State v. Sharpless

• Decision Date: 05 March 1903
• Citation: 71 P. 737,31 Wash. 191
• Parties: STATE v. SHARPLESS.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

71 P. 737

31 Wash. 191

STATE v. SHARPLESS.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 5, 1903

Appeal from superior court, Spokane county.

Richard Sharpless was convicted of practicing the occupation of a barber without obtaining a certificate of registration, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Saunders & Bassett, for appellant.

Horace Kimball and R. M. Barnhart, for the State.

MOUNT J.

Appellant was convicted of practicing the occupation of a barber without having first obtained a certificate of registration entitling him to practice such occupation. The only questions raised which may be considered on this appeal are questions which go to the constitutionality of the act of 1901 (Laws 1901, p. 349, c. 172). It is claimed (1) that the act is repugnant to section which provides that 'no bill shall embrace more than one subject and that shall brace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title' (2) that the act is repugnant to the Fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and especially to section 12, art. 1, of the Constitution of this state, which is as follows: 'No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens or corporation other than municipal privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations.'

1. The title of the act is as follows: 'An act to regulate the practice of barbering and licensing of persons to carry on such practice, and providing punishment for its violation.' The act defines the practice of barbering and provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to follow the occupation in any incorporated city or town without first having obtained a license therefor. It then provides for the appointment of a board of examiners; defines their term of office, their headquarters, compensation, and their duties; then prescribes the fees for certificates, and also the qualifications of barbers provides for the issuance of certificates to qualified persons authorizing them to practice barbering; provides for apprentices; and also specifies the causes for which the board of examiners may revoke certificates issued and reissue the same; lastly, provides a penalty for practicing the occupation in certain districts without a certificate therefor, and makes certain acts of barbers in the cities of the first, second, and third classes misdemeanors. Appellant argues that the title does not embrace the appointment of the board of examiners, or the duties of the board or the compensation of its members, or refer to apprentices of barbers, or to the subject of a license fee. But we think the title is sufficient to cover all these provisions. They are all intimately and naturally connected with the subject-matter of the act. This court, in the case of the City of Seattle v. Barto (filed Feb. 25, 1903) 71 P 735, where the title of an ordinance was 'An ordinance to license and regulate certain trades and occupations in the city of Seattle, providing penalties for the violation thereof, and repealing all ordinances inconsistent therewith,' held that a provision under this title, making it unlawful for a pawnbroker to transact his business without first procuring a license therefor, was within the scope of the title. That case, it seems to us, was a much stronger case against appellant than the one under consideration. There, after quoting approvingly from Marston v. Humes, 3 Wash. St. 267, 28 P. 520, and Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.) page 172, it was said: 'But a title, to be sufficient, need not be an index to the provisions of the ordinance. It is sufficient if it gives such notice of its object as to reasonably lead to an inquiry into its body. 'The purpose of the title is only to call attention to the subject-matter of the act, and the act itself must be looked to for a full description of the powers conferred.' Lancey v. King County, 15 Wash. 9 [45 P. 645, 34 L. R. A. 817].' See, also, Hathaway v. McDonald, 27 Wash. 659, 68 P. 376. Under the rule therein announced, the title of the act in question here is sufficient.

2. It is next argued that the act is void because 'local, class, special, and discriminating legislation'; local, because it applies only to incorporated cities and towns, and special and discriminating, because it does not affect all barbers alike. The act provides as follows:

'Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to follow the occupation of barber in any incorporated city or town in this state, unless he shall have first obtained a certificate of registration as provided in this act; provides, however, that nothing in this act shall apply to or affect any person who is now engaged in such occupation except as hereinafter provided.'

'Sec. 9. Every person now engaged in the occupation of barber in cities of the first, second or third class in this state shall within ninety days after the approval of this act file with the secretary of said board an affidavit setting forth his name, residence and length of time during which and the places where he has practiced such occupation, and shall pay to the secretary of said board one dollar, and a certificate entitling him to practice said occupation for one year shall thereupon be issued to him.

'Sec. 10. To obtain a certificate of registration under this act, any person excepting those mentioned in section nine shall make application to said board, and shall pay to the secretary an examination fee of five dollars, and shall present himself at the meeting of the board for examination of applicants. The board shall examine such person, and being satisfied that he is above the age of eighteen years, of good moral character, free from contagious or infectious disease, has studied the trade for two years as an apprentice under or as a qualified and practicing barber in this state, or other states, and is possessed of the requisite skill to properly perform all the duties, including his ability in the preparation of the tools used, shaving, cutting of the hair and beard and all the various services incident thereto, and has sufficient knowledge concerning the common diseases of the face and skin to avoid the aggravation and sprading thereof in the practice of his trade, his name shall be entered by the board in a register hereinafter provided for and a certificate of registration shall be issued to him authorizing him to practice said trade in this state, for one year. All certificates shall be renewed each year, for which renewal a fee of fifty cents shall be paid. All persons making application for examination under the provisions of this act shall be allowed to practice the occupation of barber until the next meeting as designated by said board.'

'Sec. 15. Any person practicing the occupation of barber in any city of the first, second or third class in this state, without first having obtained a certificate of registration as provided in this act, or falsely pretending to be practicing such occupation under this act, or who uses, or allows towels to be used on more than one person before such towels have been laundered; or razors, lather, or hair brushes on more than one person before same shall have been sterilized or in violation of any of the provisions of this act, and every proprietor of a barber shop who shall wilfully employ a barber who has not such a certificate shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than ten days nor more than ninety days, or both.'

The right of the legislature to enact laws for the promotion of health is now universally sustained as a police regulation. Colley on Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) page 720; Fox v. Territory, 2 Wash. T. 297, 5 P. 603; State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424, 30 P. 729; Hathaway v. McDonald, supra; State v. Zeno, 79 Minn. 80, 81 N.W. 748, 48 L. R. A. 88, 79 Am. St. Rep. 422; Ex parte Lucas, 160 Mo. 218, 61 S.W. 218; State v. Wilcox, 64 Kan. 789, 68 P. 634. Under this rule the Legislature of this state has enacted laws for the regulation of the occupations of physicians, dentists, pharmacy, and other occupations.

It is also well settled in this state that when a law operates equally upon all who fall under its operation, even though they constitute a class, the law is upheld. Fox v. Territory supra; State v. Carey, supra; Fitch v. Applegate, 24 Wash. 25, 64 P. 147; Redford v. Spokane Street Ry. Co., 15 Wash. 419, 46 P. 650; State v. Considine, 16 Wash. 358, 47 P. 755; McDaniels v. J. J. Connelly Shoe Co. (Wash.) 71 P. 37; State v. Nichols (Wash.) 69 P. 372. Mr. Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.) page 480, says: 'The authority that legislates for the state at large must determine whether particular rules shall extend to the whole state and all its citizens, or, on the other hand, to a subdivision of the state of a single class of its citizens only. The circumstances of a particular locality, or the prevailing public sentiment in that section of the state, may require or make acceptable different police regulations from those demanded in another, or call for different taxation, and a different application of the public moneys. The Legislature may therefore prescribe or authorize different laws of police, allow the right of eminent domain to be exercised in different cases and through different agencies, and prescribe peculiar restrictions upon taxation in each distinct municipality, provided the State Constituion does not forbid. ...