Williamson v. Hawaii Paroling Auth.

• Decision Date: 29 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. 22882.,22882.
• Citation: 35 P.3d 210,97 Haw. 183
• Parties: Gregory K. WILLIAMSON, Respondent-Petitioner-Appellant, v. HAWAI`I PAROLING AUTHORITY, Petitioner-Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

35 P.3d 210

97 Haw. 183

Gregory K. WILLIAMSON, Respondent-Petitioner-Appellant, v. HAWAI`I PAROLING AUTHORITY, Petitioner-Respondent-Appellee.

No. 22882.

Supreme Court of Hawai`i.

November 29, 2001.

Lisa M. Itomura, Deputy Attorney General, for petitioner-respondent-appellee on the writ.

Theodore Y.H. Chinn, Deputy Public Defender, for amicus curiae the Office of the Public Defender.

Opinion of the Court by NAKAYAMA, J.

Petitioner-respondent-appellee Hawai`i Paroling Authority (HPA) applies to this court for a writ of certiorari to review the opinion of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in Williamson v. Hawai`i Paroling Authority, 97 Hawai`i 156, 34 P.3d 1055 (Ct. App.2000) [hereinafter, the "ICA's opinion"],<sup>1</sup> vacating the circuit court's judgment dismissing the Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 petition of respondent-petitioner-appellant Gregory Williamson. In its application for certiorari, the HPA argues that the ICA erred when it held that a prisoner has a statutory right to a minimum term of imprisonment that is shorter than the maximum possible sentence. We hold that neither Chapter 706 nor Chapter 353 of the Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) prohibit the HPA from setting a prisoner's minimum term at a period equal to his or her maximum sentence. Therefore, we reverse the ICA's opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual and procedural background

Williamson was convicted of one count of assault in the second degree, in violation of HRS § 707-711 (1993), and one count of burglary in the second degree, in violation of HRS § 708-811 (1993). On January 12, 1998, Williamson was sentenced to two concurrent terms of five years' imprisonment. After a hearing pursuant to HRS § 706-669 (1993 & Supp.1998), the HPA set Williamson's minimum terms at five years.

On November 24, 1998, Williamson filed an HRPP Rule 40 petition for post-conviction relief. In his petition, Williamson argued that the HPA violated his "right to be eligible for parole" under HRS § 706-669 by setting his minimum term at the same length of time as his maximum sentence. However, on February 3, 1999, the circuit court ruled that Williamson's petition did not "raise issues of illegality of judgment as described in HRPP Rule 40(a)(1) or illegality of restraint or custody described in HRPP Rule 40(a)(2)"² and ordered that Williamson's petition be forwarded to the court clerk to be processed as a civil complaint pursuant to HRPP Rule 40(c)(3).³

The HPA was served with a summons on February 8, 1999 that required it to answer the petition within thirty days. Instead of filing an answer, on February 22, 1999, the HPA filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that it was immune to Williamson's claims. On March 4, 1999, Williamson filed a motion to strike the HPA's motion to dismiss, arguing that the HPA's motion raised "insufficient defenses" and contained "immaterial, impertinent, and/or scandalous matter." The circuit court denied Williamson's motion to strike and granted the HPA's motion to dismiss on July 2, 1999. A "judgment in a civil case" was entered in the HPA's favor on September 20, 1999. Williamson timely appealed.

B. The ICA's opinion

On appeal, Williamson argued that the circuit court erred in ordering that his HRPP Rule 40 petition be processed as a civil complaint and in granting the HPA's motion to dismiss the petition. Williamson argued that he had alleged illegal restraint or custody based on the HPA setting his minimum term in violation of his right to be eligible for parole under HRS § 706-669(1) (1993) and that, because the HPA violated his statutory "right to be eligible for parole," the court should not have dismissed his petition.

The ICA issued a published opinion on November 22, 2000. Relying on Turner v. Hawai`i Paroling Authority, 93 Hawai`i 298, 1 P.3d 768 (App.2000) (holding that an HRPP petition is the appropriate means to challenge an HPA decision denying parole), the ICA held that "[an HRPP] Rule 40 petition is an appropriate means for an inmate to challenge the minimum term of imprisonment set by the HPA."

The ICA further held that the circuit court erred in granting the HPA's motion to dismiss because every inmate who is not sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole has a statutory right to have his or her minimum term set at a period less than his or her maximum sentence. The ICA stated that:

[HRS §] 706-669 states a prisoner shall become eligible for parole after serving his minimum term of imprisonment. [HRS §] 706-670(1) . . . states a "person sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment shall receive an initial parole hearing at least one month before the expiration of the minimum term of imprisonment." [HRS §] 353-62(a)(2) directs the HPA to consider for parole all committed persons, except in cases where the penalty of life imprisonment without parole has been imposed.... And finally, [HRS] § 353-64 provides that any committed person except those sentenced to life imprisonment without parole "shall be subject to parole."

ICA's opinion at 159-60, 34 P.3d at 1058-59. The ICA stated that "[t]ogether these statutory provisions make it clear that every inmate sentenced to an indeterminate sentence is entitled to a parole hearing." Id. at 159, 34 P.3d at 1058. The ICA further held that:

By setting the same minimum term of imprisonment as the maximum term of imprisonment, the HPA has denied Williamson a meaningful parole hearing before his minimum sentences expire. Under HRS § 706-670(1), Williamson would still be entitled to a parole hearing at least one month before his minimum sentence expires, but he could not be placed on parole unless the HPA reduced his minimum terms of imprisonment. Section 706-669(5) (Supp.1999) states that the HPA in its discretion may reduce the minimum term of imprisonment. Section 706-669(5) does not contemplate minimum terms being the same as maximum terms because the HPA would then have no discretion but to reduce a minimum term of imprisonment to allow an inmate to have a meaningful parole hearing.

Id. at 160, 34 P.3d at 1059 (emphasis in original). Finally, the ICA held that "[a] `reasonable period of time should intervene between such minimum and maximum sentences.'" Id. at 160, 34 P.3d at 1059 (quoting Territory v. Lake, 26 Haw. 764, 771-72 (1923)).

Based on these principles, the ICA vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to grant Williamson's HRPP Rule 40 petition and to direct the HPA to reduce Williamson's minimum term such that there would be a reasonable period of time between his minimum and maximum terms. Id. at ____, 34 P.3d at ___.

The HPA filed a timely application for a writ of certiorari on December 22, 2000.⁴ In its application, the HPA argued that, based on the legislative history of HRS § 706-669 and the Hawai`i Penal Code, the ICA erred in holding that prisoners are entitled, as a per se matter, to minimum terms that are shorter than their maximum sentences.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of review

Whether the HPA has the authority to set a prisoner's minimum term of imprisonment at a period equal to his or her maximum sentence is a question of statutory interpretation.

"[T]he interpretation of a statute ... is a question of law reviewable de novo."... [State v.] Arceo, 84 Hawai`i [1,] 10, 928 P.2d [843,] 852 [(1996)] ... (quoting State v. Camara, 81 Hawai`i 324, 329, 916 P.2d 1225, 1230 (1996) (citations omitted)). See also State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai`i 8, 18, 904 P.2d 893, 903 (1995); State v. Higa, 79 Hawai`i 1, 3, 897 P.2d 928, 930, ... (1995); State v. Nakata, 76 Hawai`i 360, 365, 878 P.2d 699, 704, ... (1994) ....

Gray v. Administrative Director of the Court, 84 Hawai`i 138, 144, 931 P.2d 580, 586 (1997) (some brackets added and some in original). See also State v. Soto, 84 Hawai`i 229, 236, 933 P.2d 66, 73 (1997). Furthermore, our statutory construction is guided by established rules:

When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.

When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists . . . .

In construing an ambiguous statute, "[t]he meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning." HRS § 1-15(1) [(1993)]. Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool.

Gray, 84 Hawai`i at 148, 931 P.2d at 590 (quoting ... Toyomura, 80 Hawai`i [at] 18-19, 904 P.2d [at] 903-04 ...) (brackets and ellipsis points in original) (footnote omitted). This court may also consider "[t]he reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it ... to discover its true meaning." HRS § 1-15(2) (1993). "Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called upon in aid to explain what is doubtful in another." HRS § 1-16 (1993).

State v. Valentine, 93 Hawai`i 199, 204-05, 998 P.2d 479, 484-85 (2000) (quoting State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai`i 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999)) (some citations omitted) (some alterations in original).

B. Neither the plain language nor the legislative history of HRS Chapters 353 and 706 prohibits the HPA from setting a prisoner's minimum term of imprisonment at a period equal to his or her maximum sentence.

At the outset, we note that the legislature created the HPA to be the "central paroling authority for the State." HRS...