Villegas v. Griffin Industries

Decision Date20 August 1998
Docket NumberNo. 13-95-435-CV,13-95-435-CV
Citation975 S.W.2d 745
PartiesMaria VILLEGAS, et al., Appellants, v. GRIFFIN INDUSTRIES, et al., Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Willard G. Holgate, Altoona, for Appellant.

Diane M. Henson, Austin, Lev Hunt, Corpus Christi, for Appellee.

Before DORSEY, HINOJOSA and RODRIGUEZ, JJ.

OPINION

HINOJOSA, Justice.

Appellant, Maria Villegas, individually and as representative of the estate of Jose Villegas, deceased, sued appellees, Griffin Industries, Inc., Larry Findley, Russell T. McNorton, Fermin Garza, David Gonzales, and Harry Villarreal, for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, wrongful death, and other claims. The trial court granted appellees' motion for directed verdict on all claims. By seven points of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for directed verdict and in denying her request for a bill of exceptions, motion for new trial, and motion to re-open the evidence. We affirm.

Background

Jose Villegas and Maria Villegas lived together since 1967 and had five children. Jose's brother-in-law, Presidiano Trevino, operated a business purchasing and collecting used cooking grease from restaurants and re-selling it for use in the manufacture of cosmetics, animal feed, soap, and plastic explosives. Trevino had a contract for grease purchase and collection with a Grandy's Restaurant ("Grandy's") in Corpus Christi. Jose operated a similar business in which he was sometimes assisted by Maria. He also acted as a buyer and collector for Trevino and had, on several occasions, picked up used cooking grease at Grandy's for Trevino.

Griffin Industries, Inc. is a grease-rendering company based in Cold Springs, Kentucky, but doing business in Texas, among other states. Griffin contracts with restaurants to purchase and collect used cooking oil and provides large, square containers marked with Griffin's name. The containers are provided with locked interlaced wire grates on top which can only be opened with a special key carried by Griffin employees. The grates have interstices just wide enough to admit oil while filtering out rubbish like bones. Griffin contracted with Grandy's for grease purchase and collection. In 1990, Larry Findley, Griffin's Director of Security, noted that Griffin was experiencing losses in several large Texas cities due to thefts of grease from Griffin's containers. In 1992, Griffin hired four Corpus Christi police officers, Russell T. McNorton, Harry Villarreal, Fermin Garza, and David Gonzales, to perform a private investigation of the thefts from restaurants in Corpus Christi.

To facilitate their investigation, the officers decided it would be more effective to identify and follow a grease collection truck rather than stake out a single Corpus Christi restaurant. In the early hours of October 1, 1992, the officers spotted a grease truck occupied by Jose and Maria. The officers followed the couple and watched as they stopped at several restaurants, maneuvered the truck beside enclosures behind the restaurants, and entered the enclosures. A Grandy's restaurant was located on the strip where Maria and Jose were operating. Two officers went ahead to examine the Griffin container in its enclosure behind Grandy's, while the other two continued to observe Maria and Jose at another restaurant, then left to take up observation posts at Grandy's. Jose and Maria arrived at Grandy's shortly thereafter to collect grease. Their actions were observed by the police officers. Officers McNorton and Gonzales arrested the couple for stealing grease from the Griffin container behind Grandy's.

Jose died suddenly on January 7, 1993, two months before the date set for his trial. Maria's trial was set for December 6, 1993, but the criminal charges were dismissed just before trial commenced. The criminal charges against Jose were dismissed on August 16, 1994, nineteen months after his death.

On September 22, 1994, Maria filed this suit against appellees. The trial commenced on June 13, 1995. Maria called appellees as adverse witnesses. At the close of Maria's case, appellees moved for a directed verdict on all of Maria's claims, and the trial court granted the motion.

Directed Verdict: Standard of Review

A directed verdict is appropriate when reasonable minds can draw only one conclusion from the evidence. Collora v. Navarro, 574 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex.1978). In other words, where the plaintiff fails to present evidence in support of a fact essential to her right to recover or where a defense against the plaintiff's cause of action is conclusively proved or admitted, a directed verdict for the defendant is proper. Arguelles v. UT Family Med. Ctr., 941 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1996, no writ); Davis v. Mathis, 846 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1992, no writ). On review, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was rendered and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. Qantel Bus. Sys. v. Custom Controls, 761 S.W.2d 302, 303-04 (Tex.1988); Arguelles, 941 S.W.2d at 258. When reasonable minds may differ as to the truth of controlling facts, the issue must go to the jury. Collora, 574 S.W.2d at 68; Arguelles, 941 S.W.2d at 257-58.

Validity of Informal Marriage

In addition to her individual claims against appellees, Maria brought this suit as the representative and beneficiary of the estate of Jose Villegas, and all of the claims she asserts depend on her status as Jose's common law spouse. Appellees, in their answer and in their motion for directed verdict, challenged Maria's capacity and standing to bring survivor and wrongful death actions because she was not, in fact, Jose's spouse. The trial court granted the motion for directed verdict.

By her third point of error, Maria contends she was Jose Villegas' common-law spouse, and thus, had the right to bring survival claims and a wrongful death action. Because disposition of this point of error bears on whether the remaining points are to be decided regarding Maria, individually, or in a dual capacity as an individual and representative of an estate, we will consider it first.

The civil practice and remedies code provides that causes of action for personal injury to health, reputation, or person survive beyond the death of the injured party. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 71.021(a) (Vernon 1997). The heirs, legal representatives, and estate of the deceased have standing to institute such actions. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 71.021(b) (Vernon 1997). For wrongful death, the persons who may bring an action are the surviving spouse, the children, and the parents of the deceased. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 71.004 (Vernon 1997); Landers v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 369 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex.1963). Jose Villegas died intestate. Under the probate code, his surviving spouse would be an heir and qualified to bring a survival action. TEX. PROB.CODE ANN. § 38(b) (Vernon 1980).

The main question concerning Maria's capacity centers on the validity of the informal marriage between Maria and Jose. 1 In order to constitute a valid informal marriage, it must be established that the parties: (1) entered into an expressed or implied agreement to become husband and wife, (2) that such agreement was followed by cohabitation as man and wife, and (3) that they held each other out professedly and publicly as husband and wife. TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 1.91(a)(2) (Vernon 1993). 2 There is, of course, one additional fundamental rule--that in order to establish a valid marriage, the parties must possess the legal capacity to marry and there must not be any legal impediment prohibiting the marriage contract. Franklin v. Smalldridge, 616 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1981, no writ); Howard v. Howard, 459 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ); Esparza v. Esparza, 382 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1964, no writ).

It is true there is a presumption that the most recent marriage of a party is the valid one, and this presumption continues until one proves the impediment of a prior marriage. TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 2.01 (Vernon 1993). 3 Maria testified that her informal marriage to Jose commenced with her first pregnancy. However, Maria admitted knowing that Jose was already married at the time she became pregnant with their first child, complained that he continued to financially support his first family to the detriment of herself and her children, spent substantial time apart from her, and admitted she did not know whether Jose's marriage to the other woman was dissolved prior to his death. Because Maria admitted knowing of Jose's existing marriage at the time she claimed to have contracted an informal marriage and was informed by appellees' pleadings that capacity to act as a surviving spouse was an issue, it became her responsibility to prove that the legal impediment to the establishment of a valid informal marriage had been removed sometime before Jose's death. See Franklin, 616 S.W.2d at 657-58.

Informal marriages, like ceremonial marriages, can only be dissolved by legal proceedings decreeing annulment or divorce, or by the death of one spouse. Claveria's Estate v. Claveria, 615 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex.1981) (common law divorce not recognized in Texas); Ulloa v. Davila, 860 S.W.2d 202, 203 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1993, no writ). A marriage contracted while one party is married to another person is void ab initio as a matter of law, TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 2.22 (Vernon 1993); 4 Home Indem. Co. v. Edwards, 488 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), but an informal marriage will be recognized as beginning on the date the prior marriage is dissolved. TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 2.22.

Maria offered no evidence whatsoever to show that Jose's prior marriage had ended before his death. Because Maria failed to show that Jose had ended his previous...

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