The State ex rel. Case v. Seehorn

• Decision Date: 12 July 1920
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. MARY B. CASE et al. v. THOMAS J. SEEHORN, Judge of Circuit Court of Jackson County
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

223 S.W. 664

283 Mo. 508

THE STATE ex rel. MARY B. CASE et al. v. THOMAS J. SEEHORN, Judge of Circuit Court of Jackson County

Supreme Court of Missouri

July 12, 1920

Writ issued.

Scarritt Jones, Seddon & North and Lathrop, Morrow, Fox & Moore for relators.

(1) The Jackson County Circuit Court had jurisdicton of the petition for review herein. (a) Section 127 of the Public Service Act requires that "the provisions of this act shall be liberally construed with a view to the public welfare efficient facilities and substantial justice between patrons and public utilities." This court has, on several occasions, pointed out that this act is highly remedial and should be liberally construed. State ex rel. v. K. C. Gas Co., 254 Mo. 535; State ex rel. v. Public Service Comm., 259 Mo. 713; State ex rel. v. Public Service Comm., 275 Mo. 201. Having in mind this rule of construction, we seek the intent of the Legislature in providing that an application for a writ of review may be made "to the circuit court of the county where the hearing was held or in which the commission has its principal office." (2) It is perfectly apparent that the Legislature desired to avoid the necessity of bringing all court actions to review orders of the commission in a single circuit court. It is in fact noteworthy that the provision for going into the circuit court of any county where the matter involved was heard by the commission is placed first and given precedence over the right to go into the circuit court of the county where the commission has its principal office. (3) The act provides for and empowers the commission to go from place to place over the State and hold hearings so it is the evident intention of the act to so provide that it is possible for matters involving public utilities and their patrons to be heard and considered both by the commission and by the court at the place where the parties litigant reside, and the subject-matter of the investigation is situated. To prevent this evident intent of the Legislature from being frustrated, the words, "the hearing" should not be taken too strictly, but should be construed to mean "a hearing" or "any hearing," or at least the important or conspicuous hearing. (4) The act contemplates that many hearings, even in a single controversy, may be held, and that they may be held at different places in the State, to suit the convenience of the parties to the controversy as well as the commission. Section 109 refers expressly to "any hearing by the commission or a commissioner." The very nature of the investigation required to be made by the commission, the number of parties to be heard and the whole spirit of the act contemplate that the commission shall travel throughout the State and have hearings amongst the people and surroundings to be affected. And this is true, although Section 11 requires the principal office of the commission to be at Jefferson City and the act requires the orders and decisions of the commission to be recorded at its principal office. (5) It is entirely possible that the commission might hold a hearing in six or more counties of the State concerning a single controversy. It might be that each of these several hearings would be of equal importance, so that no one could technically be denominated "the hearing" of the matter. It is not reasonable to suppose that the Legislature intended that in such a case the interested parties could not go into the circuit court of any of the counties where a hearing was had for a review of the decision of the commission, but were restricted to the circuit court of the county where the commission had its principal office. Noyes v. Aid Society, 70 N.Y. 481. (6) It is a well established rule that the interpretation or construction placed on a law by those whose duty it is to administer it will be given great, if not controlling, weight by the courts. Ross v. Ry. Co., 111 Mo. 18; State ex rel. v. Severance, 49 Mo. 404; U.S. v. Ala. G. S. R. Co., 142 U.S. 615; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1. The Public Service Commission has repeatedly acted upon the construction of the act which would give to the circuit court of the county where a hearing was had, jurisdiction to review the commission's orders. In this very case the commission filed their answer and return and entered their appearance in the petition for review in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, without questioning the jurisdiction of that court. The records of this court show that it has been quite customary for writs of review to be entertained and heard by circuit courts in the county where a hearing has been had by the commission. Mo. Southern Ry. Co. v. Public Service Com., 214 S.W. 379; State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Com. v. Mo. Southern Ry. Co., 214 S.W. 381; State ex rel. Danciger v. Pub. Serv. Com., 275 Mo. 483, 205 S.W. 42; State ex rel. Wabash Rd. v. Pub. Serv. Com., 271 Mo. 155; State ex rel. M. K. & T. Ry. v. Pub. Serv. Com., 271 Mo. 270; State ex rel. United Rys. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Com., 270 Mo. 429; State ex rel. Rds. v. Publ. Serv. Com., 269 Mo. 63. (7) Any question as to the jurisdiction of the Jackson County Circuit Court was waived when the Commission filed its answer and return to the writ of review. Commonwealth v. McAllister, 1 Watts (Pa.) 307; State ex rel. Reider v. Moniteau Co. Ct., 45 Mo.App. 387; State v. Schneider, 47 Mo.App. 669; State ex rel. v. Souders, 69 Mo.App. 474; Tod v. Chrisman, 123 Iowa 693; Chambers v. Lewis, 9 Iowa, 583; Baker v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 583; State ex rel. v. Weinfurther, 66 N.W. 702; Mac Fall v. Dover, 70 N. J. L. 521; N. C. Corp. Comm. v. Southern Ry. Co., 151 N.C. 447; Specht v. Central Passenger Ry. Co., 68 A. 788.

John H. Lucas for defendant.

(1) A writ of mandamus will not lie in the instant case. The question of fact was involved, namely, the county in which the hearing was had. Where facts are disputed the lower court determines its jurisdiction on the facts before it. State ex rel. v. Mills, 231 Mo. 500; Coleman v. Dalton, 71 Mo.App. 24; State ex rel. v. Sea, 23 Mo.App. 623; State ex rel. v. Johnson, 266 Mo. 671; State ex rel. v. Jones, 155 Mo. 576; State ex rel. v. Smith, 104 Mo. 424; Holland v. Railroad Co., 134 Mo. 479; Smith v. Perryman, 272 Mo. 375; Cole v. Ricketts, 111 Mo.App. 105; Hammond v. Darlington, 109 Mo.App. 333. In the instant case the statute itself provides the method of procedure by way of appeal. Laws 1913, p. 644, sec. 14. State ex rel. Hillar v. Thornhill, 174 Mo.App. 369; State ex rel. v. Life Ins. Co., 169 Mo.App. 354; State ex rel. v. Dreyer, 183 Mo.App. 463; State ex rel. v. Hudson, 226 Mo. 239; State ex. rel. v. Spring Electric Co., 232 Mo. 130; State ex rel. v. Calhoun, 211 S.W. 111. (2) The Act of 1913, p. 641, relating to jurisdiction of the court is void as to the Circuit Court of Jackson County, in violation of the Constitution, the same being both special and local. Sec. 53, Art. 4, subdivision 17, subdivision 53; Henderson v. Koenig, 168 Mo. 356; State v. Anslinger, 171 Mo. 600; State ex rel. v. Borden, 164 Mo. 221; State ex rel. v. Turner, 210 Mo. 83; State ex rel. Barker v. Southern, 265 Mo. 275. (3) The respondent correctly construed the statute. To save the same from unconstitutionality, jurisdiction is held to be in the Circuit Court of Cole County. St. Louis v. Mo. Pacific Ry. Co., 262 Mo. 720; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 266 Mo. 394; State ex rel. v. Farmer, 271 Mo. 306. (a) A general clause will yield to a special one where there is conflict. State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 241 Mo. 231; Hershe v. Roach, 258 Mo. 541; Hershe v. Revelle, 258 Mo. 568; Wilkinson v. Thom, 194 Mo.App. 173. (b) In the instant case, the evidence having established the fact that the hearing, both in fact and in law, being in Cole County, the jurisdiction under the Commission Act was properly held to be in the circuit court of that county. Above authorities; State ex rel. v. Flannely, 96 Kan. 380; Cole v. Rickett, 111 Mo.App. 105; Hammond v. Darlington, 109 Mo.App. 333; 2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary (3 Rev.), p. 429; 25 R. C. L. secs. 207, 211, 213, 953, 956, 957; 7 R. C. L. secs. 61, 1032.

BLAIR, J. Graves, J., dissents in separate opinion.

OPINION

In Banc

Mandamus.

BLAIR J. --

This is a proceeding by mandamus to compel Hon. Thomas J. Seehorn, Judge of the Jackson County Circuit Court, to take jurisdiction and proceed to hear and determine the issues made on writ of review sued out against the Public Service Commission of Missouri. Relators are the petitioners who secured the issuance of the writ of review.

The Kansas City Light, Heat & Power Company is a corporation engaged in furnishing electrical energy and steam heat to the public in Kansas City, Missouri. In 1918 this company applied to the Public Service Commission for an increase in rates and filed the proposed schedules. Kansas City filed a protest. On June 12, 1918, the commission issued its notice that it had "set the above entitled cause for hearing before the commission on Monday, June 24, 1918, at the office of the commission in Jefferson City, Missouri." June 14, 1918 the commission made an order staying the proposed rates for a period ending October 28, 1918. June 22, 1918, many consumers, including relators, filed their protest against the proposed rates. June 24, 1918, the Light Company moved for a complete valuation of its property and "accounting examination of books." June 24, 1918, a hearing was had at Jefferson City before Commissioners Busby, Bean, Blair and Simpson, "at which testimony of certain witnesses offered by the Kansas City Light, Heat & Power Company was heard. But no evidence was then offered on behalf of any other party to the said proceeding because it was not convenient to do so and because of the assurance then given...