Town of New Milford v. SCA Services of Connecticut, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 December 1977
• Citation: 174 Conn. 146,384 A.2d 337
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: TOWN OF NEW MILFORD v. SCA SERVICES OF CONNECTICUT, INC., et al.

Page 337

384 A.2d 337

174 Conn. 146

TOWN OF NEW MILFORD v. SCA SERVICES OF CONNECTICUT, INC., et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 1, 1977.

Decided Dec. 27, 1977.

John W. Pickard, West Hartford, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph F. Keefe and William J. Purcell, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Jeffrey B. Sienkiewicz, with whom was A. Searle Pinney, Danburg, for appellees (defendant towns of Bridgewater et al.).

John E. Silliman, Hartford, filed a brief as amicus curiae.

Before HOUSE, C. J., and COTTER, LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI and LONGO, JJ.

COTTER, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendant, SCA Services of Connecticut, Inc., from using its property located in New Milford as a solid waste disposal facility for the disposal of waste material transported from outside the town limits of New Milford. In its amended complaint the plaintiff alleges that solid waste from the defendant towns of Kent, Warren, Bridgewater, Brookfield and Sherman is transported to and disposed of at the New Milford facility. The basis of the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is the failure of the defendant SCA Services of Connecticut, Inc., and the defendant towns to obtain a permit from the plaintiff to dispose of waste materials originating outside of New Milford at that facility as required by § 7-161 of the General Statutes. ¹ The defendant towns of Warren, Bridgewater, Brookfield and Sherman demurred to the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that (1) the permit requirement of § 7-161 does not apply to facilities already in existence, and (2) § 7-161 constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power since this statute lacks adequate standards for controlling the action of local officials in granting or denying the permits required thereunder. The trial court overruled the first ground of the demurrer of those towns. From the judgment rendered on the decision of the court sustaining the second ground of the demurrer, the plaintiff has appealed. The sole question presented concerns the constitutionality of § 7-161.

In passing upon the constitutionality of a legislative act, we will make every presumption and intendment in favor of its validity, and sustain the enactment unless its unconstitutionality is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Grover v. Manchester, 168 Conn. 84, 88, 357 A.2d 922; Kellems v. Brown, 163 Conn. 478, 486, 313 A.2d 53, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099, 93 S.Ct. 911, 34 L.Ed.2d 678. The trial court concluded that § 7-161 of the General Statutes constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in violation of article third, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution. ² The statute provides in part that a permit must be obtained from a commission in the particular locality in order to establish or operate a waste treatment facility which receives waste from other towns. Although § 7-161 requires that the commission afford an applicant notice and a hearing prior to its decision denying or granting such a permit, it fails to delineate applicable criteria to guide the commission in its final determination.

The law-making power is in the legislative branch of our government and cannot constitutionally be delegated; Len-Lew Realty Co. v. Falsey, 141 Conn. 524, 528, 107 A.2d 403; but the General Assembly may carry out its legislative policies within the police power of the state by delegating to an administrative agency the power to "fill in the details." Ibid.; H. Duys & Co., Inc. v. Tone, 125 Conn. 300, 312, 5 A.2d 23. "In order to render admissible such delegation of legislative power, however, it is necessary that the statute declare a legislative policy, establish primary standards for carrying it out, or lay down an intelligible principle to which the administrative officer or body must conform." State v. Stoddard, 126 Conn. 623, 628, 13 A.2d 586, 588; Wilson v. Connecticut Product Development Corporation, 167 Conn. 111, 120, 355 A.2d 72; State v. Griffiths, 152 Conn. 48, 57, 203 A.2d 144; 1 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law § 117. In conferring discretionary power upon the commission, the legislature has not only failed to provide reasonably adequate and definite guidance for the commission to pass upon an application for a statutory permit, but a reading of § 7-161 reveals the total absence of any standards which the local commission is to apply.

The plaintiff argues, however, that the standards missing in § 7-161 are provided for in § 7-162 ³ which it claims "was intended by the legislature to supplement and elaborate upon the basic provisions of § 7-161." While it is clear that § 7-162, like § 7-161, relates to the disposal of waste material, § 7-162 applies only after a permit has been granted and relates to the manner and method of transportation of waste material. Nowhere in § 7-162 can we find an intelligible principle for the commission to follow in granting or denying such a permit. Section 7-162 further states that the plant and transportation shall be conducted in accordance with approved sanitary methods, which lends additional support to the conclusion that this section was intended to apply only to waste disposal facilities already in existence once a permit has been granted. Thus, we do not construe § 7-162 as applying to the initial issuance of a permit so as to cure the constitutional infirmity inherent in § 7-161.

Although the General Assembly has enacted a rather comprehensive state-wide solid waste management program, to be administered by the commissioner of environmental protection, ⁴ it has nevertheless allowed localities to make additional provisions and otherwise further control the disposal of solid waste located within their boundaries. ⁵ Any such delegation of legislative power by the General Assembly, however, is subject to constitutional restrictions. State v. Stoddard, supra, 126 Conn. 627, 13 A.2d 586; State v. Conlon, 65 Conn. 478, 484, 33 A. 519. Where a statute, such as § 7-161, vests public officials with the discretion to grant, refuse or revoke a license to carry on an ordinarily lawful business, and does not set an express standard to guide and govern the exercise of this discretion, the attempted delegation of power is a nullity. Wilson v. West Haven, 142 Conn. 646, 655, 116 A.2d 420; Eastern Oil Refining Co. v. Court of Burgesses, 130 Conn. 606, 611, 36...