Teamsters Local Union No. 421 v. City of Dubuque

• Decision Date: 09 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-0736.,04-0736.
• Citation: 706 N.W.2d 709
• Parties: TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 421 and John Gotto, Appellants, v. CITY OF DUBUQUE, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

706 N.W.2d 709

TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 421 and John Gotto, Appellants, v. CITY OF DUBUQUE, Appellee.

No. 04-0736.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

December 9, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Scott D. Soldon and Andrea F. Hoeschen of Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman, S.C., Milwaukee, WI, for appellants.

Barry A. Lindahl, Dubuque, for appellee.

William F. Sueppel of Meardon, Sueppel & Downer, P.L.C., Iowa City, for amicus curiae Iowa League of Cities.

Donald C. Hoskins, Marion, for amicus curiae City of Marion.

CADY, Justice.

This appeal from a declaratory judgment requires us to decide whether a city snowplow operator is a "critical municipal employee" under a statute allowing cities to impose reasonable residency restrictions on such employees. The district court determined that the city snowplow operator was a critical employee and was subject to the municipal residency restriction. The court of appeals reversed. Upon our review, we agree with the district court. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the district court judgment.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In 1980, the City of Dubuque issued an administrative policy that imposed a residency requirement for its employees. The policy required that

persons hired after August 31, 1980, shall be, within six (6) months of the date of hire, residents of the State of Iowa and shall have their principal place of residence either within the corporate limits of the City of Dubuque or within 6.5 miles of the corporate limits of the City of Dubuque by the most direct street, road, or highway.

City of Dubuque, Administrative Policy No. 4.05 (Sept. 1, 1980), http://www.cityofdubuque.org/index. cfm?pageid=412. The policy was adopted after the Iowa legislature enacted a law that allowed cities in Iowa to "set reasonable maximum distances outside of the corporate limits of the city that police officers, fire fighters and other critical municipal employees may live." Iowa Code § 400.17 (2001).

John Gotto was hired by the City of Dubuque after the policy was instituted. He resides in Epworth, Iowa, 7.2 miles outside the Dubuque corporate limits. It takes Gotto twenty-five minutes to drive from his home to work in normal driving conditions. He holds the position of Equipment Operator II in the Operations and Maintenance Department of the City. His job duties include operating a snowplow to remove snow and ice from city streets.

In April 2002, the Operations and Maintenance manager for the City sent a letter to Gotto informing him that he was in violation of the residency restriction. Gotto was told he would lose his job if he failed to comply with the requirement within a certain period of time.

In response to the notice, Gotto and his local union unsuccessfully pursued a grievance against the City. They then filed a declaratory judgment petition seeking a declaration that Gotto was not a "critical municipal employee" under Iowa Code section 400.17. Gotto also asked for a declaration that the residency requirement was facially invalid because it was not restricted to "critical municipal employees," but rather applied to all city employees.

Gotto and the City filed cross-motions for summary judgment. As a part of the summary judgment record, the Operations and Maintenance Department manager and the City Manager expressed their belief that Gotto was a critical employee. Gotto's supervisor explained that Gotto is one of eight back-up employees whose function is to fill in for the twenty-eight regular department employees in case of illness, injury, or other similar events. Moreover, Gotto is one of only six employees in the entire department who operates heavy snowplow equipment. There was evidence that Gotto had been called in to work on numerous occasions to clear snow and ice from the roads. In addition, both the police chief and the fire chief for the City of Dubuque stated that their personnel would be unable to timely respond to emergencies during snowstorms if the city streets were not cleared of ice and snow.

The district court denied Gotto's motion for summary judgment and granted the City's motion. The court determined that Gotto was a "critical municipal employee," but did not address the additional issue whether the City's policy was facially invalid. Gotto filed a notice of appeal without first filing a motion asking the trial court to specifically rule on the issue whether the City's policy was invalid on its face.

We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals concluded Gotto was not a critical municipal employee. It reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Gotto. We granted the City's application for further review.

II. Standard of Review

"`A declaratory judgment action tried at law limits our review to correction of errors at law. We are bound by well-supported findings of fact, but are not bound by the legal conclusions of the district court.'" In re Estate of Tolson, 690 N.W.2d 680, 682 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Petersen, 679 N.W.2d 571, 575 (Iowa 2004)). Likewise, we review rulings granting summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Otterberg v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 696 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Iowa 2005) (citing In re Estate of Graham, 690 N.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Iowa 2004)).

III. Preservation of Error

We first address the claim by Gotto that the City policy is facially invalid because it applies to all city employees, rather than only "critical municipal employees." See Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A ("Municipal corporations are granted home rule power and authority, not inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly, to determine their local affairs in government...."); Iowa Code § 364.2(2) ("A City may exercise its general powers subject only to limitations expressly imposed by a state or city law."). Although Gotto presented this issue to the district court, the district court did not address it in its written decision, and Gotto did not file a motion to enlarge under rule 1.904(2). Generally, error is not preserved for appeal on an issue submitted but not decided by the district court when the party seeking the appeal failed to file a posttrial motion asking the district court to rule on the issue. See In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 266 (Iowa 2005); Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Iowa 2002).

Gotto argues the district court impliedly decided the municipal restriction was facially valid when it ruled that the policy applied to him. However, our preservation-of-error rule does not draw any such assumptions. Although we assume, for purposes of appellate review, that the district court considered and rejected all defenses to a claim on its merits when not specifically addressed in its ruling, this rule is inapplicable to our rule requiring error to be preserved. Id. at 539-40. Gotto was required to preserve error by filing a rule 1.904(2) motion when the district court failed to address the facial invalidity issue. Accordingly, error has not been preserved.¹

For the purposes of this appeal, we consider the City's residency policy to be limited by the "critical municipal employee" limitation under section 400.17. We therefore proceed to consider whether Gotto can be subject to the residency restriction as a "critical municipal employee."

IV. "Critical Municipal Employee"

Disputes over the interpretation of a statute can arise even with the most carefully drafted laws. 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45:02, at 15 (6th ed. 2000) [hereinafter Singer]. Disputes arise because it is nearly impossible, even for the most thoughtful lawmakers, to anticipate all future circumstances and neatly corral them into communicative words. Id. Thus, it is a fundamental role, and duty, of courts to interpret statutes enacted by our legislature when particular disputes arise. See Slockett v. Iowa Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist., 359 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1984) ("[I]t is the fundamental prerogative of the legislature to declare what the law shall be, but of the courts to declare what it is." (Citation omitted.)); accord Lynch v. Saddler, 656 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 2003) ("In general, it is the legislature's duty to declare the law and the court's responsibility to interpret the law." (Citation omitted.)).

Courts have, over time, carefully crafted and refined rules of construction to help ascertain the legislative intent of a statute. See State v. DeCamp, 622 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Iowa 2001) ("In the absence of clear legislative intent, we turn to the rules of statutory construction." (citing State v. Perez, 563 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Iowa 1997))); Singer § 45:02, at 13 ("Accepted rules of statutory construction can provide helpful guidance in uncovering the most likely legislative intent."). We apply these rules in resolving statutory disputes to attain our goal of interpreting statutes according to the intent of the legislature. See Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 606 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Iowa 2000) ("In interpreting the statute, our ultimate goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature." (citing Iowa Fed'n of Labor AFL-CIO v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 427 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Iowa 1988))). We begin in this case, as we do in all cases, with the language of the statute. See Singer § 47:01, at 208 ("The starting point in statutory construction is to read and examine the text of the act....").

Iowa Code section 400.17 provides, in relevant part:

Cities may set reasonable maximum distances outside of the corporate limits of the city that police officers, fire fighters and other critical municipal employees may live.

Iowa Code § 400.17. Gotto claims the legislature intended the phrase "critical municipal employees" to cover only employees who regularly respond to emergency situations that...