Van v. U.S. Dep't of Justice
| Decision Date | 26 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 17-cv-04043-YGR |
| Parties | NATHALIE THUY VAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA; DISTRICT JUDGE LUCY KOH, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Plaintiff Natalie Thuy Van brings this suit against defendants United States Department of Justice (the "DOJ"), District Court for the Northern District of California (the "District Court"), and District Judge Lucy Koh ("Judge Koh") alleging violations of plaintiff's rights under (1) the Fourteenth and (2) Fifth Amendment; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Judge Koh; (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the DOJ and District Court; and (5) 42 U.S.C. § 1981; as well as (6) civil conspiracy and collusion; (7) fraud and misrepresentation; (8) fraud by commission; (9) retaliation; (10) intentional infliction of emotion distress; (11) negligence infliction of emotional distress; and (12) negligent hiring, training, and supervision of an employee. Defendants move to dismiss all claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 23, Motion.) Having carefully considered the pleadings and the arguments of the parties, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6).1
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This suit arises from Van's prior action against Language Line Services, Inc. for unpaid wages (the "Language Line" action). (Dkt. No. 1, Complaint ¶¶ 15-18.) Van initially filed the Language Line action in state court. See Van v. Language Line Services, Inc., 14-cv-03791-LHK (N.D. Cal. 2014), Dkt. No. 10-2 at 5. Three state court judges presided over the Language Line action, and Van filed complaints against the first two alleging improper ex parte communications. Id., Dkt. No. 61 at 2-5.2 After assignment, and with orders pending, Van voluntarily dismissed the case before refiling it in federal court. Id. Judge Koh presided over the Language Line action through trial.
In the instant case, Van alleges several instances of improper conduct surrounding the Language Line action, namely Judge Koh's alleged decisions to (1) deny plaintiff's motions for disqualification of Judge Koh, (2) prevent Van from discussing the court's prior ruling on objections to a witness subpoena during Van's closing argument, (3) issue allegedly erroneous jury instructions regarding damages and the statute of limitations under the Fair Labor Standards Act, (4) enter two different verdict forms on the docket the day before the jury reached its verdict, (5) enter judgment in Van's favor which was less than the amount Van claimed in damages, (6) delay entering trial documents until six days after the trial had concluded, (7) deny Van's motion for attorneys' fees, (8) fraudulently modify documents, (9) permit her clerk to engage in ex parte communications with defense counsel, and (10) engage in ex parte communications with defense counsel regarding trial exhibits, and (11) allow a Deputy United States Marshal to serve on the jury. (Complaint ¶¶ 23, 25, 27-29, 31, 32, 34, 41, 49, 52.)
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a "lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). The complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If the facts alleged do not support a reasonable inference of liability, stronger than a mere possibility, the claim must be dismissed. Id. at 678-79. Mere "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004).
"Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for their judicial acts." Adams v. Committee on Judicial Conduct & Disability, 165 F.Supp.3d 911, 921-922 (N.D. Cal. 2016); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per curium). The doctrine of judicial immunity supports "judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988). When acting in their judicial capacity, judges are immune from suit except when their conduct is "in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Both the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have described this immunity as "absolute." Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987); Moore, 96 F.3d at 1243; Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Allegations that a judge acted outside the judge's judicial capacity are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Lonneker Farms, Inc. v. Klobucher, 804 F.2d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir. 1986).
Here, plaintiff's allegations against Judge Koh are based on Judge Koh's evidentiary rulings, voir dire, jury instructions, denial of Van's motion for attorneys' fees, and maintenance of the case file docket, and on alleged third-party communications with defense counsel in the Language Line action. The Court finds that these allegations arise from judicial acts and that plaintiff's claims against Judge Koh are thus barred under the doctrine of judicial immunity. SeeCooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 946 (6th Cir. 2000) (); Mullis, 828 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1998) (); Adams, 165 F.Supp.3d at 924 (same).
Van argues that judicial immunity does not apply here because Judge Koh was subject to automatic disqualification. Specifically, Van relies on Liteky v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 1147 (1994), which held that Id. at 1162 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Here, plaintiff asserts that Van orally requested that Judge Koh recuse herself from the Language Line action and then filed a motion for disqualification. Judge Koh denied the motion and declined to recuse herself on the ground that "the Court [held] no biases or prejudices in [that] case." Language Line, Dkt. No. 354. Further, Van avers that "Van believed that District Judge Ko[h] had a bias or prejudice against her and that Van did not receive justice." (Dkt. No. 27, Opposition at 10.)
Plaintiff does not persuade. Other than referencing case-specific actions plaintiff has provided no factual support for her allegation that "District Judge Koh had a bias or prejudice against her and that Van did not receive justice." Thus, the allegations are insufficient to raise a plausible inference that "an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality" or that Judge Koh's "attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely." Liteky, 113 S.Ct. at 1162. As the Ninth Circuit held in Lonneker, conclusory allegations "that a judge acted outside the judge's judicial capacity are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss." Lonneker. 804 F.2d at 1097.
Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss with regard to Judge Koh is GRANTED on the ground that Van's suit is barred under the doctrine of judicial immunity.3
"As a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit unless it waives such immunity." Chadd v. United States, 794 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2015). "Similarly, suits against officials of the United States . . . in their official capacity are barred if there has been no waiver." Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 2001). "It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction." Jachetta v. United States, 653 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)). "[W]aivers must be 'unequivocally expressed in the statutory text' and 'are to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign." Jordan v. The Presidio Trust, 2017 WL 396169, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999)). The party seeking waiver bears the burden of meeting this "high standard." Id. (quoting Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 811 F.3d 1086, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016).
Here, plaintiff alleges claims against the DOJ and District Court under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983; as well as for civil conspiracy and collusion; fraud and misrepresentation; fraud by commission; retaliation; intentional infliction of emotion distress; negligence infliction of emotional distress; and negligent hiring, training, and supervision of an employee. However, plaintiff fails to allege any facts which support a plausible inference that the DOJ or District Court waived sovereign immunity with regard to such claims. See Chadd v. United States, 794 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2015).
Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss with regard to the District Court and DOJ is GRANTED on the ground that Van's suit is barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
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