State v. Walden, 14–1280.
Decision Date | 23 October 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 14–1280.,14–1280. |
Citation | 870 N.W.2d 842 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Daniel Logan WALDEN, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Jesse A. Macro Jr. of Gaudineer & George, L.L.P., West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant Attorney General, Eric Hansen, County Attorney, and Tricia McSorley, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
In this appeal, we must decide which statute of limitations governs a charge of kidnapping to commit sexual abuse of a minor under Iowa Code section 710.2 (2007), a class “A” felony with a mandatory sentence of life in prison. In 2014, a teenage girl reported the defendant had locked her in his bedroom and molested her eight years earlier when she was six years old. He was arrested the day after her forensic interview and charged with two counts of sexual abuse of a minor, indecent contact with a minor, and kidnapping with intent to commit sexual abuse. Defendant moved to dismiss the kidnapping charge as time-barred under the general three-year statute of limitations for felonies, Iowa Code section 802.3, noting kidnapping is not one of its enumerated exceptions. The State resisted, arguing the applicable statute of limitations is section 802.2, an enumerated exception that expires ten years after the minor victim of sexual abuse reaches age eighteen. The State noted sexual abuse of a minor is a lesser included offense for the kidnapping charge and contended it would be absurd to apply a shorter deadline to the more serious crime of kidnapping to commit that abuse. The district court agreed with the State and denied the motion to dismiss. We granted the defendant's application for discretionary review.
We must apply the unambiguous operative statutory language as written. The legislature, recognizing child sex-abuse victims often delay reporting such crimes, listed four exceptions to the three-year limitations provision. But the legislature did not include kidnapping among those exceptions. Accordingly, under the plain meaning of the statutory text, the kidnapping charge is time-barred. We decline the State's invitation to apply the absurd-results doctrine to effectively rewrite the statute. The legislature made the policy choice to leave the three-year limitations intact for first-degree kidnapping. For the reasons further explained below, we reverse the district court's order on the motion to dismiss and remand the case to proceed under the remaining charges, including the lesser included offense of sexual abuse of a minor.
In February 2014, concerned parents sent their troubled fourteen-year-old daughter, K.R., to an inpatient treatment center to address her self-harming behavior, suicidal thoughts, and drug use. While in counseling, K.R. told her therapist that she had been sexually abused as a child by a neighbor, Daniel Walden. During group therapy, K.R.'s parents heard K.R. announce she had been molested by a “neighbor.” When they asked if it was Walden, she nodded “yes.” The parents contacted the Glenwood police, who recommended that K.R. undergo a forensic interview. That interview occurred on May 8.
K.R. told her interviewer Walden had sexually abused her when she was about six years old. K.R. said she often bicycled around the cul-de-sac near her house, and Walden watched her. In 2006 or 2007, during a warm part of the year when K.R. was in first grade, Walden invited her into his house “to see puppies.” According to the minutes of testimony, she told the interviewer that Walden locked her in his bedroom, touched her private parts, and made her touch his. He ordered her not to tell anyone. She complied and kept this secret for eight years.
K.R. never told anyone about Walden molesting her until 2014. K.R. first told a close friend shortly before she began therapy. She later told another friend, then her therapist and parents. She disclosed specific details in her May 8 forensic interview and diagrammed the interior of Walden's home.
Based on her statements, on May 9, Glenwood police executed a search warrant on Walden's home and arrested him. The interior room layout of Walden's home, the wall color, and furniture placement in his bedroom generally fit K.R.'s description. The search of his home found pornographic images of young girls, “little girl undergarments,” and stuffed animals posed in sexual positions. Walden was taken into custody, given Miranda warnings, and interrogated.
Walden denied molesting K.R. or touching her inappropriately. Walden initially denied ever having children in his home but then said K.R. had been inside his house twice. The first time, she was injured falling off a teeter-totter and came to his wife, a physician, for assistance. Walden claimed his wife examined K.R. in the master bedroom. The second time, he said she came inside the house to sell lemonade. K.R.'s parents denied K.R. had ever been inside Walden's home to sell lemonade but recalled Walden's wife treating K.R.'s scrapes in Walden's living room, not the bedroom.
On May 20, Walden was charged by trial information with one count of kidnapping in the first degree, two counts of sexual abuse in the second degree, and one count of indecent contact with a child. Each count was based on Walden's alleged molestation of K.R. at his home in 2006 or 2007.
On June 17, Walden filed a motion to dismiss the kidnapping charge as barred by the statute of limitations. The State filed a resistance. The district court held a hearing on July 7 and denied the motion the same day. The district court ruled the statute of limitations would expire ten years after K.R. turned eighteen because K.R. was a minor at the time of the abuse and one of the sexual abuse charges would merge with the kidnapping if Walden were convicted of both. On August 6, Walden filed an application for discretionary review, which we granted to decide the governing statute of limitations.
The sole issue on appeal is a question of law—determining the applicable statute of limitations for the charge of first-degree kidnapping with intent to subject K.R., a minor, to sexual abuse. We review questions of statutory interpretation for correction of errors of law. State v. Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 2013).
Walden allegedly kidnapped K.R. eight years before he was charged with the crime. We must decide whether the district court erred by ruling the applicable statute of limitations is Iowa Code section 802.2 rather than 802.3. This is a question of first impression. Walden argues the three-year general limitation period for felonies in section 802.3 controls because kidnapping is not among its enumerated exceptions. The State argues that because Walden is charged with kidnapping with intent to subject K.R. to sexual abuse while she was a minor, the district court correctly applied an enumerated exception to section 802.3 —the extended limitations period in section 802.2 that expressly allows the State to charge the crime of sexual abuse of a minor up to ten years after the victim reaches age eighteen. We read the interrelated statutes together and conclude that the longer limitations period does not apply to kidnapping.
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114–15, 90 S.Ct. 858, 860, 25 L.Ed.2d 156, 161 (1970) ;1 see also James Herbie DiFonzo, In Praise of Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense Cases, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 1205, 1209 (2004) .
The Toussie Court recognized “the principle that criminal limitations statutes are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.” 397 U.S. at 115, 90 S.Ct. at 860, 25 L.Ed.2d at 161 (internal quotation marks omitted). We apply the same principle. See State v. Francois, 577 N.W.2d 417, 418 (Iowa 1998) ; see also Anderson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2011) , superseded by statutory amendment, 2012 Iowa Acts ch. 1138, § 91 (codified at Iowa Code § 907.3 (2013)); 3 Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 58:4, at 120 (7th rev. ed.2008)) [hereinafter Sutherland Statutory...
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