Watson v. United States
| Decision Date | 20 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | Criminal No. 1:07CR396,Civil Action No. 1:10CV3 91 |
| Parties | YAHYA AZIM WATSON, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
This case is before the Court on the Petitioner's Motion to Vacate and Correct his Sentence pursuant to Title 28, United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 2255.
This case originated from an investigation into a large-scale cocaine trafficking ring operating in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Yahya Azim Watson obtained narcotics from California and had the narcotics shipped to the Washington metropolitan area, with the assistance of co-conspirators, to distribute to others. Cause was established through bulk cash seizures, informant information, state-court authorized wiretap intercepts, search and seizure warrants, and the interception of a package containing approximately 7 (seven) kilograms of cocaine.
A Criminal Complaint was filed against the Petitioner in the Eastern District of Virginia on August 24, 2007. A federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia returned an Indictment against Mr. Watson on September 27, 2007. The Indictment charged Yahya Azim Watson with Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Five (5) Kilograms of Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The Indictment further charged that, if convicted, the Petitioner shall forfeit to the United States $1.2 million, which constitutes proceeds obtained as a result of the offense.
On October 22, 2007, the United States filed a Criminal Information, indicating that the Government would rely on Petitioner's prior conviction for Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana to increase the statutory penalties, including increasing the minimum term of imprisonment from ten to twenty years.
On November 27, 2007, Petitioner, and defense counsel Drewry B. Hutcheson, Jr., appeared before this Court and pled guilty to the Indictment without a written plea agreement. On February 29, 2008, an Order was entered granting Mr. Hutcheson's Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for Yahya Watson. On February 29, 2008, Matthew Alan Wartel was appointed to represent Yahya Watson. On May 12, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to three hundred and twenty-four (324) months incarceration and a ten (10) year term of supervised release.
On May 7, 2008, Petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and the Motion was denied by this Court on May 9, 2008. On May 9, 2008 the Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit issued an unpublished, per curiam opinion upholding the District Court's decision to deny Petitioner's Motion on March 23, 2009.
On April 13, 2009, the Petitioner filed a Petition For Re Hearing En Banc with the Fourth Circuit, which was denied on May 12, 2009. Petitioner also filed a Petition For Writ Of Certiorari on October 29, 2009 to the Supreme Court. On December 8, 2009, the Petition was denied. Watson then filed the instant Motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on December 2, 2010.
A petitioner collaterally attacking his sentence or conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 bears the burden of proving that his sentence or conviction was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such a sentence, that the sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or that the sentence otherwise is subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2008) . Wastson's Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 asserts four grounds of relief: 1) improper plea colloquy; 2)improper venue; 3) improper transfer between jurisdictions; and 4) prosecutorial misconduct.
A motion pursuant to § 2255 "may not do service for an appeal." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982) (citing United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184-185 (1979); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428-429 (1962); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 181-182 (1947); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 274 (1942); Glasgow v. Mover, 225 U.S. 420, 428 (1912); In re Gregory, 219 U.S. 210, 213 (1911)). See also Dragonice v. Ridge, 389 F.3d 92, 98 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Frady); Matthews v. United States, 514 F.Supp.2d 827, 832 (E.D. Va. 2007) . Consequently, "the doctrine of procedural default bars the consideration of a claim that was not raised at the appropriate time during the original proceedings or on appeal." United States v. Hurdle, Civil Action No. 2:07cv49, Criminal Action No. 2:06cr21, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37709, at *6 (E.D. Va. May 22, 2007) (). See also Matthews v. United States, 514 F.Supp.2d at 833 (same) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977) () ; Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68 ()). Watson's direct appeal only raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Therefore, Watson procedurally defaulted any claims other than those he actually raised on directappeal that he was required to appeal prior to seeking alternate relief. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 165 (1982); Matthews v. United States, 514 F.Supp.2d at 832-33; Hurdle, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37709, at *6.
A procedurally defaulted claim may be considered on collateral review in only limited circumstances. First, procedural default will not act as a bar to collateral relief where a petitioner shows both cause and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged error underlying his § 2255 motion. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 167; Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 84; United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 492-95 (4th Cir. 1999) . In demonstrating such error, the petitioner must demonstrate "that the error worked to his 'actual and substantial disadvantage,' not merely that the error created a possibility of prejudice.'" Satcher v. Pruett, 126 F.3d 561, 572 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494 (1986)). See also Hurdle, 2007, U.S. Dist. Lexis 37709, at *6. Second, where a petitioner can demonstrate actual innocence, collateral relief should be granted to avoid a miscarriage of justice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). Third, ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be the subject of a proper § 2255 motion despite a failure on the petitioner's part to seek direct review. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1991).
Watson does not assert that he is actually innocent of the charges for which he pled guilty. Watson must establish all of his claims for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by a preponderance of the evidence. See Miller v. United States, 261 F.2d 546, 547 (4th Cir. 1958); Allgood, 48 F.Supp.2d at 558.
Watson, a pro se litigant, is entitled to a liberal construction of his § 2255 Motion for relief. See United States v. Davis, 532 F.2d 752, 752 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Curry, No. 99-7179, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 8744, at *2-3 (4th Cir. May 2, 2000) (); Watkins v. United States, Civil Case No., 4:07cv67, Criminal Case No.: 4:00cr43, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62911, at *5-6 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2007) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, a defendant must include in his § 2255 motion for relief each ground supporting his claim for relief. See U.S.C.S. § 2255 PROC. R. 2(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2008). Moreover, a defendant's factual allegations must be stated with sufficient specificity to allow a reader to determine from the face of the motion whether further review is warranted. See id. at 2(b) (2) . Accord Hodges v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 2d 688, 693 (S.D. 111. 2004) (citing Oliver v. United States, 961 F.2d 1339, 1343 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1992); Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989) ; United States v. Aiello,814 F.2d 109, 113-14 {2nd Cir. 1987); United States v. Unger, 635 F.2d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 1980) () ("A § 2255 petition cannot stand on vague and conclusory assertions of a constitutional violation; rather, the petition must set forth facts with sufficient detail to point the district court to the real possibility of a constitutional error.") . Cf. Hurdle, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37709, at 10.
Petitioner claims that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent because he was not given adequate notice of the proper mandatory minimum sentence. This claim was fully litigated on direct appeal and the Fourth Circuit issued an unpublished opinion directly addressing this claim, Petitioner is, therefore, barred from relitigating this issue through his § 2255 Motion.
Watson's conviction resulted from his entry of a guilty plea, which, by its very nature, "is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts." Boykin v. Ala., 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) . It is an "admission that [the accused] committed the crime charged against him." N. C. v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32 (1970). By entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not simply stating that he did the discrete acts described in the indictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563,570 (1989). Thus, "[a] plea of guilty and the ensuing conviction comprehend all of the factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a lawful sentence." Id. at 569. A voluntary and intelligent guilty plea forecloses federal collateral review of alleged constitutional errors preceding the entry of the plea: "a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an...
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