STEPNEY, LLC v. Fairfield

• Decision Date: 20 May 2003
• Docket Number: (SC 16929).
• Citation: 821 A.2d 725,263 Conn. 558
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STEPNEY, LLC v. TOWN OF FAIRFIELD

263 Conn. 558

821 A.2d 725

STEPNEY, LLC v. TOWN OF FAIRFIELD

(SC 16929).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 13, 2003.

Officially released May 20, 2003.

Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js.

James T. Baldwin, for the appellant (defendant).

George W. Ganim, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

KATZ, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal¹ is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the action by the plaintiff, Stepney, LLC, seeking to enjoin the defendant, the town of Fairfield, acting through the town's board of health and its director, Arthur Leffert, from enforcing a certain town health code ordinance. We conclude that, because the plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, the trial court improperly exercised jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff and order that the action be dismissed.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. The plaintiff, a limited liability corporation, owns two single-family homes, located at 989 and 1019 Fairfield Beach Road in Fairfield, and for many years has rented both properties to various tenants. Throughout this rental period until approximately 1999, the plaintiff annually completed an application for, and obtained, a certificate of rental occupancy (certificate) in compliance with the town's health code regulations governing rental dwellings, specifically regulation 3.3.²

In 1999, the defendant amended regulation 3.3 to require, in addition to the existing requirement that no false statement be made concerning specified tenant information, that applicants make no false statement concerning "any other information requested on [the] application form or by the Director of Health." Thereafter, the defendant amended the application form to require an applicant to: (1) provide tenants' license plate numbers; and (2) obtain tenants' signatures on a form certifying that they will comply with "applicable regulations, ordinances, and statutes" and that they will not exceed occupancy limitations. Despite the fact that both of its properties were rented in 1999, the plaintiff failed to apply for certificates that year. On July 13, 2000, the plaintiff served this action on the defendant, challenging the validity of regulation 3.3 and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that the enactment of the regulation was an ultra vires act by the defendant in excess of its statutory authority under General Statutes § 19a-207,³ and that the regulation was unconstitutional on various grounds.⁴ On July 18, 2000, the defendant, through Leffert, issued an order of compliance, pursuant to § 19a-207, ordering the plaintiff to apply for a certificate pursuant to regulation 3.3 of the Fairfield public health code.⁵ On July 21, 2000, the plaintiff appealed from the order to the state board of health pursuant to General Statutes § 19a-229,⁶ but thereafter withdrew the appeal.

At trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the action, claiming that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the matter because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Specifically, the defendant contended that the plaintiff was required to pursue its administrative appeal and that its failure to do so deprived the court of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the defendant's motion, concluding that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply because the plaintiff was attacking the validity and constitutionality of the regulation itself. The court then found that the information on the application form required by regulation 3.3 was not reasonably related to health and sanitary issues, and that the concerns of the board of health adequately were addressed by the defendant's zoning regulations.⁷ Therefore, the court determined that "[r]egulation 3.3 is inconsistent with General Statutes § 19a-207 and is void." The court then noted that, although it was not going to discuss the regulation's constitutionality, the absence of any definition of "tenant" made the regulation vague. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff. This appeal followed.

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) failed to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (2) determined that the enactment of regulation 3.3 exceeded the powers granted to municipal health authorities pursuant to General Statutes § 19a-200 et seq.⁸ We agree with the defendant's first claim and, therefore, do not address the second issue.

"It is a settled principle of administrative law that if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter. . . . Housing Authority v. Papandrea, 222 Conn. 414, 420, 610 A.2d 637 (1992); Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 215 Conn. 616, 622, 577 A.2d 1017 (1990); Connecticut Life & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Jackson, 173 Conn. 352, 358-59, 377 A.2d 1099 (1977). We have frequently held that where a statute has established a procedure to redress a particular wrong a person must follow the specified remedy and may not institute a proceeding that might have been permissible in the absence of such a statutory procedure. Norwich v. Lebanon, 200 Conn. 697, 708, 513 A.2d 77 (1986); Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, supra, [623]. [B]ecause the exhaustion doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, we must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the plaintiff['s] claim.. . . Housing Authority v. Papandrea, supra, 420; Concerned Citizens of Sterling v. Sterling, 204 Conn. 551, 556, 529 A.2d 666 (1987). . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fish Unlimited v. Northeast Utilities Service Co., 254 Conn. 1, 11-12, 756 A.2d 262 (2000).

"The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in the jurisprudence of administrative law. . . . The doctrine provides that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. . . . McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193, 89 S. Ct. 1657, 23 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1969). . . . Johnson v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 248 Conn. 87, 95, 726 A.2d 1154 (1999). Where a statutory requirement of exhaustion is not explicit, courts are guided by [legislative] intent in determining whether application of the doctrine would be consistent with the statutory scheme. . . . [Johnson v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra], 96; accord McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144, 112 S. Ct. 1081, 117 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1992). Consequently, [t]he requirement of exhaustion may arise from explicit statutory language or from an administrative scheme providing for agency relief. . . . Howell v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 72 F.3d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1995). . . .

"A primary purpose of the doctrine is to foster an orderly process of administrative adjudication and judicial review, offering a reviewing court the benefit of the agency's findings and conclusions. It relieves courts of the burden of prematurely deciding questions that, entrusted to an agency, may receive a satisfactory administrative disposition and avoid the need for judicial review. . . . Shortt v. New Milford Police Dept., 212 Conn. 294, 306 n. 10, 562 A.2d 7 (1989); accord Johnson v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 248 Conn. 95. Moreover, the exhaustion doctrine recognizes the notion, grounded in deference to [the legislature's] delegation of authority to coordinate branches of Government, that agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that [the legislature] has charged them to administer. McCarthy v. Madigan, supra, 503 U.S. 145; accord Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, [supra, 215 Conn. 625]. Therefore, exhaustion of remedies serves dual functions: it protects the courts from becoming unnecessarily burdened with administrative appeals and it ensures the integrity of the agency's role in administering its statutory responsibilities." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford v. Hartford Municipal Employees Assn., 259 Conn. 251, 281-82, 788 A.2d 60 (2002).

"The [exhaustion] doctrine is applied in a number of different situations and is, like most judicial doctrines, subject to numerous exceptions.... [W]e have recognized such exceptions only infrequently and only for narrowly defined purposes . . . Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, 227 Conn. 545, 561, 630 A.2d 1304 (1993); Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, [207 Conn. 346, 353, 542 A.2d 672 (1988)]; such as when recourse to the administrative remedy would be futile or inadequate." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fish Unlimited v. Northeast Utilities Service Co., supra, 254 Conn. 13. Because of the policy behind the exhaustion doctrine, we construe these exceptions narrowly. See, e.g., O & G Industries, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 232 Conn. 419, 429, 655 A.2d 1121 (1995) (actual bias, rather than mere potential bias, of administrative body renders resort to administrative remedies futile); Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, supra, 561 (mere conclusory assertion that agency will not reconsider decision does not excuse compliance, on basis of futility, with exhaustion requirement); Housing Authority v. Papandrea, supra, 222 Conn. 432 (fact that commissioner of housing previously indicated how he would decide plaintiff's challenge to voucher program did not excuse compliance, on ground of futility, with exhaustion requirement).

Against this background, we must decide whether the plaintiff's failure to exhaust its appellate remedies pursuant to § 19a-229; see footnote 6 of this opinion; deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. More explicitly, we...