Stikes Woods Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Lacey

• Decision Date: 01 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 60990-0,60990-0
• Citation: 880 P.2d 25,124 Wn.2d 459
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STIKES WOODS NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, a Washington corporation; L.M. Middleton; and John E. Bouscher, Appellants, v. CITY OF LACEY, Washington, a municipal corporation; Larry M. Mayes and Bonita A. Mayes, husband and wife; Marcel A. Tomlin and Betty J. Tomlin, husband and wife; and Howard W. Sommer dba Hometown Land Corporation, a Washington corporation, Respondents.

Page 459

124 Wn.2d 459

880 P.2d 25

STIKES WOODS NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, a Washington corporation; L.M. Middleton; and John E Bouscher, Appellants, v. CITY OF LACEY, Washington, a municipal corporation; Larry M. Mayes and Bonita A. Mayes, husband and wife; Marcel A Tomlin and Betty J. Tomlin, husband and wife; and Howard W Sommer dba Hometown Land Corporation, a Washington corporation, Respondents.

No. 60990-0.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

Sept. 1, 1994.

Connolly, Holm, Tacon & Meserve, Allen T. Miller, Jr., Olympia, for appellants.

Kenneth R. Ahlf, Lacey City Atty., Lacey, for respondents.

GUY, Justice.

Appellants (collectively referred to as Stikes Woods) appeal the decision of the Thurston County Superior Court to deny as untimely its application for a writ of review. Stikes Woods argues it filed the application on time under CR 6(a). ¹ The Superior Court dismissed the application

                as untimely under RCW 1.12.040. 2  We reverse and reinstate Stikes Woods' application for a writ of review
                

FACTS

On July 8, 1993, the Lacey City Council discussed the preliminary plat for Ruddell Park, a 29-lot subdivision for single-family homes located south of Yorkshire Estates and Wonderwood Park. The City of Lacey's (Lacey) Environmental Impact Review Committee had previously given the subdivision a determination of nonsignificance under the State Environmental Policy Act.

At the City Council meeting, Stikes Woods appealed the determination of nonsignificance, arguing that the subdivision would unreasonably increase traffic on Ruddell Loop and create problems with storm water runoff. The City Council upheld the determination and approved the preliminary plat for Ruddell Park. On August 9, 1993--a Monday and 32 days later--Stikes Woods applied for a writ of review in Thurston County Superior Court. Under RCW 58.17.180 and RCW 43.21C.075(5)(a), Stikes Woods had 30 days to appeal the City Council's decision. The 30th day fell on August 7, 1993--a Saturday.

Lacey moved to deny Stikes Woods' application for the writ, arguing the writ was untimely. The Superior Court denied Lacey's motion and on September 7, 1993, issued the writ of review. Lacey timely filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's ruling, citing RCW 1.12.040. On September 20, 1993, the Superior Court granted the motion, finding the 30-day limitations period had run on Stikes Woods' application. The court quashed the writ of review. We accepted direct review.

ISSUE

The issue presented by this case is whether final Saturdays should be excluded in computing statutes of limitations periods. In other words, this case determines whether a claimant must file on the preceding Friday or the following Monday when a limitations period expires on a Saturday.

BACKGROUND

The Legislature first adopted RCW 1.12.040 in 1854 and has not revised it since 1887. Then, the usual workweek was 6 days long. Saturday was a day of commerce--banks, attorney offices, state offices, and courts were open for business. RCW 1.12.040 reflects this custom.

World War II ushered in the 5-day workweek. In 1955, the Legislature authorized state offices to close on Saturdays. RCW 42.04.060. In 1971 the Legislature recognized Saturday as a day off for the judiciary but never amended RCW 1.12.040 to reflect this change. RCW 2.04.030.

On May 5, 1967, this court adopted the Civil Rules for Superior Court (CR), effective July 1, 1967. CR 6(a) excluded the final Saturday (as well as the Sunday and holidays excluded by RCW 1.12.040) from computation of statutory limitations periods.

In four cases, ³ Division Two of the Court of Appeals determined that the civil rules generally, and CR 6(a) specifically, have no effect prior to the commencement of an action. The first of the four cases is Tarabochia v. Gig Harbor, 28 Wash.App. 119, 622 P.2d 1283 (1981). In its decision to include the final Saturday in time computation, the Tarabochia court followed Joint Council Dining Car Employees Local 370 v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 157 F.2d 417 (2d Cir.1946). There the Second Circuit argued:

Rule 6(a) is a rule of procedure relating to acts done or proceedings had after the commencement of action and to any statutes (Italics ours. Citations omitted.) Joint Council, 157 F.2d at 420.

expressly applicable to such proceedings. It is not intended to modify and change existing statutes of limitation. 1 Moore's Federal Practice 408 ...

Because plaintiffs cannot file complaints on Saturdays, strict adherence to the 1887 statute and the Tarabochia line of cases, while supportable, creates a "trap for the unwary". Further, the logic of Joint Council is no longer followed in the majority of federal jurisdictions. Once plaintiffs are in superior court, Washington follows CR 6. Thus, only when plaintiffs file their complaints is Saturday counted as the last day of a statutory period. The time is ripe for resolution of this incongruity and reconciliation of state and federal practice in this area.

ANALYSIS

It is a well-accepted premise that "[l]itigants and potential litigants are entitled to know that a matter as basic as time computation will be carried out in an easy, clear, and consistent manner, thereby eliminating traps for the unwary who seek to assert or defend their rights." McMillon v. Budget Plan of Va., 510 F.Supp. 17, 19 (E.D.Va.1980).

The confusion as to whether Saturdays will be excluded when computing the expiration of a statute of limitations contradicts this fundamental rule. A remedy may be accomplished by concluding CR 6(a) supercedes RCW 1.12.040; by reinterpreting RCW 1.12.040 to so exclude; or by harmonizing CR 6(a) and RCW 1.12.040. We hold that claimants faced with this filing dilemma--expiration of a limitations period on a Saturday--may file on the following Monday because CR 6(a) supersedes RCW 1.12.040, thereby excluding the final Saturday from computation.

We begin our analysis by addressing the holding of Joint Council. First, the Joint Council opinion's comments on Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) were not dispositive of the issue and were thus dicta.

Second, support for Joint Council has eroded substantially over time. Most federal circuits now hold that Fed.R. Third, recent scholarly commentary provides criticism for the argument sustained by the Joint Council rule. C. Wright and A. Miller note:

Civ.P. 6(a) does apply to statutes of limitations. In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 880 F.2d 1439 (D.C.Cir.1989); Kane v. Douglas, Elliman, Hollyday & Ives, 635 F.2d 141 (2d Cir.1980); Frey v. Woodard, 748 F.2d 173 (3d Cir.1984); Wirtz v. Peninsula Shipbuilders Ass'n, 382 F.2d 237 (4th Cir.1967); Quave v. Progress Marine, 912 F.2d 798 (5th Cir.1990); Tribue v. United States, 826 F.2d 633 (7th Cir.1987); Cooper v. Ashland, 871 F.2d 104 (9th Cir.1989); Hart v. United States, 817 F.2d 78 (9th Cir.1987); Maahs v. United States, 840 F.2d 863 (11th Cir.1988). A majority of state courts follow their example. Salzman v. Morentin, 116 Ariz. 79, 567 P.2d 1208 (1977); Dutton v. McKinley Cy. Bd. of Comm'rs, 113 N.M. 51, 822 P.2d 1134 (Ct.App.1991).

The thrust of this argument is that the computation provision in Rule 6(a) applies only to the measurement of time periods pertaining to facets of previously commenced litigation and have no relevance to the computation of the timeliness of the commencement itself. The argument seems somewhat metaphysical and, even if accepted, leaves open the question whether Rule 6(a) should not be drawn upon by the federal courts as a guideline for measuring federal limitations periods.

(Italics ours. Footnote omitted.) Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 4A Federal Practice § 1163, at 463 (2d ed. 1987).

Next, we examine the Court of Appeals' rationale in following Joint Council in the Tarabochia line of cases. That court expressed two concerns preventing Saturday exclusion: first, that by extending the date of filing from Saturday to Monday, the court improperly grants itself subject matter jurisdiction; and second, by increasing the time in which plaintiffs may file a complaint, the court impermissibly enters the legislative arena. Tarabochia, 28 Wash.App. at 123, 622 P.2d 1283; Patrick v. DeYoung, 45 Wash.App. 103, 108, 724 P.2d 1064 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Sidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann, Inc., 117 Wash.2d 325, 815 P.2d 781 (1991); Fisher v. Tacoma, 70 Wash.App. 635, 639, 855 P.2d 299 (1993).

In response to the first concern, we note that federal courts have developed the "jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction" rule, giving courts the inherent jurisdiction to construe jurisdictional statutes. In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., supra at 1445; United Mine Workers of Am. v. Dole, 870 F.2d 662, 665 (D.C.Cir.1989). This court also has jurisdiction to determine the procedures which govern its own jurisdiction. RCW 2.04.190. Additionally, any decision the court makes on this issue will affect its subject matter jurisdiction (shortening or lengthening the period will have the same effect in jurisdictional terms).

As to the Court of Appeals' second concern, this court's action does not encroach upon legislative powers. In acting to interpret the statute and the rule, the court is effecting the legislative purpose and intent behind RCW 1.12.040; that is, to provide the greatest degree of fairness to claimants by allowing for filing on the next business day when the period of limitations expires on a day of court closure. The Supreme Court is authorized by RCW 1.12.010 ⁴ to liberally construe the provisions of the code.

When the Legislature first enacted RCW 1.12.040, Sundays and holidays were the only days courts were closed. Now, because the Legislature has acted to close courts on Saturdays, common sense suggests the Legislature's intention.

Many civil rules affect litigant behavior prior to the formal commencement of an action. These areas of influence can be characterized as fundamentally procedural. In acting as ...