White v. County of Orange
Decision Date | 22 March 1985 |
Citation | 212 Cal.Rptr. 493,166 Cal.App.3d 566 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | Martha Penny WHITE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, Defendant and Respondent. G 000263. |
Plaintiff Martha Penny White appeals the granting of summary judgment in favor of defendant County of Orange. The issue presented is whether a governmental entity can be held liable for the intentional wrongs of an employee deputy sheriff while on duty.
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Shortly after midnight on October 21, 1980, George Loudermilk, an Orange County deputy sheriff on patrol in a black and white unit, stopped an automobile driven by White. Without explanation, Loudermilk placed White in his patrol car and drove her to an isolated orange grove where he threatened to rape and murder her. He then drove White around for several hours in secluded areas of Irvine Ranch, all the while threatening her with rape and murder. Loudermilk returned White to her car after she promised to go out with him that weekend. Shortly after White drove away, Loudermilk stopped her again for the sole purpose of obtaining a "goodnight kiss."
White promptly complained to the appropriate authorities resulting in Loudermilk's arrest and conviction on felony counts of kidnapping and false imprisonment. Following his conviction, White brought a civil action for damages against Loudermilk charging false imprisonment, assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She also sued the County of Orange on the theory of respondeat superior. The County moved for summary judgment, claiming Loudermilk's actions were beyond the scope of employment as a matter of law. Although the County did not produce affidavits to support its position, the motion was granted.
On appeal, White first contends the trial court erred in granting the County's motion because the County did not file any declarations in support of the summary judgment motion. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c requires supporting declarations be filed in order to grant a summary judgment motion. 1 The County's failure to do so precludes consideration of their motion as one for summary judgment. (Adohr Milk Farms, Inc. v. Love (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 366, 370, fn. 3, 63 Cal.Rptr. 123; Verreos v. City and County of San Francisco (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 86, 100, 133 Cal.Rptr. 649.)
However, (C.L. Smith Co. v. Roger Ducharme, Inc. (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 735, 745, 135 Cal.Rptr. 483; see also Blanch v. Young (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1016, 1019, 200 Cal.Rptr. 9.) Therefore, we treat this appeal as one from the granting of a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Since a motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, the facts alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true for the purposes of review. (Nunn v. State of California (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616, 620-621, 200 Cal.Rptr. 440, 677 P.2d 846.) 2 Here, White's unverified complaint alleges the facts described above against Loudermilk and further alleges the County is vicariously liable. In granting the County's motion, the trial court implicitly accepted the County's position that it was not liable for the actions of Loudermilk. The County maintains these alleged actions represent a substantial deviation from Loudermilk's duties as a deputy sheriff and, therefore, were not within his scope of employment as a matter of law. Accepting the allegations against Loudermilk as true, we review the validity of the County's position.
Initially, we note that in governmental tort cases, "the rule is liability, immunity is the exception." (Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211, 219, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457.) This is so because "it would be unjust in some circumstances to require an individual injured by official wrongdoing to bear the burden of his loss rather than distribute it throughout the community." (Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District (1961) 55 Cal.2d 224, 230, 11 Cal.Rptr. 97, 359 P.2d 465.) Therefore, "[u]nless the Legislature has clearly provided for immunity, the important societal goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by willful or negligent acts must prevail." (Ramos v. County of Madera (1971) 4 Cal.3d 685, 692, 94 Cal.Rptr. 421, 484 P.2d 93.)
The Legislature has not clearly provided for governmental immunity in the present situation. On the contrary, Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a) follows common law and imposes governmental liability for injuries proximately caused by acts of employees within the scope of employment. 3 Therefore, in order to avoid vicarious liability, the County must show Loudermilk's actions were beyond the scope of his employment.
Scope of employment is normally a question of fact. (Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 707, 722, 159 Cal.Rptr. 835, 602 P.2d 755.) However, where only one conclusion is possible "and where there is no dispute over the operable, overt, observable facts, then the question logically becomes one of law." (Golden West Broadcasters v. Superior Court (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 947, 956, 171 Cal.Rptr. 95.) Here, there is complete agreement as to what occurred during the early morning hours of October 21, 1980. Therefore, this appeal raises a question of law.
In Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 133, 176 Cal.Rptr 287, the court addressed the liability of an employer school district for the rape of an 11 year old student by an employee janitor. The court stated that whether a tort is committed during the course of employment turns on "whether or not: (1) the act performed was either required or 'incident to his duties' [citation] or (2) the employee's conduct could be reasonably foreseen by the employer in any event [citations]." (Id., at p. 139, 176 Cal.Rptr. 287.) The court then held the school district was not liable because ...
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