Waterman v. Bridge & Iron Works

• Decision Date: 28 July 1931
• Docket Number: No. 30682.,30682.
• Citation: 41 S.W.2d 575
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: GILBERT A. WATERMAN, Appellant, v. CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON WORKS.

41 S.W.2d 575

GILBERT A. WATERMAN, Appellant, v. CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON WORKS.

No. 30682.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

Division One, July 28, 1931.

Appeal from Ralls Circuit Court. — Hon. C.T. Hays, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

P.W. Bennett and Roy Hamlin for appellant.

(1) The Workmen's Compensation Law and especially Section 44, Laws 1927, pp. 512 and 513, is null, void, unconstitutional and of no effect, being in violation of Article II, sec. 28; Article III; Article IV, sec. 53, pars. 17 and 32; and Article VI, secs. 1, 22 and 23, Constitution of Missouri. The final award of the Commission shall be conclusive and binding unless either party to the dispute shall within thirty days from the date of the final award appeal to the circuit court of the county in which the accident occurred, or if the accident occurred outside of this State, then in the county where the contract of employment was made. Such appeal may be taken by filing notice of appeal with the Commission, whereupon the Commission shall under its certificate return to the court all documents and papers on file in the matter, together with a transcript of the evidence, the findings and award, which shall thereupon become the record of the cause. Upon appeal no additional evidence shall be heard and in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact made by the Commission within its powers shall be conclusive and binding. The court, on appeal, shall review only questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the award upon any of the following grounds and no other: 1. That the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers; 2. That the award was procured by fraud; 3. That the facts found by the Commission do not support the award; 4. That there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award. Under this section, the Legislature has attempted to transfer the judicial powers and jurisdiction of the subject-matter from the circuit court to the Workmen's Compensation Commission. To determine whether one private citizen, under both the law and the facts, owes another private citizen a sum of money is a question of fact and as such is purely a judicial question to be heard and determined by a constitutional court only. State ex rel. Railroad v. P.S.C., 303 Mo. 212, 259 S.W. 445. The Legislature is powerless to vest judicial powers in any other body or change the jurisdiction, authority or powers of a constitutional court. Art. VI, secs. 1, 22, 23 and 37, Constitution of Missouri; Sections 2 and 3, Amendment of 1884, of Constitution of Missouri; State ex rel. Barrett v. May, 290 Mo. 302; State ex rel. v. Ryan, 182 Mo. 355; State ex rel. v. Woodson, 161 Mo. 454; Lee v. Licking Valley Coal Digger Co., 209 Ky. 780; Hunter v. Coal Co., L.R.A. 19171) 15, 175 Iowa, 245; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 61 L. Ed. 678, Ann. Cas. 1917D 1637; State v. Trimble, 297 S.W. 378; Davidson v. Schmidt, 256 Mo. 18; Railroad v. Gildersleeve, 219 Mo. 170. (2) The circuit court, being a court created by the Constitution and invested, endowed and empowered by the Constitution with original jurisdiction and power to hear and determine all cases at law and in equity not otherwise provided for in the Constitution, should not have affirmed the final award of the Compensation Commission without first hearing the parties at issue, their attorneys, representatives, witnesses and evidence, and that by not hearing the parties at issue, their attorneys, representatives, witnesses and evidence, and there being no findings of fact from the Commission upon which to render judgment, there were no matters properly before the court for adjudication and the court was without power and lacked jurisdiction to pass on, render judgment and affirm the final award. Article VI, secs. 22, 23, Constitution. (3) The court should have and is bound to construe the Workmen's Compensation Act liberally toward the employee, and to place that construction on the evidence that will be most favorable to the employee. Howes v. Stark Bros. Nurseries & Orchards Co., 22 S. W. (2d) 839; Betz v. Columbia Tel. Co., 24 S.W. (2d) 224. (4) The court should have heard the testimony and evidence proffered and offered by the appellant to establish the fact that the Compensation Commission fraudulently set up and recited in the final award rendered by the Commission that, the parties appeared and their attorneys, representatives and witnesses and that upon a hearing thereof, the Commission made its finding, when in truth and in fact the parties were never notified of the time or place of the review hearing, nor given an opportunity to be present or be heard, and all statements with reference thereto were a fraud upon the appellant. That the award was fraudulently rendered by the Commission in that the Commission wholly disregarded the appellant's favorable testimony in rendering the award and rendered an award very inadequate in appellant's case in view of the evidence submitted by the appellant. That to hear the above testimony was within the jurisdiction, power and authority of the circuit court because the circuit court is a court of general and original jurisdiction created and empowered by the Constitution and is the only tribunal having constitutional power, authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine suits in all civil cases at law or in equity except as otherwise provided in the Constitution and there are no other tribunals provided for in the Constitution to hear and determine civil cases of claims for money damages save only the constitutional courts. Article VI, secs. 1, 22, 23, and 37 of the Constitution; Sections 2 and 3, Amendment of 1884; Dorrance v. Dorrance, 257 Mo. 325. (5) The circuit court being a court of general jurisdiction created by the Constitution and empowered with original jurisdiction and authority except as is otherwise provided in the Constitution, should have given appellant his day in court and a trial upon the merits of appellant's case. That the judicial power of the State being exclusively vested in the constitutional courts only, until appellant has had his day in court and a trial upon the merits of his case in a constitutional court, appellant has had no trial upon the merits of his case before a proper tribunal with the proper power and jurisdiction to hear and determine the merits of his case as provided by and in the Constitution of Missouri. That the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission is not a proper court to hear and determine the merits of appellant's case and render an award that will be final and conclusive as to the facts of appellant's case, because it is not created nor empowered by the Constitution and at most is but an unconstitutional body having no constitutional powers or authority, and its findings and awards are null, void and unconstitutional.

Mahan, Mahan & Fuller for respondent.

(1) The act is not unconstitutional as invading the constitutional right of trial by jury. Kiser on Workmen's Compensation Act, sec. 19; DeMay v. Liberty Foundry Co., 327 Mo. 395; Shade v. Cement Co., 93 Kan. 257, 144 Pac. 249; Hunter v. Coal Co., 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N.W. 1037; Greene v. Caldwell, 170 Ky. 571, 586; Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co., 261 Ill. 454, 466; Matchison v. St. Ry. Co., 126 Minn. 286, 297; Sexton v. Telegraph Co., 84 N.J.L. 85, 101; Cunningham v. Northwestern Imp. Co., 44 Mont. 180, 119 Pac. 554; State ex rel. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101. (2) The Compensation Act does not transgress upon or violate the constitutional guaranties accorded by Section 28 of Article 2 of the Constitution. The Missouri Compensation Act does not contravene or violate Article 3 of the State Constitution, which provides for and limits the distribution of governmental powers. DeMay v. Liberty Foundry Co., 327 Mo. 395; State ex rel. v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, 320 Mo. 893, 8 S.W. (2d) 897; Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209; State ex rel. v. District Court, 128 Minn. 221, 150 N.W. 623; Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556. (3) The Workmen's Compensation Act does not violate Section 53 of Article IV, par. 17, for the reason that the Compensation Commission is not a court and is not vested with judicial powers, but merely performs a judicial function in hearing and determining facts. State ex rel. v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, 320 Mo. 893, 8 S.W. (2d) 897. (4) And the act does not violate Section 53, Article 4, par. 32, of the Constitution, because it has no application to the determination of claim for compensation. (5) The Workmen's Compensation Act is not unconstitutional as violating Article 6, secs. 1, 22, and 23, of the Constitution. DeMay v. Liberty Foundry Co., 327 Mo. 395. (6) Unquestionably the record filed by appellant not only shows an award but also shows the finding of facts by the referee which was adopted by the Commission. (7) The court committed no error in construing the law. The testimony of Dr. Hardesty and the statement of Dr. Vosburgh show that there was no permanent disability. In determining sufficiency of evidence to sustain finding of facts by Workmen's Compensation Commission, appellate courts will look only to evidence most favorable. Findings of Workmen's Compensation Commission are conclusive if sustained by substantial and competent evidence. Bricker v. Gille Mfg. Co., 35 S.W. (2d) 662; Woods v. American Coal & Ice Co., 25 S.W. (2d) 144; State ex rel. Brewen-Clark Syrup Co. v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, 8 S.W. (2d) 897; Kinder v. Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 18 S.W. (2d) 91; Stone v. Blackmer & Post Pipe Co., 27 S.W. (2d) 459. (8) The appellant herein, employee below, did not offer any evidence to prove that the award was procured by fraud.

HYDE, C.

This proceeding was commenced by appellant filing with the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, on October 15, 1929, a claim for...