Tony W., Matter of

• Decision Date: 11 October 1977
• Citation: 398 N.Y.S.2d 528,91 Misc.2d 700
• Parties: Matter of TONY W., a person alleged to be a juvenile delinquent, Respondent.
• Court: New York City Court

Page 528

398 N.Y.S.2d 528

91 Misc.2d 700

Matter of TONY W., a person alleged to be a juvenile delinquent, Respondent.

Family Court of City of New York, New York County.

Oct. 11, 1977.

J. Bernard Richland, Corp. Counsel, New York City (Richard H. Rosenberg, New York City, of counsel), for petitioner.

Charles Schinitsky, Legal Aid Society, Brooklyn (Maura B. Somers, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

NANETTE DEMBITZ, Judge:

The instant motion for the sealing of a juvenile arrest record, invokes a recent amendment of the Criminal Procedure Law as a fresh basis for an order to the police to seal the record of a juvenile's arrest. Under the law as it stood prior to the CPL amendment, the Court of Appeals had rejected a variety of arguments offered in support of efforts to secure such orders. Matter of Richard S., 32 N.Y.2d 592, 347 N.Y.S.2d 54, 300 N.E.2d 426; Matter of Antonio P., 40 N.Y.2d 960, 390 N.Y.S.2d 919, 359 N.E.2d 42. ¹ The Court nevertheless recognized the social and economic dilemmas that had given rise to the numerous cases seeking to expunge or seal juvenile arrest records, concluding that an arrest record may "result in unwarranted discrimination in the child's future." Richard S., 32 N.Y.2d at p. 595, 347 N.Y.S.2d at p. 56, 300 N.E. at p. 427.

The recent amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law provides for a court order to the police to seal an arrest record when a criminal action terminates in favor of the accused in a specified manner. (CPL 160.50, effective September 1, 1976). The record thereafter will be available only to the accused and to various officials, under specified circumstances.

The CPL amendment reads in the terms of adult criminal proceedings and omits any mention of Family Court juvenile delinquency proceedings, in which charges of crime against minors under 16 are adjudicated. The question at bar is whether the principle of fair and equal treatment of juvenile with adult offenders, established by a body of appellate rulings in this State and in the United States Supreme Court, requires the extension to juveniles of the new rule as to the sealing of an arrest record. For the reasons detailed below, this court holds that juveniles must be given the benefit of the CPL amendment.

A. Application of CPL to Juveniles

While the United States Supreme Court recognizes that a juvenile delinquency proceeding is essentially criminal, it has left for case-by-case determination the issue of whether the various Constitutional protections accorded adult defendants also cover juveniles (Matter of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; Matter of Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368; McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647). In similar vein, the New York Court of Appeals has held that the CPL does not automatically govern in its entirety in juvenile delinquency proceedings (Matter of D., 27 N.Y.2d 90, 95, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704, 707, 261 N.E.2d 627, 630), and applicability has been decided on a case-by-case, provision-by-provision basis.

The learning to be derived from this body of law is that the constitutional guarantee of "due process and fair treatment" requires that courts accord the juvenile in a delinquency proceeding the protections accorded in adult criminal proceedings unless the particular procedural step "would risk destruction of beneficial aspects of the juvenile process." Matter of Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359, 366, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073. Thus, one CPL provision after another has been held applicable, as a matter of Constitutional necessity, to a juvenile, because "to hold otherwise would deny to him his right of equal protection of the laws" and violate "the requirements of due process and fair treatment" Matter of Steven B., 30 A.D.2d 442, 444, 293 N.Y.S.2d 946, 947, 948 (1st Dept.). A failure to accord the protection of a CPL provision "based solely upon age, without other justification, denies both due process and equal protection of the law." Matter of Eric R., 34 A.D.2d 402, 403, 312 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (2nd Dept.). ² See also Guggenheim v. Mucci, 32 N.Y.2d 307, 313, 344 N.Y.S.2d 944, 949, 298 N.E.2d 109, 112, where the court in effect imported the CPL rules on preliminary hearings into juvenile proceedings, saying: "It would take a distorted view to believe that adult felony criminal proceedings were designed to be more tender of the rights of detained adults than the Family Court proceedings are of juveniles."

The net result of the cases considering whether juveniles should enjoy the various constitutional or statutory protections accorded to adult criminal defendants, is that all have been held applicable to juveniles except for the right to jury trial which was deemed disadvantageous to juveniles ³ and except for the minor, formal requirement of notice of intention to introduce an admission. Matter of D., 27 N.Y.2d 90, 95, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704, 707, 261 N.E.2d 627, 630.

B. Application to Juveniles of New CPL Provision on Sealing Arrest Records

1. Purpose and Policy of CPL Provision

Under the principle established by the above cases that a protection conferred on adult defendants must be extended to juveniles unless inappropriate for them, it seems clear that the new provision on arrest records must be applied to juveniles. Certainly juveniles cannot be denied its benefit on the ground approved in Winship for an exception to the general principle of equality of treatment of juveniles and adults (that its application "would risk destruction of beneficial aspects of the juvenile process". Winship, 397 U.S. at p. 366, 90 S.Ct. at p. 366.) And, for validity, a discrimination denying a benefit to a juvenile "must, at the very least 'have some relation to the purpose for which the classification is made.' " Matter of Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 88, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33, 36. This principle dictates the application of the arrest-record provision to juveniles. For, there is no rational ground for distinction between adults and juveniles from the standpoint of the purpose and policy of the legislation.

The purpose of the CPL amendment, as stated in the Governor's message approving it, was "to protect the rights of individuals" and to effectuate "the presumption of innocence." McKinney's Session Laws of New York for 1976, p. 2451. That presumption is just as basic for juveniles as adults (see Winship, 397 U.S. at p. 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068). But, as the Court of Appeals recognized in Richard S. (supra), in the economic world the juvenile must prepare to enter there tends to be a presumption of guilt from an arrest record rather than the presumption of innocence that in the world of legal theory prevails until conviction. The police record of a juvenile's arrest, even though he was never found guilty, thus is a handicap to him when he seeks public or private employment or entrance into the Armed Forces or a scholarship or a professional license (see Richard S., 32 N.Y.2d at p. 595, 347 N.Y.S.2d at p. 56, 300 N.E.2d at p. 427). ⁴

Certainly the injustice to which the CPL amendment is directed, and the "unwarranted discrimination in the child's future" (ibid ) is as serious for a youth as an adult. Further, many arrested juveniles are children of the poor and the minorities; it is particularly onerous, and contrary to the public interest, for them to bear the additional handicap of an arrest record when they attempt to gain a foothold on the economic ladder and climb out of the poverty ghetto.

Juvenile delinquency proceedings in place of criminal court proceedings for youths under 16 were designed to ameliorate the harsh consequences of the latter, and especially to lessen the stigma of arrest (Fam.Ct.Act, sec. 784). It would be an irrational anomaly if juveniles under 16 are denied the benefit of the protection of the CPL amendment on arrest records while it is available to those tried in adult criminal proceedings or in the youthful offender part established in the criminal court for youths 16 to 19.

2. Comparison with Provisions Previously Held Applicable

While the CPL provisions previously held applicable to juveniles have involved the admissibility of evidence and trial procedure, a distinction between them and the instant provision seems unjustified from the standpoint of the principle of fair and equal treatment of juveniles with adults. The CPL amendment at bar provides for the issuance of the sealing order as the final phase of the trial proceeding itself, rather than in a separate proceeding. Thus, the status of the instant provision is similar to that of the provision on preliminary hearings, involved in Guggenheim v. Mucci, supra. ⁵

Further, the principle that juveniles are entitled to the same protection as adults encompasses more than evidentiary matters. In Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530-531, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1786, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy applies to a juvenile as it does to an adult for the "heavy pressures and burdens psychological, physical and financial . . . on a person charged" as well as the "anxiety and insecurity" which the accused experiences, are the same for a juvenile as an adult. The appellate courts expound a broad rather than a narrow application of the principle of fair treatment of juveniles: there is a need for "fundamental fairness in the juvenile court system" (Breed, 421 U.S. at p. 531, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1786); it must be animated by "sympathy and concern for the young" (McKeiver, 403 U.S. at p. 555, 91 S.Ct. at p. 1991; also see p. 550, 91 S.Ct. 1976); "irreparable harm (is) . . . the antithesis" of its purpose (Richard S., 32 N.Y.2d at p. 595, 347 N.Y.S.2d at p. 56, 427 N.E.2d at p. 427).

3. Imputation of Terms into CPL

That the CPL provision reads in terms of adult proceedings, referring throughout to "criminal action", "accusatory instrument" and the "accused", is no obstacle to application of the provision in juvenile...