Visco v. Cody

• Decision Date: 27 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 6215,6215
• Citation: 16 Conn.App. 444,547 A.2d 935
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Larry VISCO v. Clifford CODY et al.

Page 935

547 A.2d 935

16 Conn.App. 444

Larry VISCO v. Clifford CODY et al.

No. 6215.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 10, 1988.

Decided Sept. 27, 1988.

David A. Pels, Newington, with whom, on the brief, was Sheryl J. Sha'afi, Farmington, for appellants (defendants).

Clifton E. Thompson, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before DUPONT, C.J., and BORDEN and SPALLONE, JJ.

SPALLONE, Judge.

The defendants appeal from the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff in this summary process action. The sole issue presented is one of first impression: Whether the trial court erred in finding that the defendants' good faith requests for repairs did not successfully invoke the provisions of General Statutes § 47a-20 because the requested repairs were minor in nature. We find no error.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. In October, 1976, the plaintiff purchased an apartment building located at 149 Barbour Street in Hartford. The defendants, Clifford Cody and Elsie Cody, were tenants in the building at that time. The plaintiff and the defendants entered into an oral agreement for a month-to-month tenancy by the defendants, to begin on November 1, 1986. Clifford Cody testified that he first asked the plaintiff to perform specific repairs on the apartment in October of 1986, when the plaintiff first assumed ownership, and requested additional repairs at various times thereafter.

On April 14, 1987, the plaintiff caused a notice to quit, based on lapse of time, to be served on the defendants, advising them to quit possession of the premises on or before April 30, 1987. When the defendants did not vacate the apartment, the plaintiff on May 12, 1987, initiated this summary process action. The defendants answered on June 4, 1987, raising a special defense, pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-20, ¹ that the summary process action was commenced within six months of the defendants' requests for repairs, and therefore, the action was barred.

The evidence at trial, adduced through the testimony of both the plaintiff and Clifford Cody, was that the defendants had made several requests for work to be done in their apartment and that the plaintiff had responded to these requests. The plaintiff testified that, at the defendants' request, he bled the bathroom radiator, tightened the bedroom windows and replaced the sash cords, weatherstripped the front door to eliminate drafts, fixed some loose tiles on the bathroom floor and provided paint to the defendants so that they could repaint the kitchen. On the basis of this evidence, the trial court determined that the protection afforded by General Statutes § 47a-20 had not been "triggered," because the requested repairs did not "relate to defects which materially affect health and safety." From this judgment, the defendants have appealed.

The defendants claim that the trial court erred in requiring them to prove more than a good faith request for repairs. ² The interpretation of § 47a-20 propounded by the defendants is that any good faith request for a repair, no matter how minor, invokes the provisions of the protective statute, effectively insulating the tenant from eviction for the next six months. ³ We cannot agree with such a broad reading of this particular provision.

Although we are cognizant of the principle that "[c]ourts must interpret statutes as they are written; Muha v. United Oil Co., 180 Conn. 720, 730, 433 A.2d 1009 (1980)"; Lucarelli v. State, 16 Conn.App. 65, 70, 546 A.2d 940 (1988); we are also bound by our duty to " 'avoid a consequence which fails to attain a rational and sensible result which bears most directly on the object which the legislature sought to obtain.' " Dukes v. Durante, 192 Conn. 207, 214, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984), quoting La Providenza v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 178 Conn. 23, 29, 420 A.2d 905 (1979). We do not believe that a literal definition of the word "repairs," as urged by the defendants, yields a "rational and sensible result" when viewed in context with the other statutory provisions of our landlord and tenant law embodied in title 47a of the General Statutes.

General Statutes § 47a-7 sets forth the responsibilities of a landlord to his tenants. ⁴ As well as complying with all applicable building and housing codes of the state or any political subdivision thereof, a landlord is mandated to "make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition." General Statutes § 47a-7(a)(2). The remedies available to a tenant in the event of the landlord's dereliction of these statutory duties are various: the tenant may withhold his rental payment, § 47a-4a; ⁵ the tenant may initiate an action to compel the landlord to perform his legal duties, § 47a-14h; ⁶ or the tenant may interpose the landlord's noncompliance as a defense in a summary process action, §§ 47a-20; 47a-33. ⁷

With regard to the first two forms of relief, the tenant's ability to recover is not automatic once he has alleged a breach of the landlord's statutory duty. For example, before a tenant can initiate an action pursuant to § 47a-14h, he must allege that within the previous twenty-one days he lodged a complaint concerning the condition of the premises with a municipal agency. General Statutes § 47a-14h(b)(5); see generally Dugan v. Milledge, 196 Conn. 591, 494 A.2d 1203 (1985). Similarly, for a tenant to make a successful claim that he had the right to withhold payment of rent, he must show that the landlord's failure to comply with § 47a-7(a) "materially affects his safety"; Tucker v. Lopez, 38 Conn.Sup. 67, 69, 457 A.2d 666 (1982); or has rendered the premises "uninhabitable." Steinegger v. Rosario, 35 Conn.Sup. 151, 156, 402 A.2d 1 (1979). Furthermore, to establish uninhabitability, the tenant needs to do more than assert a unilateral, self-serving statement that the premises are untenantable. Evergreen Corporation v. Brown, 35 Conn.Sup. 549, 552, 396 A.2d 146 (1978) (suggesting that a tenant "utilize the broad range of municipal boards, agencies, and commissions" to remedy defects).

In light of the fact that "the sanctions in these sections are not triggered until and unless evidence is adduced at trial establishing that there is a substantial violation or series of violations of housing and health codes creating a material risk or hazard to the occupant," P. Marzinotto, Connecticut Summary Process Manual, p. 118, citing Evergreen Corporation v. Brown, supra; Arroyo v. Fernandez, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Housing Session, Docket No. SPWA-00076 (December 9, 1982); the defendant's assertion that a good faith request for any repair invokes the application of § 47a-20 is overly simplistic. ⁸

If we were to adopt the defendants' argument, we would have to acknowledge a greater duty to make repairs as set forth in § 47a-20 than that which is specified in § 47a-7(a). The latter obliges a landlord to maintain his leased premises in a fit and habitable condition; the former, under the defendants' construction, would also oblige the landlord to make any cosmetic or aesthetic repairs, solely at the tenant's good faith behest. This is not to say that a tenant does not have the right to request aesthetic repairs; rather, the tenant cannot avoid eviction, using § 47a-20 as a shield, on the grounds that he requested such repairs in good faith. Any other result would effectively prevent a landlord from recovering possession of his property based on a possible defect in the leased premises which he had no statutory duty to repair, and would, therefore, be anomalous indeed. We must not look at the single word "repairs" in isolation, to the exclusion of the remainder of that provision or to the exclusion of interrelated legislation. "What appears to be clear statutory language should not be read to arrive at an 'ambiguous or unreasonable result' or to 'defeat a legislative intent which becomes evident when the statute is read in the light of its history and purpose.' State v. Delafose, [185 Conn. 517, 522, 441 A.2d 158 (1981) ]. Statutes should be considered as a whole, reconciling their separate parts so that a reasonable overall interpretation is achieved. Dukes v. Durante, [supra, 192 Conn. at 214, 471 A.2d 1368]. Furthermore, the meaning of a particular phrase in a statute is to be determined by reference to the use of that phrase in other parts of the same statute. Doe v. Institute of Living, Inc., 175 Conn. 49, 57, 392 A.2d 491 (1978); Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands) § 46.05. A meaning should not be ascribed to it which would render the meaning of those other uses difficult or bizarre; State v. Campbell, 180 Conn. 557, 563, 429 A.2d 960 (1980); Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation, v. DPUC, 1 Conn.App. 1, 4, 467 A.2d 679 (1983); and it must be construed with common sense. State v. Privitera, 1 Conn.App. 709, 721, 476 A.2d 605 (1984)." Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Della Ghelfa, 3 Conn.App. 432, 438, 489 A.2d 398 (1985), aff'd, 200 Conn. 630, 513 A.2d 52 (1986).

In Alteri v. Layton, 35 Conn.Sup. 261, 408 A.2d 18 (1979), the trial court, in a well reasoned opinion, rejected the defendant tenant's claim of retaliatory eviction, holding that the repair requested had to be one "required to conform a dwelling unit to basic structural, mechanical and housing code regulations...." Id., at 267, 408 A.2d 18 citing Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation, 463 F.2d 853, 865 (D.C.Cir.1972); see also Friske v. Miranda, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain, Housing Session at New Britain, Docket No. SPN-7907-512-BE (September 11, 1979). The Alteri court reasoned that "[t]o enforce properly the statute in a meaningful manner requires a balancing of the interests of both landlord and tenant.... To accept the literal interpretation propounded by the defendant could effectively negate the summary process proceedings of Connecticut statutes. The...