Williams v. Evans

• Decision Date: 21 December 1917
• Citation: 139 Minn. 32,165 N.W. 495
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. EVANS et al.<SUP>*</SUP>
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

139 Minn. 32

165 N.W. 495

WILLIAMS

v.EVANS et al.^*

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

FN^* Rehearing denied, 166 N. W. 504.A. M. RAMER CO.

v.SAME.

Nos. 19166, 19167.

Dec. 21, 1917.

Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; Frederick M. Catlin, Judge.

Actions by E. W. Williams and by the A. M. Ramer Company to enjoin Eliza P. Evans and others, members of the Minimum Wage Commission, from enforcing orders fixing minimum wages. Demurrer to complaint overruled, and temporary injunction ordered, and defendants appeal. Order reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

The state Legislature possesses all legislative power not withheld or forbidden by the state or federal Constitution. The provisions of the state Constitution, so far as here applicable, are not more restrictive than the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. This amendment guarantees liberty of contract, subject to regulation under the police power of the state.

Chapter 547, Laws 1913 (Gen. St. 1913, §§ 3904-3923), establishing a minimum wage commission and providing for the determination and establishment of minimum wages for women and minors, is a valid exercise of the police power of the state.

The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power, but it may delegate authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. It may delegate power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes its own operation depend.

This act was a complete statute when it left the Legislature, and does not delegate legislative power to the minimum wage commission.

Inequalities of minor importance do not render a law invalid. The limitations of the Constitution are flexible enough to permit of practical application. Felix Frankfurter, of New York City, for National Consumers' league.

Lyndon A. Smith, Atty. Gen., and John C. Nethaway, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Alva R. Hunt, of Litchfield, of counsel), for appellants.

Brown, Abbott & Somsen, of Winona, and O'Brien, Young & Stone and Durment, Moore & Oppenheimer, all of St. Paul, for respondents.

HALLAM, J.

The Legislature of Minnesota in 1913 passed an act (Laws 1913, c. 547; G. S. 1913, § 3904) establishing a minimum wage commission and providing for the determination and establishing of minimum wages for women and minors.

This act defines a living wage as a ‘wage sufficient to maintain the worker in health and supply him with the necessary comforts and conditions of reasonable life.’ ‘Minimum wage’ is given the same meaning. Section 20 (G. S. § 3923).

The act prohibits every employer in any occupation ‘from employing any worker at less than the living wage or minimum wage as defined in this act and determined in an order of the commission.’ Section 12 (G. S. § 3915).

The act gives the commission the power ‘at its discretion’ or at the request of not less than 100 persons engaged in any occupation where women and minors are employed, to make an investigation. The commission must hold public hearings at which employers and employés may appear. If, after investigation, the commission is of opinion that the wages paid to one-sixth or more of the women or minors employed therein are less than living wages, the commission shall establish a legal minimum rate of wages in said occupation for women and minors of ordinary ability and for learners and apprentices. The commission shall then issue an order to be effective 30 days thereafter making the wages then determined the minimum wages in said occupation throughout the state or within any area of the state, if differences in the cost of living warrant this restriction.

Defendants, members of a commission constituted as provided by the act, after a hearing and investigation, made two orders fixing minimum wages for women and minors of ordinary ability in certain occupations. These actions are brought to restrain the enforcement of the orders on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional and void. The trial court overruled a demurrer to the complaint and ordered a temporary injunction as prayed. Defendants appealed. The ground of the order was that the statute is unconstitutional and void. This is the question in the case.

[1] 1. We do not look to the Constitution to find legislative power of a state. The state Legislature possesses all legislative power not withheld or forbidden by the terms of the state or federal Constitution. State v. Corbett, 57 Minn. 345, 59 N. W. 317,24 L. R. A. 498;State ex rel. Simpson v. City of Mankato, 117 Minn. 458, 463, 136 N. W. 264,41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 111.

There are some limitations in the state Constitution on legislative power. It may safely be said, however, that so far as applicable to the facts in this case there are none more restrictive than the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. We may therefore direct our inquiry to the question whether this law is violative of any provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The pertinent part of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:

‘Nor shall any state deprive any person of * * * liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’

This guarantees to the citizen liberty of contract and liberty to conduct his business affairs in his own way. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct. 124, 48 L. Ed. 148;Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 48, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937,3 Ann. Cas. 1133;Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436,13 Ann. Cas. 764;McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 545, 29 Sup. Ct. 206, 53 L. Ed. 315;Coppage v. State of Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441, L. R. A. 1915C, 960. This right it is claimed has been infringed by this statute.

The liberty of contract guaranteed by this amendment is not absolute. It is subject to the power of the state to legislate for certain permissible purposes. For example, the state may, under certain conditions, regulate hours of labor of women, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 52 L. Ed. 551,13 Ann. Cas. 957;Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U. S. 671, 34 Sup. Ct. 469, 58 L. Ed. 788; or of minors in certain occupations, Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320, 34 Sup. Ct. 60, 58 L. Ed. 245, L. R. A. 1915A, 1196; or of men engaged in employments hazardous to health, Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780;Bunting v. State of Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435, 61 L. Ed. 830; or of men employed on public work, Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct. 124, 48 L. Ed. 148; or it may regulate conditions of labor, or the time of payment of employés, Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 23 Sup. Ct. 821, 47 L. Ed. 1002;Erie R. R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685, 34 Sup. Ct. 761, 58 L. Ed. 1155,51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1097; or the manner or medium of payment, Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 22 Sup. Ct. 1, 46 L. Ed. 55;McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct. 206, 53 L. Ed. 315.

The power of a state Legislature to restrict liberty of contract is coincident with what is familiarly known as the police power. Freund, Police Power, §§ 498-500. The police powers of the state, said Chief Justice Taney, in the License Cases, Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 How. 504, 583, 12 L. Ed. 256, ‘are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominion.’ In Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 359 , Justice Field defines the police power as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity.' In Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 111, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 188 [55 L. Ed. 112, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 487], that court broadened the definition as follows:

‘It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. * * * It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare’-citing Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518, 17 Sup. Ct. 864, 42 L. Ed. 260.

Yet there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power by the state. It is not enough to merely assert that the subject relates to the health, peace, morals, education, or good order or welfare of the people. ‘The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.’ Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 57, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 543 [49 L. Ed. 937,3 Ann. Cas. 1133]. ‘The liberty of contract guaranteed by the Constitution is freedom from arbitrary restraint,’ not freedom from reasonable regulation. The real test is whether the limitation is a ‘reasonable regulation to safeguard the public interest,’ imposed, not solely for the benefit of the individual, but essentially for the common benefit of all. Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 380, 381, 35 Sup. Ct. 342, 59 L. Ed. 628, L. R. A. 1915F, 829.

[2] 2. Bearing these principles in mind, we must determine whether this statute is within the proper field of legislation.

There is a notion, quite general, that women in the trades are underpaid, that they are not paid so well as men are paid for the same service, and that in fact in many cases the pay they receive for working during all the working hours of the day is not enough to meet the cost of reasonable living. Public investigations by publicly appointed commissions have resulted in findings to the above effect. Starting with such facts, there is opinion, more or less widespread, that these conditions...