State v. Slavens, SD 31613.
| Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
| Writing for the Court | WILLIAM W. FRANCIS |
| Citation | 375 S.W.3d 915 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. John David SLAVENS, Appellant. |
| Docket Number | No. SD 31613.,SD 31613. |
| Decision Date | 12 September 2012 |
375 S.W.3d 915
STATE of Missouri, Respondent,
v.
John David SLAVENS, Appellant.
No. SD 31613.
Missouri Court of Appeals,
Southern District,
Division One.
Sept. 12, 2012.
[375 S.W.3d 916]
Timothy R. Cisar, Lake Ozark, MO, for Appellant.
Steven M. Kretzer, Camdenton, MO, for Respondent.
WILLIAM W. FRANCIS, JR., J.
John David Slavens (“Slavens”) appeals his conviction by the trial court for one count of the class B misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated (“DWI”), a violation of section 577.010.1 In his sole point relied on, Slavens argues the trial court erred in convicting him of DWI because the incident which led to his conviction was the result of a “dirt bike” accident on his private property. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The parties stipulated to the facts and evidence in this case. Slavens was operating a motor vehicle, referenced by both parties as a “non street legal” “dirt bike,” in his own yard when he had an accident that necessitated the response of medical personnel, as well as the Missouri State Highway Patrol. Upon arrival of the Highway Patrol officer, Slavens admitted to drinking and consented to having a blood sample drawn to determine his blood alcohol content. The result of that testing indicated Slavens' blood alcohol content was 0.226 percent. He was then charged and convicted of the aforementioned offense of DWI and fined $500.
At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in convicting Slavens under section 577.010, when he was on his private property operating his dirt bike—a motor vehicle, which as stipulated by the parties, was not primarily designed for use on a roadway. He argues that such a conviction was error in that section 577.010 does not specifically “make it a crime to operate a motor vehicle, which is primarily designed for off-road use, in your own yard while intoxicated.”
The specific issue for our determination is whether Slavens can be convicted of violating section 577.010 for operating a “non street legal” “dirt bike” on his own private property.
We note that neither Slavens, nor the State, set forth the applicable standard of review in their briefs. Given the issue presented in this point, we necessarily are called upon to interpret section 577.010. “ ‘Statutory interpretation is a question of law, and questions of law are reviewed de novo.’ ”
[375 S.W.3d 917]
State v. Downing, 359 S.W.3d 69, 70 (Mo.App. W.D.2011) (quoting State v. Pesce, 325 S.W.3d 565, 575 (Mo.App. W.D.2010)). As such, “the lower court's ruling on a question of law is not a matter of judicial discretion.” State v. Laplante, 148 S.W.3d 347, 348 (Mo.App. S.D.2004). “Absent an erroneous declaration or application of the law, however, we will sustain the judgment of the trial court.” Id. at 349.
Section 577.010.1 provides that a “person commits the crime of ‘[DWI]’ if he operates a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged condition.” “ ‘Thus, the elements of the offense of [DWI] are twofold: that the defendant operated a motor vehicle and that he did so while in an intoxicated or drugged condition.’ ” State v. Tyler, 285 S.W.3d 353, 354 (Mo.App. S.D.2009) (quoting State v. Ball, 113 S.W.3d 677, 679 (Mo.App. S.D.2003)). The term “motor vehicle” is not defined in section 577.010. As the dispute in the present matter hinges on whether Slavens' dirt bike is considered to be a motor vehicle for purposes of the DWI statute when it was being operated on his private property as opposed to a public roadway, this Court is called upon to carefully parse that term.
The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and give effect to that intent as it is reflected in the plain language of the statute. State v. Lewis, 188 S.W.3d 483, 487 (Mo.App. W.D.2006). “Where the legislative intent is made evident by giving the language employed in the statute its plain and ordinary meaning, we are without authority to read into the statute an intent, which is contrary thereto.” State v. Brushwood, 171 S.W.3d 143, 147 (Mo.App. W.D.2005). However, “where the language is ambiguous or will lead to an illogical result, we look beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute.” State v. Daniel, 103 S.W.3d 822, 826 (Mo.App. W.D.2003).
With these guiding principles in mind, we turn to the phrase “motor vehicle,” which has not been defined in connection with section 577.010, in order to determine if a dirt bike is a motor vehicle for purposes of that statute. We are directed in our examination by Fainter v. State, 174 S.W.3d 718, 719 (Mo.App. W.D.2005). In Fainter, a post-conviction relief matter, the defendant pled guilty to the felony of stealing a lawn mower under section 570.030.3(3)(a), which makes it a crime to steal “[a]ny motor vehicle, watercraft or aircraft[.]” Id. at 719; § 570.030.3(3)(a). Fainter then argued in his post-conviction motion that there was an insufficient factual basis for his plea because a riding lawn mower is not a motor vehicle such that he should be granted an evidentiary hearing. Id. His request for an evidentiary hearing was denied along with his request for post-conviction relief. Id. at 719–20. He then appealed. Id.
The reviewing court in Fainter, began its examination of the issue by noting not only did the statute the defendant was charged under provide no definition for “motor vehicle,” but there were myriad statutes that defined “motor vehicle” in numerous different ways:
The [Stonger v. Riggs, 85 S.W.3d 703, 708 (Mo.App. W.D.2002),] court expressly noted ... that ‘several statutes separately define ‘motor vehicle’ for various purposes, and what may be considered a ‘motor vehicle’ for one statute may not be considered a ‘motor vehicle’ for another.' Indeed, the Supreme Court, in Trailiner Corporation v. Director of Revenue, 783 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Mo. banc 1990), noted that its ‘perusal of the statutes' found that the General Assembly had defined ‘motor vehicle’ ‘no less than
[375 S.W.3d 918]
ten times through the various chapters.’ According to the Trailiner court, each definition ‘differs to meet the discrete goals addressed during adoption of...
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...Rev. Stat. § 577.010, the Missouri appellate courts held that a motorized bicycle qualified as a "motor vehicle." See State v. Slavens , 375 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Mo. App. 2012) (citing State v. Laplante , 148 S.W.3d 347, 350-51 [Mo. App. 2004] ). By parity of reasoning, a regular bicycle ought ......
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