Williams v. Garcia

• Decision Date: 24 August 1983
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 83-0623.
• Citation: 569 F. Supp. 1452
• Parties: Thomas T. WILLIAMS and Kempy Mitchell, Plaintiffs, v. Victor GARCIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

569 F. Supp. 1452

Thomas T. WILLIAMS and Kempy Mitchell, Plaintiffs, v. Victor GARCIA, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 83-0623.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.

August 24, 1983.

Kenneth W. Morrison, Detroit, Mich., and Robert A. Peurach, Bloomfield Hills, Mich., for plaintiffs.

Thomas D. Beeby, Detroit, Mich., for Sheriff Santos and Webb Co.

Anthony C. McGettrick, Asst. City Atty., Laredo, Tex., and James C. Zeman, Detroit, Mich., for Garcia, Tatangelo, Police Dept. & City of Laredo.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RALPH M. FREEMAN, Senior District Judge.

The complaint filed in this case contains two counts. Jurisdiction is based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), 1986, and the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs' claim is based on the imprisonment of plaintiffs in Laredo, Texas by the City of Laredo Police Department. Plaintiffs' first count asserts that defendants, acting separately and in concert, deprived them of a battery of constitutionally protected rights. (Plaintiffs' Complaint ¶ 21). The second count asserts that the same defendants are liable for the same conduct on a variety of tort theories under Texas law. In lieu of answering the complaint, defendants Mario Santos, Jr., Webb County, Texas, Victor Garcia, Aldo Tatangelo, City of Laredo, Texas, and the Laredo Police Department have moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) and (3) or, in the alternative, for change of venue to the Western District of Texas pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 1406(a). There are four unnamed Texas defendants, Laredo Police Officers A and B, Laredo Police Detective John Doe, and Laredo Warrant Officer Richard Roe. The only other defendant is Joseph Moses, who is alleged to be a resident of Michigan. Based on the record in this case, Moses has not been served with the complaint. Argument was heard on August 3, 1983 at which time this matter was taken under advisement.

12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss

The Court will first review the Texas defendants'¹ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180, 99 S.Ct. 2710, 2714-15, 61 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979). Each party agrees that valid service depends upon the reach of Michigan's long-arm statute under F.R. Civ.P. 4(e). This Court must first determine whether the state statute authorizes jurisdiction over these defendants and, second, whether the jurisdictional reach of the statute is within the constitutional due process limits of the Fourteenth Amendment. When the state has permitted its courts to reach the constitutional limit, the two questions merge into one. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); National Can Corp. v. K Beverage Co., 674 F.2d 1134 (6th Cir.1982); Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir.1968).

In the case at hand, plaintiffs contend that the Court has limited personal jurisdiction over the Texas defendants under M.C. L.A. § 600.705(2) and § 600.715(2). The relevant language of these sections, which apply to individuals and corporations, respectively, and which is identical, requires "the doing or causing of any act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort." Plaintiffs all but acknowledge that all conduct which they allege violated their constitutional rights and all conduct which they allege was tortious occurred in Texas. The only nexus to Michigan is defendant Moses, who plaintiffs allege conspired with the Texas defendants resulting in the alleged injuries to plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs allege the following facts in their complaint, which give rise to their cause of action. Defendant Garcia is the Chief of Police for the City of Laredo. Defendant Tatangelo is the Mayor of the City of Laredo. Defendant Mario Santos, Jr., is the Sheriff of Webb County. Plaintiffs' employer, Stephen Talley, entered into a lease agreement with defendant Moses for use of a tractor to haul freight. Moses supplied the tractor to Talley who then engaged plaintiffs to haul freight to Missouri. While in Missouri, plaintiffs obtained a one-way haul from Lebo, Kansas to Laredo, Texas. Subsequent to plaintiffs' departure from Detroit, a dispute arose between Moses and Talley with respect to the terms of the lease. At this point, Moses demanded payment or return of his tractor. When Talley refused both demands, plaintiffs allege that Moses set in motion the events which led to their arrest and incarceration in Laredo, Texas for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle under the Texas Penal Code. The alleged injurious conduct of the defendants is asserted to have begun with the arrest and continued throughout their incarceration. The plaintiffs have presented two theories on just how the Laredo Police Department was brought into this matter. In the complaint, at ¶ 5, plaintiffs allege that defendant Moses directly contacted the Laredo Police Department. In plaintiffs' response to the motions now before the Court, they allege that Moses first contacted the Detroit Police Department about the missing tractor and that it was the Detroit Police Department who then contacted the Laredo Police Department. When questioned about the discrepancy at the hearing, plaintiffs asserted that their investigation has led them to believe that Moses initially contacted the Detroit Police Department. Plaintiffs noted, however, that they need further time to discover the nature of Moses' contacts with both the Detroit Police Department and the Laredo Police Department. Plaintiffs allege that the Laredo Police Department obtained a warrant for their arrest based on the information transmitted by the Detroit Police Department. The plaintiffs were then arrested pursuant to the warrant. Plaintiffs describe the subsequent events as follows:

After apprehending the plaintiffs, the Laredo Police Department contacted the Detroit Police Department, by telecommunication, to determine whether to extradite the plaintiffs for prosecution in the State of Michigan. The Detroit Police, pursuant thereto, contacted Moses for verification of the plaintiffs' identities and for a formal, sworn complaint. Moses, however, refused to swear to the formal complaint because his charges were unfounded.

Faced with an inadequate record the Detroit Police Department sent another message to the Laredo Police Department directing that the plaintiffs be immediately released. However, in spite of that direction, and without charging plaintiffs with any violation of Texas law, the Laredo Police Department retained plaintiffs in jail for thirty-eight (38) more days. Plaintiffs understand that the Laredo Police Department did not release them because of further directions directly from Moses. It was during that false imprisonment period that plaintiffs were subjected to the repeated psychological and physical abuse alleged in the complaint which included, but was not limited to, racial slurring, inadequate physical protection, grossly substandard meals and general ill treatment, which resulted in the anxiety, humiliation and general suffering for which plaintiffs are suing herein.

For purposes of the instant motion, therefore, the connection between the tortious course of conduct that began with Moses' fraudulent complaint filed in Detroit, and continued with the other malicious acts in Texas, turns upon the conspiracy between the Texas defendants and Moses to subject the plaintiffs to retributional abuse without regard to constitutional rights. (Plaintiffs' brief in response to Motion to Dismiss). Plaintiffs contend that, because very little discovery has been completed, they are not able to set forth the nature of defendant Moses' contacts with the Texas defendants. This is compounded by their inability to serve Moses with the complaint in this action.

In Hadad v. Lewis, 382 F.Supp. 1365 (E.D.Mich.1974), M.C.L.A. § 600.705(2) was construed as bestowing upon Michigan courts the broadest grant of jurisdiction that would be consistent with due process, citing Sifers v. Horen, 385 Mich. 195, 188 N.W.2d 623 (1971). Section 600.715 has been construed as granting equally extensive jurisdiction. Microelectronic Sys. Corp. v. Bamberger's, 434 F.Supp. 168 (E.D.Mich. 1977). Thus, the sole inquiry for this Court is whether there are minimum contacts between the defendants and Michigan, keeping in mind that "limited jurisdiction ... exposes a nonresident to suit in Michigan only for a cause which arose out of the relationship serving as a basis for such jurisdiction." Sifers v. Horen, 385 Mich. at 199, 188 N.W.2d 623. It is clear that even a single act may provide the basis for longarm jurisdiction under the statute. Khalaf v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 404 Mich. 134, 273 N.W.2d 811 (1978); Sifers v. Horen, 385 Mich. 195, 188 N.W.2d 623 (1971). Considering the due process limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction based on a single act, the Sixth Circuit has developed three criteria for determining the outer limits of such jurisdiction:

First, the defendant must purposely avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from defendant's activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.

Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir.1968). Michigan also requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that a non-resident defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Michigan before he can be subject to the jurisdiction of Michigan courts. Khalaf v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., supra.

Since there is no statutory procedure for resolving the issue...