loney.
Norm Maleng, King Co. Pros., Greg Hubbard, Asst. Chief Deputy, Jeanne E. Tweten, Deputy King County Courthouse, Seattle, for respondent.
The main issue in this case is not a new one to this court. In at least two previous opinions, we have extensively discussed the issue and have concluded that juvenile offenders need not be afforded jury trials. See State v. Lawley, 91 Wash.2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979); Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash.2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968). Appellants now raise the same issue, but in a somewhat different light. In more than 200 pages of briefs, the six appellants in this case strenuously argue that recent developments in the law mandate granting juvenile offenders jury trials.
While we recognize the importance of the right to trial by jury, we also recognize the realities of life, and the enormous impact that jury trials would have on the juvenile justice system. We question whether the system, as presently structured, could even begin to absorb jury trials in juvenile cases without a restructuring of the entire legal system.
We are also well aware, however, that such practical realities are not determinative of the issue before us. It is our obligation to see to it that the state and federal constitutions are complied with, and that the appellants are accorded their full rights under the law. Because of the
importance of this issue to juvenile offenders as well as the state, we deem it appropriate to deal with the numerous arguments raised by appellants in some detail.
The six defendants herein were charged and tried as juveniles. Timothy Schaaf and Matthew Webb were charged with indecent liberties, Eddie Loney with robbery in the first degree, Mark McNeely with kidnapping in the second degree and possession of stolen property in the second degree and Trevor Dixon with theft in the second degree. Scott Bolton was charged with possessing liquor, violating the Uniform Controlled Substances Act and simple assault; the first charge was dismissed at the factfinding hearing. Two of the juveniles filed pretrial motions requesting jury trials. The trial court denied the motions.
Each juvenile presented evidence on his own behalf; each was found guilty of the offenses charged. All six juveniles appealed, claiming that they were entitled to a jury trial under the state and federal constitutions. 1 The six appeals were consolidated and this court accepted certification from the Court of Appeals. 2
ISSUE ONE. Do recent developments in Washington law require granting juvenile offenders the right to a jury trial?
ISSUE TWO. Does denying juveniles the right to a jury trial violate the equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions?
ISSUE ONE.
CONCLUSION. Juvenile proceedings remain rehabilitative in nature and distinguishable from adult criminal prosecutions. Thus, no right to trial by jury attaches.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ..." (Italics ours.) Similarly, article 1, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution provides that "[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury ..." (Italics ours.)
This court and the Legislature have previously declined to recognize juvenile proceedings as criminal prosecutions that entitle an accused to a jury trial. In 1968, we rejected a challenge to RCW 13.04.030, which then denied juvenile offenders a jury trial. 3 In ruling that juveniles deserve basic due process protections, we pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has not held that those protections include a jury trial. 4 We concluded that while juvenile proceedings had to comply with "rules of fairness and basic procedural rights", such compliance was possible without the formality of a jury trial. "One of the substantial benefits of the juvenile process is a private, informal hearing conducted outside the presence of a jury." 5
Then in 1979 we upheld RCW 13.04.021(2), which provides that juvenile court cases shall be tried without a jury. 6 In Lawley, appellants charged that the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA) had so altered the law's focus from treating and rehabilitating juveniles to punishing them that juvenile proceedings had become criminal prosecutions. A majority of the court disagreed, and cited the United States Supreme Court's conclusion that juvenile court jury trials are not a constitutional requirement. 7 While the JJA widened the juvenile system's earlier focus on a juvenile's individual needs and problems to include his or her prior criminal activity, the Act did not make juvenile proceedings so like an adult criminal prosecution that a jury trial was constitutionally required. 8
Defendants now claim, however, that recent developments in Washington law do subject juveniles to criminal prosecution. They argue that juveniles are now accused of and held accountable for criminal behavior and, therefore, should be entitled to jury trials under Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wash.2d 87, 100, 653 P.2d 618 (1982), which held that "[a]s for those offenses which carry a criminal stigma and particularly those for which a possible term of imprisonment is prescribed, the constitution requires that a jury trial be afforded unless waived." As support for their claim, defendants point first to several sections of the JJA.
RCW 13.40.020(11) defines "juvenile offender" as any juvenile found by the juvenile court to have committed an offense. An offense is "an act designated a violation or a crime if committed by an adult under the law of this state ..." (Italics ours.) 9 Furthermore, two of the JJA's purposes are to "[m]ake the juvenile offender accountable for his or her criminal behavior " and to "[p]rovide for punishment commensurate with the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender". (Italics ours.) 10 The Lawley majority acknowledged these purposes as placing a new emphasis on a juvenile's criminal behavior, 11 ] but defendants believe that this emphasis merits closer scrutiny in light of recent cases stressing juvenile accountability for such behavior.
In one of those cases, a defendant argued that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery or involuntary servitude except as punishment for crime, and that a juvenile therefore could not be sentenced to restitution or community service because juvenile offenses are not crimes. 12 The Court of Appeals noted that while there is no right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings, the law guarantees many of the same due process rights to juveniles and adults. "Given these similarities with the adult criminal justice system, we hold that the juvenile disposition order did constitute 'punishment for crime' sufficient to fall within the constitutional exception to involuntary servitude." 13
This court similarly found juveniles accountable for criminal behavior in State v. Bird, 95 Wash.2d 83, 622 P.2d 1262 (1980). At issue was whether RCW 9.92.060, which grants courts the authority to suspend a criminal sentence, applies to juveniles. The State argued that the statute applies only to those convicted of a crime, and that a juvenile offense is not a crime. 14 A majority of the court found juvenile offenses sufficiently analogous to crimes to allow trial courts to suspend juvenile sentences under RCW 9.92.060. As support, the majority pointed to the Court of Appeals' holding that the compromise of misdemeanors statute, RCW 10.22, applies to juvenile offenses as well as adult misdemeanors. 15
The fact that juveniles are accountable for criminal behavior does not erase the differences between adult and juvenile accountability. The penalty, rather than the criminal act committed, is the factor that distinguishes the juvenile code from the adult criminal justice system. 16 Under the juvenile code, a court order adjudging a child delinquent or dependent "shall in no case be deemed a conviction of crime." 17 We have interpreted this provision to mean that a juvenile cannot be convicted of a felony. "[A] juvenile has not committed a crime, including a felony, when he has committed an offense, 'an act designated as a crime if committed by an adult.' " 18
Important distinctions result from being accused and convicted of a crime as opposed to an offense. A juvenile may be eligible for a diversion agreement in lieu of prosecution, and if prosecuted and found guilty will normally be sent to a juvenile detention facility. 19 Indeed, the purpose of the juvenile system is to provide an alternative to incarceration in adult correctional facilities. 20 As the Court of Appeals has stated:
Although juveniles will be held accountable for their behavior, juvenile courts are vested with broad powers to provide any necessary treatment, guidance, or rehabilitation for juvenile offenders. The procedures are not as punitive as are adult criminal proceedings.
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