Weston v. Cassata

• Decision Date: 05 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99CA2449.,99CA2449.
• Citation: 37 P.3d 469
• Parties: Frances F. WESTON, Christine M. Kneubehl, and Shauna Parks, n/k/a Shauna Disher, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Donald M. CASSATA, Director of the Adams County Department of Social Services, in his official capacity; and Adams County Board of Social Services, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

37 P.3d 469

Frances F. WESTON, Christine M. Kneubehl, and Shauna Parks, n/k/a Shauna Disher, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Donald M. CASSATA, Director of the Adams County Department of Social Services, in his official capacity; and Adams County Board of Social Services, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 99CA2449.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

July 5, 2001.

Certiorari Denied January 14, 2002.¹

Davis, Graham & Stubbs, LLP, Thomas S. Nichols, Hoffman Reilley Pozner & Williamson, L.L.P., Barbara Blumenthal, Faegre & Benson, LLP, Steven D. Zansberg, Christopher P. Beall, Denver, CO, Law Offices of Kimberly E. Ghiselli, LLC, Kimberly E. Lord, Boulder, CO, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

James D. Robinson, Adams County Attorney, Patricia A. Fredrick, Hal B. Warren, Assistant County Attorneys, Brighton, CO, for Defendants-Appellants.

Opinion by Judge DAVIDSON.

In this class action brought to determine the validity of sanction notices issued under Colorado's program for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, defendants, Donald M. Cassata, Director of the Adams County Department of Social Services, and the Adams County Board of Social Services, appeal from the judgment in favor of plaintiffs, Frances F. Weston, Christine M. Kneubehl, and Shauna Disher, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. We affirm.

The Welfare Reform Act of 1996, also known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), 42 U.S.C. § 601, et seq., brought about extensive changes in welfare law. Among other changes, it repealed the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and instituted the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program. Unlike AFDC, which provided recipients with benefits as long as they were eligible, TANF limits welfare benefits to sixty months for eligible adult care-providers of a family unit.

Funding for TANF assistance, like funding for AFDC before it, comes partly from federal monies disbursed to the states. Under TANF, however, receipt of these federal block grants is conditioned in part on the states' enacting legislation limiting welfare relief to recipients who comply with the more rigorous requirements of the new welfare system.

In 1997, in accordance with PRWORA, Colorado enacted the Colorado Works Program Act (CWPA), § 26-2-701, et seq., C.R.S.2000. Under this program, participants receive funds "subject to available appropriations" as long as they comply with program requirements. See § 26-2-709(1)(a), C.R.S.2000. Counties are required to provide funds to eligible recipients as long as funds are available. See Colorado Department of Human Services, Agency Letter AFDC-97-12-A (July 3, 1997). The Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS), charged with responsibility for overseeing administration of the CWPA, develops standardized forms for the counties to use in streamlining their works program applications, services, and tracking of participants. Section 26-2-712(5)(a), C.R.S.2000.

Participants in the TANF program are required to enter into an Individual Responsibility Contract (IRC), which outlines the program requirements. Section 26-2-708, C.R.S.2000. Individual counties will sanction participants who fail to comply with TANF IRC requirements, and that sanction is in the form of a reduction of their cash assistance. Section 26-2-711(2), C.R.S.2000. Before a participant is sanctioned, however, the participant must receive a sanction notice stating the basis for the county's decision or action, detailing the participant's rights to a county conference under the dispute resolution process and to a state-level appeal, and describing the process of such an appeal. Section 26-2-127(1)(a)(I), C.R.S.2000; CDHS Manual § 3.830, 9 Code Colo. Regs. 2503-1.

All members of the plaintiff class are or were recipients of welfare benefits in Adams County under the revised welfare system administered by defendants; all were sent sanction notices by the Adams County Department of Social Services. The individual plaintiffs who received sanction notices were given the right to dispute the sanction at a local or state level. However, the various sanction notices did not include full or accurate information about the sanctions and the appeal process. Testimony given at trial illustrated that defendants pursued a policy of consistently reinstating benefits to recipients who disputed their sanctions, yet defendants continued to use the defective notices.

Plaintiffs brought this class action to determine whether the sanction notices were insufficient. Specifically, pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law, § 13-51-101, et seq., C.R.S.2000, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), § 24-4-101, et seq., C.R.S.2000, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs sought a declaration that the sanction notices were inadequate as a matter of law, an injunction barring use of the inadequate notices, reversal of the sanctions, and restitution of amounts withheld under the inadequate notice scheme. Plaintiffs also sought attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

The named defendants in the original lawsuit included the Denver Department of Social Services; Philip A. Hernandez, Manager of the Denver Department of Social Services; the Colorado Department of Human Services; Marva Livingston Hammons, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Human Services. The Denver defendants settled with plaintiffs prior to trial. The State defendants are not party to this appeal.

After a bench trial, the court found in favor of plaintiffs. Specifically, the court found that none of the five versions of sanction notices sent by defendants to noncomplying participants between July 1997 and November 1999 met statutory or regulatory requirements. Moreover, the court found that defendants failed to provide due process to plaintiffs, in violation of both the state and the federal constitutions.

Accordingly, the trial court declared all notices provided to plaintiffs inadequate as a matter of law, enjoined defendants from using such notices, ordered reversal and removal of all records of previous sanctions based on inadequate notices, and ordered defendants equitably to restore the cash assistance benefits improperly withheld from plaintiffs under the inadequate notice scheme.

I.

Defendants contend that the trial court incorrectly refused to dismiss plaintiffs' claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, they argue that the court erred in determining that defendants' actions had deprived plaintiffs of procedural due process. We disagree.

To prevail on a § 1983 claim, plaintiffs must show that: (1) A person (2) acting under color of state law (3) subjected plaintiffs or caused plaintiffs to be subjected to (4) the deprivation of a right secured by the constitution or the laws of the United States. County of Adams v. Hibbard, 918 P.2d 212, 217 (Colo.1996).

We review matters of statutory construction de novo. Canal Ins. Co. v. Nix, 7 P.3d 1038 (Colo.App.1999).

A.

Initially, we address defendants' argument that they are not "persons" and therefore may not be sued under § 1983. We disagree.

In an action for monetary damages brought pursuant to § 1983, the states, state officers acting in their official capacities, and local entities considered "arms of the state" are not "persons" and therefore are not subject to suit. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Simon v. State Comp. Ins. Auth., 946 P.2d 1298 (Colo.1997). Thus, county departments of social services and their employees have been held not subject to suit for damages under § 1983. See Wigger v. McKee, 809 P.2d 999 (Colo.App.1990).

In contrast, official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the state. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, supra. Thus, in actions for declaratory or injunctive relief, such as here, government entities and their officers are properly considered "persons" under § 1983 so long as they are responsible for the implementation and enforcement of a state statute. See Jackson v. State, 966 P.2d 1046 (Colo.1998).

Here, the plain language of the Colorado Human Services Code, § 26-1-101, et seq., C.R.S.2000, and the CWPA, clearly delineates responsibilities for both the state and county agencies.

CDHS is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the works program statewide, see §§ 26-1-111(2)(a), 26-2-711(1), 26-2-712(5)(a), (e), 26-2-715(2)(3), C.R.S.2000, including, inter alia, prescribing such forms as it may deem necessary, see § 26-1-111(2)(e), C.R.S.2000, and developing standardized forms for the counties' use. See § 26-2-712(5)(a). To facilitate the counties' use of forms, the state maintains the Client Oriented Information Network (COIN) database, which contains a series of codes describing the activities giving rise to sanction and is available for use by the counties in preparing their sanction notices.

The county departments serve as agents of CDHS and administer public assistance in accordance with its rules and regulations. See § 26-1-118(1), C.R.S.2000. Under state regulations, the counties must give adequate and timely notice of any action adversely affecting a participant's welfare benefits. See CDHS Manual §§ 3.830.2, 3.830.21-.22, 9 Code Colo. Regs. 2503-1. In doing so, Adams County utilizes the sanction forms developed by the state and uses the COIN program in completing the sanction forms.

We disagree with defendants that under this scheme, and because of the oversight role given to the state, they are not responsible for implementation and enforcement of the statute. One of the expressly stated purposes of the CWPA is to permit counties to have "increased responsibility for the administration of the works program." See § 26-2-705(2)(c), C.R.S.2000. The county's role in administration of benefits and the...