Williams v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 04 December 1989
• Docket Number: No. D010421,D010421
• Citation: 264 Cal.Rptr. 677,216 Cal.App.3d 378
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Robin G. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent; RD INSTRUMENTS, Real Party in Interest.

Page 677

264 Cal.Rptr. 677

216 Cal.App.3d 378

Robin G. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent RD INSTRUMENTS, Real Party in Interest.

No. D010421.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Dec. 4, 1989.

Phillips, Campbell, Haskett & Noone and Frederick Phillips, San Diego, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy and Jody A. Landry, San Francisco, for real party in interest.

HUFFMAN, Associate Justice.

Robin G. Williams petitions this court for a writ of mandate to overturn an order of the superior court transferring his action for wrongful termination to the municipal court. That order was issued by a judge who conducted settlement proceedings following arbitration and concluded based on his analysis of the pleadings and the history of the action that the contract cause of action would not likely support an award of damages meeting the superior court jurisdictional limit of $25,000 or more. This petition presents a recurring issue of considerable importance to counsel and the courts, and therefore we have requested supplemental briefing and heard oral argument on the matter. ¹

Having analyzed the applicable statutory provisions and the facts as presented to the settlement judge, we conclude the court acted within its authorized discretion in transferring this case to the municipal court. We therefore deny the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Williams, a British citizen, filed a superior court action on November 24, 1987, for breach of contract and related theories, seeking damages for alleged wrongful termination from RD Instruments (RDI), his former employer. His complaint includes as exhibits a letter from RDI offering him employment, stating no particular term of years, and a letter from RDI to the Immigration and Naturalization Service requesting a visa for Williams for a period of three years, on the basis that "[w]e estimate that approximately a three-year period of time will be sufficient for Dr. Williams to complete his responsibilities and train other personnel capable of handling his position within our organization."

Upon motion by RDI, ² Williams's related causes of action for promissory estoppel, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud were dismissed in the law and motion department in light of the ruling in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373. The contract cause of action praying for damages in excess of $150,000 survived the motion and is the subject of the challenged transfer proceedings.

Following judicial arbitration proceedings which resulted in an award in favor of RDI, Williams sought a trial de novo. A settlement conference was held resulting in no significant progress on the case. A second settlement conference was ordered before the same judge and the parties were required to file settlement briefs stating their estimation of the damages sought, to assist the court in conducting settlement negotiations and to respond to the court's concern that the case might not meet the $25,000 jurisdictional limit for superior court. (§ 86(a)(1).)

In his "Statement of Damages" filed with the settlement judge, Williams reiterated his position that he had been hired for a period of three years although he had been terminated after ten months. He placed his damages for moving expenses at $14,590, his total lost wages for a three-year period at $28,244, and for a hypothetical additional seven-year period at $97,405 In RDI's "Statement of Position in Regards to Special Settlement Conference," it outlined the history of the employment relationship between the parties, denying there was any contract of employment, and arguing that even if there were, Williams had been terminated for good cause. Assuming, however, a two-year contract existed because of the undisputed fact Williams had obtained a two-year visa, RDI estimated his damages for loss of earnings at $12,311 when taking into account his later employment. Although Williams claimed damages for moving expenses of $14,590, RDI claimed many of those expenses were "questionable," and stated he would only be able to show a loss of $5,000, thus placing his actual damages at around $18,000.

thus resulting in a grand total of damages claimed of $140,239.

After considering these briefs and hearing argument by the parties, the settlement judge on his own motion ordered the matter transferred to the municipal court on the basis Williams was unlikely to recover damages of $25,000 or more. He explained his ruling on the record by stating he was aware Williams had only obtained a two-year visa and concluding it was doubtful under the facts shown that Williams could establish the existence of a contract. Even if Williams could show a contract had been entered into, the judge found it would be limited to a two-year period: "Anything beyond two years then is speculation that he would even be in the country. So I don't think you can read this as being a three-year contract." The court then stated the arbitration award in favor of RDI was a consideration which could properly be taken into account, and ordered the transfer fees waived. (§ 399.) This petition promptly followed.

DISCUSSION

Williams contends the trial court abused its discretion in transferring the case to municipal court as the amount prayed for by the complaint on its face met the jurisdictional limit of $25,000. He also argues the trial court improperly considered the arbitration award in favor of RDI in making its decision to transfer the case.

The parties have correctly framed the issue presented as whether the order of transfer constituted an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Although generally the provisions of section 396 ³ are mandatory and jurisdictional (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Jurisdiction, § 322, p. 739), an exception applies here. Section 396 in its fifth paragraph allows the superior court the discretion to retain for decision those cases in which the judgment to be rendered, as determined at a trial or hearing, could also have been rendered by a municipal or justice court. (Campbell v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 147, 152, fn. 2, 261 Cal.Rptr. 509; Wexler v. Goldstein (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 410, 414, 304 P.2d 41.)

We therefore are required to evaluate the challenged order in light of guidelines for review of an exercise of discretion recently expressed by the Supreme Court in Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478-479, 243 Cal.Rptr. 902, 749 P.2d 339 "The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court. [Citations.]"

An alternate statement of the test for an abuse of discretion was made in IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69, 196 Cal.Rptr. 715, 672 P.2d 121:

"A trial court will be found to have abused its discretion only when it has ' "exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence." ' [Citations.]"

A writ of mandate to compel the exercise of discretion in a particular manner by a court will lie only where the facts would support only one decision. (Nathanson v. Superior Court (1974), 12 Cal.3d 355, 361, 115 Cal.Rptr. 783, 525 P.2d 687.)

Here, the settlement judge had several items of information before him on which to base a decision. These included a consideration of the pleadings and settlement briefs, knowledge of the prior arbitration proceedings and award, and some familiarity with the case through two unsuccessful settlement conferences he conducted.

These circumstances are similar to those which led to a transfer from superior court to municipal court in Campbell v. Superior Court, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 147, 261 Cal.Rptr. 509. In Campbell, the court had before it a tort case alleging assault and battery, false imprisonment and other theories. No special damages were alleged, although general damages of $500,000 were sought along with $1 million punitive damages. Judicial arbitration resulted in an award to the plaintiff in the amount of $1,400 from one defendant and nothing from another. Two unsuccessful settlement conferences were held and trial was scheduled. The matter came before the acting presiding judge, who was familiar with the facts, having assisted in attempting to settle the case, and who determined in light of the events at issue and the arbitrator's assessment that a superior court verdict was virtually unattainable. (Id. at p. 150, 261 Cal.Rptr. 509.) Accordingly, the judge transferred the case to the municipal court. That decision was upheld on appeal.

The court in Campbell found it appropriate for a trial court to consider the results of an arbitration. It also recognized the trial court, familiar with the facts of the case, could engage in some weighing of those facts in order to make a proper exercise of its discretion. A decision by the trial court based upon such evaluation is reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion. (Campbell v. Superior Court, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 152, 261 Cal.Rptr. 509.)

In Campbell, the court recognized the general rule that the amount of damages sought in the prayer controls the determination of jurisdiction for a civil action, unless the prayer is fraudulent or fictitious on its face. (2 Witkin, op. cit. supra, § 19, p. 385; Depretto v. Superior Court (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 36, 39, 171 Cal.Rptr. 810; Davis v. Superior Court (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 596, 599-560, 102 Cal.Rptr. 238.) On this point, the court cited Davis v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 599, 102 Cal.Rptr. 238, quoting Sellery v. Ward (1942) 21 Cal.2d 300, 304-305, 131 P.2d 550: " 'Ordinarily the relief claimed...