State v. Strobel

• Decision Date: 18 May 2004
• Docket Number: No. COA03-566.,COA03-566.
• Citation: 596 S.E.2d 249,164 NC App. 310
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Crystal STROBEL.

596 S.E.2d 249

164 NC App. 310

STATE of North Carolina v. Crystal STROBEL.

No. COA03-566.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

May 18, 2004.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Daniel D. Addison, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Katherine Jane Allen, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.

STEELMAN, Judge.

Defendant, Crystal Strobel, appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress a statement given by her to the police. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.

The State's evidence tended to show that on 14 November 2001, Jessica Pritt, a manager at a Taco Bell restaurant in Havelock, North Carolina, was robbed while making a nightly deposit at the Branch Bank and Trust. Three individuals were involved in the robbery. One of the individuals, Ernest Erdman, approached Pritt with a bottle while defendant waited in the car. Pritt sustained minor head injuries as she was robbed of a $1600 deposit.

Officer Brian Woods of the Havelock City Police Department interviewed defendant on 25 November 2001, after receiving information obtained from Erdman's girlfriend that indicated defendant was involved in the crime. This was a non-custodial interview. On 29 November 2001, a warrant was issued for the arrest of defendant, charging her with conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. Police arrested defendant on 30 November 2001, and she appeared before the District Court of Craven County on 3 December 2001. At that time, defendant requested an attorney and the court appointed Joshua Willey to represent her on the conspiracy charge.

Sergeant David King of the Havelock Police Department subsequently interviewed Ernest Erdman, who implicated defendant as a participant in the robbery. On 18 January 2002, a warrant was issued for the arrest of defendant, charging her with robbery with a dangerous weapon. Police arrested defendant on 24 January 2002, and she gave a written statement to Sergeant King following her arrest. Defendant moved to suppress her 24 January 2002 statement. The trial court denied this motion after a hearing on 22 October 2002. Following this ruling, defendant entered pleas of guilty to robbery with a dangerous weapon and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. The charges were consolidated by the trial court and defendant received an active sentence from the mitigated range of thirty-eight to fifty-five months.

Defendant appeals the denial of her motion to suppress pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-979(b). This is her sole assignment of error.

Sergeant King's interview of defendant on 24 January 2002 was a custodial interrogation. Prior to a custodial interrogation of a defendant, an officer must give warnings to the defendant as mandated by the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v. Steptoe, 296 N.C. 711, 716, 252 S.E.2d 707, 710 (1979). In order for a statement obtained during a custodial interrogation to be admissible, Miranda requires the following warnings be given to an accused before such interrogation begins: (1) that she has the right to remain silent; (2) that anything she says can and will be used against her in court; (3) that she has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have a lawyer present during interrogation; and (4) that if she cannot afford an attorney, counsel will be appointed to represent her. Steptoe, 296 N.C. at 716, 252 S.E.2d at 710.

The trial court found that "Detective King did not orally advise the Defendant of her Miranda Rights, but rather they were given to her to read on State's Exhibit No. 1, the Voluntary Statement." The written statement form set forth each of the Miranda rights. It also contained the following language:

I do not want to talk to a lawyer and I hereby knowingly and personally waive my rights to remain silent and my right to have a lawyer present while I make the following statement to the aforesaid person, knowing that I have the right and privilege to terminate any interview at anytime hereafter and have a lawyer present with me before ... answering any more questions or making any more statements if I choose to do so.

Defendant signed each page of the statement. The following language appears at the bottom of the first page of the statement:

I have read each page of this statement consisting of four pages, each page of which bears my signature and corrections, if any, bears my initials, and I certify that the facts contained hereon are true and correct. I further certify that I have made no request for advice or presence of a lawyer before or during any part of this statement, nor at any time before it was finished did I request the statement be stopped. I also declare that I ... was not told or prompted what to say [in this] statement, and that this statement was completed at 10:40 a.m. on the 24th of January, 2002.

Defendant first contends Sergeant King was required to give defendant the Miranda warnings orally and not just in writing. Defendant further contends she did not read the Miranda warnings placed in front of her. As a result of these alleged defects, defendant asserts she did not knowingly waive her Miranda rights, and thus, her confession should have been suppressed as being obtained in violation of her rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Where a defendant challenges the admissibility of an in-custody confession, the trial judge must conduct a voir dire hearing to ascertain whether defendant has been informed of their constitutional rights and has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived these rights before making the challenged admissions. State v. Jenkins, 300 N.C. 578, 584, 268 S.E.2d 458, 463 (1980). "When the voir dire evidence is conflicting, as here, the trial judge must weigh the credibility of the witnesses, resolve the crucial conflicts and make appropriate findings of fact." Id. Where the trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, they are conclusive on appeal. Id. However, the trial court's conclusions of law "must be legally correct, reflecting a correct application of applicable legal principles to the facts found." State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 11, 484 S.E.2d 350, 357 (1997). On appeal, the conclusions of law, which are drawn from these findings are fully reviewable. State v. Booker, 306 N.C. 302, 308, 293 S.E.2d 78, 81 (1982).

There is no specific requirement as to the exact manner in which police must convey Miranda warnings to a person suspected of a crime. United States v. Osterburg, 423 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 914, 90 S.Ct. 2216, 26 L.Ed.2d 571 (1970). "The requirement is that the police fully advise such a person of [their] rights" Id. (quoting Bell v. United States, 382 F.2d 985, 987 (9th Cir.1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 965, 88 S.Ct. 1070, 19 L.Ed.2d 1165 (1968)). Although we were unable to find a case in North Carolina addressing this issue, numerous other courts have found that it is not essential that the warnings required by Miranda be given in oral rather than written form. See e.g., United States v. Sledge, 546 F.2d 1120, 1122 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 910, 97 S.Ct. 1185, 51 L.Ed.2d 588 (1977); United States v. Coleman, 524 F.2d 593, 594 (10th Cir.1975); United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 659-660 (5th Cir.1972); United States v. Alexander, 441 F.2d 403, 404 (3d Cir.1971); United States v. Van Dusen, 431 F.2d 1278, 1280 (1st Cir.1970); United States v. Johnson, 426 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 842, 91 S.Ct. 86, 27 L.Ed.2d 78 (1970); United States v. Osterburg, 423 F.2d 704 (9th Cir.1970); Bell v. United States, 382 F.2d 985, 987 (9th Cir.1967). Thus, the mere fact that Sergeant King did not read the Miranda warnings to defendant, standing alone, does not render defendant's waiver ineffective.

Defendant further argues that since she did not read the "Voluntary Statement" form before she signed it, she did not receive the required Miranda warnings and, therefore her statement is inadmissible. We find this argument unpersuasive.

When a statement purporting to be a confession bears the signature of the accused, it is presumed, nothing else appearing, that the accused has read it or has knowledge of its contents." State v. Walker, 269 N.C. 135, 139, 152 S.E.2d 133, 137 (1967). The rule in civil cases, also applicable to the defendant's argument in this criminal case, is that a person who signs a paper writing has a duty to ascertain the contents of the writing, and he will be held to have signed with full knowledge and assent as to its contents unless it is shown that he was wilfully misled or misinformed by the opposing party, or if the contents were fraudulently withheld from him. Williams v. Williams, 220 N.C. 806, 18 S.E.2d 364 (1942).

State v. King, 67 N.C.App. 524, 526, 313 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1984).

Here, the trial court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) it had the opportunity to see and observe each witness and determine what weight and credibility to give each witness's testimony; (2) Detective King did not orally advise defendant of her Miranda rights, but rather gave them to her to read on a form entitled "Voluntary Statement;" (3) defendant could read and write; (4) she apparently read the Voluntary Statement form; (5) defendant was 22 years old at the time she gave this statement and she had previous employment, which required her to read and sign other documents; and (6) defendant signed each page of her four page statement and on the first page of the document she signed acknowledging she had read each page of the statement and initialed any corrections made to the statement. Based on these findings of fact, the trial court concluded:

4. The Statement made by the Defendant to Detective David King on January 24, 2002, was made freely,

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