State v. Sullivan

• Decision Date: 13 May 1930
• Parties: STATE ex rel. CRUMP et al. v. SULLIVAN et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

128 So. 478

99 Fla. 1070

STATE ex rel. CRUMP et al. v. SULLIVAN et al.

Florida Supreme Court

May 13, 1930

En Banc.

Original proceedings by the State, on the relation of L. S. Crump and others, for writ of mandamus to be directed to George J Sullivan, as chairman and member of the Board of County Commissioners of Leon County, and others. On motion to quash the alternative writ.

Motion overruled, with leave to answer and direction for peremptory writ in default of answer.

COUNSEL

W. J. Oven, F. B. Winthrop, James Messer, Jr., and Clyde W. Atkinson, all of Tallahas see, for relators.

William Blount Myers, of Tallahassee, for respondents.

OPINION

STRUM J.

This is a proceeding in mandamus, a case of original jurisdiction the purpose of which is to determine whether candidates for the office of county commissioner of Leon county are now to be nominated by the electors of the county at large, or whether they are to be nominated by the electors of the several commissioners' districts; each district nominating its own commissioner by the votes of the electors of that district alone.

The matter comes up for hearing upon motion to quash the alternative writ which in effect commands the present county commissioners of Leon county to prepare the ballots for the primary election of June 3, 1930, so that all candidates to be nominated for the office of county commissioner in that county shall be balloted upon by the electors of the county at large.

It is not questioned in this litigation that under the Constitution, art. 8, § 5, as amended in 1900, county commissioners must be 'elected' by the electors of the county at large. This litigation concerns the method of nominating those who will become candidates for election in the general election.

The Legislature of 1913 enacted chapter 6469, Laws of Florida, popularly known as the Bryan Primary Law. This law contained no specific provision with reference to whether candidates for county commissioner should be nominated by the county at large or by districts. By section 63 of that law it was provided, however, that:

'The primary elections required by this Act, except as herein otherwise provided, shall be held in accordance with the provisions of article 1 of Title IV, First Division, of the General Statutes of Florida.' (Regulating the holding of general elections.)

By chapter 6874, Acts 1915, § 10, section 63 of the Bryan Primary Law just quoted was amended by adding thereto the following proviso:

'Provided, however, that County Commissioners and Members of the Board of Public Instruction shall be nominated by the several districts of the county instead of by the county at large.'

Section 63 of the Bryan Primary Law, as amended by the addition of the proviso just quoted, was brought forward into the Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920 as section 362 thereof, and into the Comp. Gen. Laws 1927 as section 419 thereof, in which form it has since remained.

In 1927 the Legislature passed chapter 13029, a special law, providing in effect that after the effective date of that law nominations for the office of county commissioner and for member of the board of public instruction of Leon county shall be made by the voters of the county at large, and not by districts as provided in section 362 of the Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920. This act, pursuant to the terms thereof, was submitted to and ratified by the voters of Leon county, and on April 21, 1930, the Governor, pursuant to the provisions of the act, proclaimed it fully effective.

In 1929 the Legislature enacted chapter 13761, section 18 of which is:

'The primary elections required by this Act, except as herein otherwise provided, shall be held and conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article 1, Chapter 1, of Title 4, First Division of Compiled General Laws of Florida, 1927; provided, however, that County Commissioners and members of the Board of Public Instruction shall be nominated by the several districts of the county instead of by the county at large.'

Section 19 of chapter 13761 provides that all laws and parts of laws in conflict therewith are thereby repealed.

It will be noted that section 18 of chapter 13761, just above quoted, is a re-enactment verbatim of section 362, Rev. Gen. St. 1920 (section 419, Comp. Gen. Laws 1927), the history of which has been given. The Constitution, art. 3, § 24, provides that 'the legislature shall establish a uniform system of county and municipal government, which shall be applicable, except in cases where local or special laws are provided by the legislature that may be inconsistent therewith.'

Unless, therefore, section 18 of the Act of 1929, purporting to provide for the nomination of county commissioners by district, has the effect of repealing the antecedent local law relating to Leon county, then the latter law, directing their nomination by the county at large, prevails as it is inconsistent with section 362, Rev. Gen. St. 1920; section 419, Comp. Gen. Laws 1927.

Respondents contend that it was the clear intent of the Legislature of 1929 to repeal all existing special laws relating to the nomination of county commissioners by the county at large, including the Leon county law, so as to re-create a uniform method of nominating county commissioners in all counties by providing for their nomination by districts. Otherwise, so it is claimed by the respondents, there would have been no purpose in including section 18 in the Act of 1929, as it is a mere re-enactment of the existing general law on the subject, section 362, Rev. Gen. St. 1920, section 419, Comp. Gen. Laws 1927.

Relators challenge the validity of the proviso appearing as the last sentence of section 18 of chapter 13761, just above quoted, upon the ground that such proviso is not within the title of the act, and therefore is in violation of article 3, § 16, of the Constitution, which provides, amongst other things, that:

'Each law enacted in the legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title. * * *'

Relators contend that the proviso should therefore be eliminated, the result of which is that the special law of 1927 relating to Leon county remains operative as an exception to the provision of existing section 362, Rev. Gen. St. 1920, section 419, Comp. Gen. Laws 1927.

The contention is well founded.

One of the principal purposes of article 3, § 16, of the Constitution is to avoid surprise and fraud in legislation as well as evils of 'omnibus' or 'log rolling' legislation, Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291; State v. Green, 36 Fla. 154, 18 So. 334; State v. Burns, 38 Fla. 367, 21 So. 290.

If serious doubt exists as to whether matter found in the bill is included in, or properly connected with, the subject expressed in the title, the courts resolve the matter in favor of the legislative determination thereof and sustain the validity of the questioned matter. County Commissioners v. Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 196, 18 So. 339, 29 L. R. A. 416; Ex parte Knight, 52 Fla. 144, 41 So. 786, 120 Am. St. Rep. 191; Rushton v. State, 75 Fla. 422, 78 So. 345.

The title to an act may be general, and mere generality alone is no objection, so long as it is not employed as a guise to cover incongruous legislation. State v. Palmes, 23 Fla. 620, 3 So. 171; In re De Woody, 94 Fla. 96, 113 So. 677; Whitney v. Hillsborough County (Fla.) 127 So. 486, decided March 25, 1930.

On the other hand, the Legislature may make the title of a bill as restrictive as it may desire. Smith v. Chase, 91 Fla. 1044, 109 So. 94. In the latter event the Legislature must limit itself in the provisions of the bill to its own self-imposed restriction. State v. Green, 36 Fla. 154, 18 So. 334; State v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929; Smith v. Chase, supra.

We recognize the principle that our constitutional provision relates to the 'subject' of the act and not necessarily to the 'purpose' to be accomplished. The accomplishment of several 'purposes' may be logically embraced in one 'subject' so long as all of such purposes are germane to or properly connected with the expressed general subject. But as the Legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as it may desire, it is obvious that a title may sometimes be framed so as to preclude the incorporation in the bill of matters which, with entire propriety, might have been embraced in the same enactment with the matters indicated by the title, but which must be excluded because the title has been made unnecessarily restrictive. Cooley, Const. Lim. (7th Ed.) p. 212.

If the title of a statute be a restrictive one, carving out for consideration a part only of a general subject, matters not germane to or properly connected with that part of the general subject so singled out, as reasonably and fairly understood, cannot be validly incorporated in the act. All provisions beyond such limits are invalid, even though such matters might have been incorporated in the act under a broader title, because as to such unrelated matters the title is misleading. State v. Palmes, 23 Fla. 620, 3 So. 171; Ex parte Knight, 52 Fla. 144, 41 So. 786, 120 Am. St. Rep. 191; State v. Burns, 38 Fla. 367, 21 So. 290; Smith v. Chase, 91 Fla. 1044, 109 So. 94; State v. Love (Fla.) 126 So. 374; Webster v. Powell, 36 Fla. 703, 18 So. 441; S. F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Geiger, 21 Fla. 669, 58 Am. Rep. 697; Carr v. Thomas, 18 Fla. 736; Albritton v. State, 82 Fla. 20, 89 So. 360; West v. State, 50 Fla. 154, 39 So. 412.

The title of chapter 13761, Acts of 1929, containing the proviso under attack, is:

'An Act Repealing Sections 370, 410, 412 of Compiled General Laws, 1927, Being Same as Sections 313, 353 and 355 of Revised General Statutes...