State v. Wright, 15816

• Citation: 246 Conn. 132,716 A.2d 870
• Decision Date: 04 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. 15816,15816
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Ray Charles WRIGHT.

Page 870

716 A.2d 870

246 Conn. 132

STATE of Connecticut v. Ray Charles WRIGHT.

No. 15816.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 2, 1998.

Decided Aug. 4, 1998.

William J. Shea, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Michael E. O'Hare, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, State's Attorney, and Joseph C. Valdes, Former Assistant State's Attorney, for appellee (State).

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

BORDEN, Associate Justice.

The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the legislative classifications of larceny in the second degree by the taking of property from the person of another in violation of General Statutes § 53a-123 (a)(3) ¹ (larceny from the person) as a class C felony, and robbery in the third degree by the taking of property with the use or threat of immediate use of physical force in violation of General Statutes § 53a-136 ² (simple robbery) as a class D felony, violate the defendant's right to equal protection of the laws under the federal constitution. ³ Following our grant of certification to appeal, ⁴ the defendant, Ray Charles Wright, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment of conviction of larceny from the person. State v. Wright, 46 Conn.App. 616, 700 A.2d 79 (1997). The defendant claims that, by classifying larceny from the person as a class C felony, the penal statutes violate his equal protection rights because the allegedly more serious offense of simple robbery is classified as only a class D felony. The state argues that this classification scheme is rational, and therefore constitutional. We agree with the state and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court stated the facts that the jury reasonably could have found, as follows. "On February 19, 1995, the victim, Angel Rivera, was walking on Capitol Avenue in Hartford when he was approached by the defendant. When the defendant asked Rivera if he was a gang member, Rivera responded that he was not. The defendant then demanded that Rivera remove his coat and give it to him. Rivera complied and the defendant ran away with the coat. Thereafter, Rivera returned home and told his mother, Hilda Cordero, that the defendant had taken his coat. Cordero called the police and reported the incident.

"The next day, Rivera and Cordero were on their way to the Greater Hartford Community Center when they observed the defendant on the corner of Albany Avenue in Hartford. The defendant was wearing the coat that he had taken from Rivera the previous day. Subsequently, Rivera and Cordero drove to the community center, telephoned the police and reported that they had seen the defendant wearing Rivera's coat. Officer Dennis O'Connor of the Hartford police department, who responded to the call, went to the community center, interviewed Rivera and then proceeded to the corner of Albany Avenue where he saw the defendant. O'Connor placed the defendant in his cruiser and drove him back to the community center. Rivera then identified the defendant as the man who had taken his coat, and O'Connor seized the coat the defendant was wearing as evidence and placed him under arrest." Id., at 617-18, 700 A.2d 79.

The state charged the defendant with one count of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a)(3), ⁵ and one count of larceny from the person, in violation of § 53a-123 (a)(3). The jury found the defendant not guilty of robbery in the first degree, but guilty of larceny from the person. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, and sentenced the defendant to an eight year term of imprisonment, with execution suspended after five years, and five years of probation.

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court. The defendant claimed "that [larceny from the person] is a crime of a less serious nature than [simple robbery] because [larceny from the person] does not involve the element of the use or the threat of immediate use of physical force, and that, because the penal statutes assign a greater penalty to larceny [from the person], a class C felony, than they do to [simple robbery], a class D felony, they violate the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitution." State v. Wright, supra, 46 Conn.App. at 618-19, 700 A.2d 79. ⁶ The Appellate Court rejected this claim, stating: "By classifying [larceny from the person] as a class C felony, the legislature has recognized its serious nature and has classified it accordingly.... [W]e conclude that the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the legislature's classification of [larceny from the person] as a class C felony is irrational or unreasonable." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 619-20, 700 A.2d 79. This appeal followed.

The defendant reiterates the claim that he made before the Appellate Court, namely, that the classification in § 53a-123 (a)(3) of larceny from the person as a class C felony, punishable by a maximum of ten years imprisonment; see General Statutes § 53a-35a; ⁷ violates his equal protection rights under the state and federal constitutions. That classification violates his equal protection rights, he claims, because the assertedly more serious offense of simple robbery is classified in § 53a-136 as a class D felony, punishable by only five years imprisonment. General Statutes § 53a-35a. ⁸ He claims that simple robbery is a more serious offense than larceny from the person because the former necessarily involves the use or threat of immediate use of physical force, whereas the latter, in certain circumstances, may not involve the use or threat of immediate use of force. The defendant claims that "the highest constitutional standard of strict scrutiny" should apply to review of this classification scheme because it affects the length of his imprisonment and, therefore, directly impinges on his fundamental right of liberty. Alternatively, he argues that if rational basis scrutiny applies to his claim, the classification cannot be supported on any rational basis.

The state claims that rational basis analysis governs the defendant's equal protection challenge. Furthermore, the state argues that the classification of larceny from the person as a class C felony, while simple robbery is classified as a class D felony, passes the rational basis test because the legislature reasonably could have concluded that, under some circumstances, the former is a more serious offense than the latter. Moreover, the state contends, the legislature rationally could have concluded that larceny from the person warranted a more severe sentence on the basis of the ease with which the crime potentially can be committed. We agree with the state and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

As an initial matter, we note that the defendant, as he conceded at oral argument before this court, has offered no independent analysis of his equal protection claim under the state constitution. Therefore, "we limit our review to the relevant federal constitutional claim." Johnson v. Meehan, 225 Conn. 528, 543 n. 20, 626 A.2d 244 (1993); see also State v. Morant, 242 Conn. 666, 674 n. 2, 701 A.2d 1 (1997); State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 133 n. 77, 698 A.2d 739 (1997); State v. Matos, 240 Conn. 743, 748-49 n. 9, 694 A.2d 775 (1997); State v. Morales, 240 Conn. 727, 738 n. 12, 694 A.2d 758 (1997).

"In order to analyze the [defendant's claim], we first must detail the principles applicable to equal protection analysis." State v. Morales, supra, 240 Conn. at 738, 694 A.2d 758. First, in general, as in any constitutional challenge to the validity of a statutory scheme, the "statut[ory scheme] is presumed constitutional ... and [t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993).

More specifically, "[t]o implicate the equal protection [clause] under the ... federal [constitution] ... it is necessary that the state statute [or statutory scheme] in question, either on its face or in practice, treat persons standing in the same relation to it differently." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morales, supra, 240 Conn. at 738-39, 694 A.2d 758. Thus, the analytical "predicate [of consideration of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons similarly situated." Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462, 473, 556 A.2d 145 (1989).

"The equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages [between such similarly situated persons].... Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., [200 Conn. 562, 577-78, 512 A.2d 893 (1986) ].... To determine whether a particular classification violates the guarantees of equal protection, the court must consider the character of the classification; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972).... Franklin v. Berger, 211 Conn. 591, 595, 560 A.2d 444 (1989). Where ... the classification at issue neither impinges upon a fundamental right nor affects a suspect group it will withstand constitutional attack if the distinction is founded on a rational basis. Laden v. Warden, [169 Conn. 540, 543, 363 A.2d 1063 (1975) ]; see also McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); Franklin v. Berger, [supra] [at] 595. Rational basis review is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification.... Johnson v. Meehan, ...