Williams v. State
Decision Date | 28 February 2001 |
Docket Number | No. A00A2193.,A00A2193. |
Citation | 248 Ga. App. 316,546 S.E.2d 74 |
Parties | WILLIAMS v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Derek H. Jones, Decatur, for appellant.
Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Eleanor A. Kornahrens, Maria B. Golick, Bruce D. Hornbuckle, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. ELLINGTON, Judge.
A Cobb County jury found Wallace James Williams guilty of aggravated assault with intent to rape, OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(1), aggravated battery, OCGA § 16-5-24(a), child molestation, OCGA § 16-6-4(a), and cruelty to children, OCGA § 16-5-70(b). Wallace appeals from the order denying his motion for new trial, challenging his aggravated battery conviction, the court's admission of certain evidence, the jury charge, the court's merging of offenses, and his trial counsel's effectiveness. Because the evidence was insufficient to support Williams' aggravated battery conviction, we must reverse that conviction.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence shows that Williams attacked 13-year-old C.T. when she was alone at her uncle's house. Williams knocked at the door and asked to speak with C.T.'s uncle. When C.T. said her uncle was not home, Williams asked to use the telephone. Although C.T. did not know Williams she let him into the house and handed him the telephone. Williams made two calls, then handed the phone back to C.T. He then asked C.T. if she was scared of him. C.T. asked Williams to leave; instead, he approached her, grabbed her arm, and touched her thigh. Williams chased C.T., grabbed her by the shoulders, and wrestled her into her uncle's bedroom. Once there, Williams pushed C.T. to the floor and tried to pull her shorts down. C.T. testified that she thought Williams was also trying to remove his pants. Williams called C.T. a "whore," yelled at her to shut up, felt C.T.'s legs and inner thigh, and stuck his fingers in C.T.'s mouth. When C.T. bit Williams, Williams retaliated by stepping on her face with his foot so hard that it left an imprint of his shoe's tread on her skin. During this struggle, C.T. grabbed the phone and acted as if she were going to call the police. Williams fled.
C.T. locked herself in the house and waited for her uncle to come home. When the uncle returned, he called the police. When C.T. told the responding detective that her attacker was short, very dark-skinned, and "cock-eyed," the uncle thought he knew who the man might be. Based on information from the uncle, the detective put together a photographic lineup and C.T. selected Williams' photo from it immediately. Later that evening, the detective arrested Williams at his home. Williams smelled of an alcoholic beverage and appeared intoxicated. The detective noted that Williams' face and knees were scratched and that he looked like he had "been in a fight." The tread on Williams' tennis shoes was consistent with the marks on C.T.'s face. At trial, Williams admitted he drank a quart of beer that evening. He also admitted he struggled with C.T., but that it was in self-defense because C.T. had "lost all self-control" and attacked him.
C.T. testified that the bruises and scratches to her face healed completely within a month and left no scars. The photographs of C.T.'s face taken after the attack do not show any bleeding wounds or swelling. C.T. testified that after the attack, her face started "stinging real bad." However, the evidence shows that C.T. did not require immediate medical attention. In fact, she did not go to the hospital until several hours after the attack. The State adduced no evidence showing that C.T. needed or received any diagnostic tests, like x-rays; medical treatment, like anti-inflammatory drugs, bandages, or ice packs; or minor surgery, like stitches.
1. Williams argues that the evidence adduced was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated battery. We agree. The aggravated battery statute provides, in relevant part, that a "person commits the offense of aggravated battery when he or she maliciously causes bodily harm to another by ... seriously disfiguring his or her body or a member thereof." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-5-24(a). (Punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of H. S., 199 Ga.App. 481, 405 S.E.2d 323 (1991). "To constitute the crime of aggravated battery, there is no requirement that, in addition to being `serious,' the disfigurement of a victim be permanent." Id.
This Court has never attempted to illustrate what is meant by the term "seriously" in the "seriously disfiguring" element of aggravated battery, and the trial court is not required to give a charge explaining that term. See, e.g., Perkins v. State, 269 Ga. 791, 796(5), 505 S.E.2d 16 (1998); Levin v. State, 222 Ga.App. 123, 127-128(7), 473 S.E.2d 582 (1996); Miller v. State, 155 Ga. App. 54, 55-56(4), 270 S.E.2d 466 (1980). Because the circumstances of each aggravated battery vary, whether disfigurement is serious is best resolved by the factfinder on a case-by-case basis. Consequently, what constitutes serious disfigurement is almost always a question for the jury. Silvers v. State, 245 Ga.App. 486(1), 538 S.E.2d 135 (2000). That does not mean, however, that no threshold exists for determining whether disfiguring injuries meet the requisite level of seriousness for an aggravated battery charge.
The legislature has created three distinct categories of battery: simple battery, OCGA § 16-5-23 ( ); battery, OCGA § 16-5-23.1 ( ); and aggravated battery, OCGA § 16-5-24 ( ). These statutes evidence a legislative intent to categorize the types of battery by the severity of the harm inflicted and to provide harsher penalties for batteries that result in more severe bodily harm. For example, a simple battery is generally punished as a misdemeanor. See OCGA § 16-5-23(b). The greater offense of battery, however, may be punished as a felony under certain circumstances and a prison sentence of up to five years imposed. OCGA § 16-5-23.1(e), (f)(2), (i), (k). Aggravated battery, the most grave of the battery offenses, carries a maximum 20-year penalty. OCGA § 16-5-24(b).
Pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-23.1, a person commits a battery when he "intentionally causes substantial physical harm or visible bodily harm to another." Thus, this intermediate battery offense requires something more than simple battery's offensive touching or physical harm. The injury must be manifest, that is, "capable of being perceived by a person other than the victim." OCGA § 16-5-23.1(b). "[V]isible bodily harm," in fact, is defined to include, "but is not limited to, substantially blackened eyes, substantially swollen lips or other facial or body parts, or substantial bruises to body parts." OCGA § 16-5-23.1(b). It logically follows then that, although "seriously disfiguring" is not defined in OCGA § 16-5-24, it must require an injury more severe than the visible wounds used to illustrate the "visible bodily harm" required to support a battery conviction.
In every aggravated battery based upon a serious disfigurement, including those in which the disfigurement was temporary, the injury inflicted was more than a superficial wound, that is, a scrape, bruise, discoloration, or swelling. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 246 Ga. at 318(2), 271 S.E.2d 360 ( ); Penland v. State, 229 Ga. 256, 257(1), 190 S.E.2d 900 (1972) ( ); Ganas v. State, 245 Ga.App. 645-646(1)(a), 537 S.E.2d 758 (2000) ( ); Silvers v. State, 245 Ga.App. at 486(1), 538 S.E.2d 135 ( ); Ramsey v. State, 233 Ga.App. 810-811(1), 505 S.E.2d 779 (1998) ( ); Deal v. State, 233 Ga.App. 79, 84(15), 503 S.E.2d 288 (1998) ( ); McClain v. State, 232 Ga.App. 282, 283(1), 502 S.E.2d 266 (1998) ( ); Miller v. State, 155 Ga.App. at 56-57(4), 270 S.E.2d 466 ( ). We have found no case upholding an aggravated battery based upon injuries like those C.T. suffered. In fact, C.T.'s injuries are comparable to those found sufficient to support a conviction for battery. See Hussey v. State, 206 Ga.App. 122, 123(2), 424 S.E.2d 374 (1992) ( ); Danzis v. State, 198 Ga.App. 136, 137-138, 400 S.E.2d 671 (1990) ( ). The evidence in this case is sufficient to support a finding that C.T. suffered visible bodily harm and, as a consequence of that, her appearance was temporarily impaired by scratches and bruises. However, the evidence adduced is insufficient to support a finding that the disfigurement was serious. Because the State adduced no evidence from which the jury could infer that C.T.'s injuries were more significant, grave, or severe than the superficial, visible wounds that would typically support a battery conviction under OCGA § 16-5-23.1, the State has failed to carry its burden of proving the "seriously disfiguring" element of the offense of aggravated battery. Consequently, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is insufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams was guilty of aggravated battery. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We must, therefore, reverse Williams' conviction for aggravated battery.
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