Wilson v. People

• Decision Date: 04 November 1985
• Docket Number: Nos. 83SC450,83SC452,s. 83SC450
• Citation: 708 P.2d 792
• Parties: Terry Trent WILSON, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Terry Trent WILSON, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 792

708 P.2d 792

Terry Trent WILSON, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Terry Trent WILSON, Respondent.

Nos. 83SC450, 83SC452.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Nov. 4, 1985.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 2, 1985.

David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Seth J. Benezra, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for petitioner.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Laura E. Udis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondent.

KIRSHBAUM, Justice.

We granted certiorari in these two cases ¹ to review the decision in People v. Wilson, 677 P.2d 948 (Colo.App.1983), in which the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of a motion by the defendant, Terry Trent Wilson, to vacate his plea of guilty to an information charging him with the offense of rape, as defined by C.R.S. 1963, § 40-3-401 (1971 Cum.Supp.). ² We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in People v. Wilson, and affirm the judgment of the trial court in other respects.

The material facts are not disputed. On March 20, 1973, the People filed an information charging the defendant with rape, two counts of deviate sexual intercourse, second degree kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. As the result of plea negotiations, the defendant agreed to enter a plea of guilty to the charge of rape in return for the dismissal of the remaining counts of the information and an agreement by the People to recommend sentencing under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act of 1968 (the Act). ³ A providency hearing was held, and on May 18, 1973, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of rape.

At the providency hearing the following colloquy took place between the trial court and the defendant:

THE COURT: Well, let me generally tell the defendant at this time, you understand that you are charged in Count 1, Mr. Wilson, with the charge of rape, in that on the 4th day of February, 1973, in Denver, Colorado, you did unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with a female person not your spouse, namely, [the victim], by compelling her to submit by force and by threat of serious bodily harm to be inflicted on [the victim]; contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the People of the State of Colorado.

Do you understand the nature of the charge against you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Now, is this something you want to do, [defense counsel] has explained this situation to you, hasn't he?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

The trial court then discussed aspects of the Act with the defendant, as follows:

THE COURT: The Court must tell you some of the things that the doctors will be asked to find, that is, to give an opinion as to whether or not if you remain at large you constitute a threat of bodily harm to members of the public; and they will also be asked to state whether you are mentally deficient, whether you could benefit from psychiatric treatment, and whether you can be adequately supervised under probation.

Those are things they will be called on to answer. If those should be answered in the negative, then the Court has a right to sentence you under the original rape statute, which carries not less than five or more than forty years in prison; but if the Court finds that these doctors answer these questions in the affirmative, sentence will then be imposed under the sex offenders act, then the Court has the right to commit you to the Director of Institutions for a period of not less than a day and a maximum of life.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

On July 13, 1973, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. At that hearing, two psychiatric examination reports concerning the defendant were filed. The reports contained factual information supplied by the defendant regarding the events underlying the charges filed against him. The defendant waived his right to an evidentiary hearing, and the trial court proceeded to impose sentence. Based on the reports, the trial court found the defendant a proper candidate for sentencing under the Act. The defendant was then sentenced to the custody of the Department of Institutions (the Department) for a term of one day to life.

The defendant was initially sent to the Colorado State Hospital at Pueblo, Colorado, for treatment as a sex offender, but was subsequently transferred to the Colorado State Penitentiary due to misconduct at the State Hospital. The defendant was again sent to the State Hospital, but, when he refused treatment, was transferred back to the State Penitentiary, where he was confined at the time he filed his Crim.P. 35(c) motion.

I

At the Crim.P. 35(c) motion hearing, the defendant argued that his guilty plea should be vacated because he had not been advised by the trial court of the mens rea element of the offense of rape. The statute under which the defendant had been charged contained no express culpable mental state requirement. However, in People v. Naranjo, 200 Colo. 1, 612 P.2d 1099 (1980), this court determined that the conviction of first degree sexual assault under section 18-3-402, 18 C.R.S. (1973), ⁴ required proof of knowing conduct. The Crim.P. 35(c) trial court determined that, pursuant to Naranjo, the rape statute under which the defendant had been charged also required proof of knowing conduct.

Although at the providency hearing neither the trial court nor defense counsel referred to the term "knowingly" when discussing the tendered guilty plea, the information read to the defendant by the trial court alleged that the defendant acted "unlawfully" and "feloniously." The Crim.P. 35(c) court concluded that the word "feloniously" appearing in the information was equivalent in meaning to the terms "knowingly" or "willfully" and that the reading of the information to the defendant adequately informed him of the mens rea element of the offense of rape. Relying on our decision in People v. Muniz, 667 P.2d 1377 (Colo.1983), the Court of Appeals reversed. We do not consider Muniz dispositive of the issue, and find that the record supports the Crim.P. 35(c) court's conclusion that the defendant's plea was entered knowingly.

Under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, section 25, of the Colorado Constitution, a guilty plea must be made voluntarily and knowingly to be effective. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 99 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Harshfield v. People, 697 P.2d 391 (Colo.1985); Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834 (Colo.1982). When a defendant subsequently challenges the efficacy of a guilty plea, the record of the providency hearing must show the defendant's understanding of the critical elements of the offense to which the plea is tendered. Harshfield 697 P.2d 391; Watkins, 655 P.2d 834; People v. Keenan, 185 Colo. 317, 524 P.2d 604 (1974).

The provisions of Crim.P. 11 are designed to ensure compliance with these constitutional principles. See People v. Leonard, 673 P.2d 37 (Colo.1983). Compliance with Crim.P. 11 also creates a record to support a determination by both the trial court and a reviewing court of the defendant's understanding of the charge to which the plea is tendered. Id. At the time the defendant entered his plea, Crim.P. 11(c) ⁵ provided in pertinent part:

The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere without ... determining:

(1) That the defendant understands the charge against him.

The rule did not then require judicial definition of every element of the charged offense. Rather, it was sufficient for purposes of due process analysis that the record disclosed that the defendant knew and understood the general nature and critical elements of the offense. See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 186 Colo. 129, 526 P.2d 144 (1974); People v. Sanders, 185 Colo. 356, 524 P.2d 299 (1974); People v. Cumby, 178 Colo. 31, 495 P.2d 223 (1972); People v. Colosacco, 177 Colo. 219, 493 P.2d 650 (1972).

In rejecting post-conviction challenges to the content of an information, we have concluded that the word "feloniously" in an information is equivalent to "knowingly" or "willfully." See Gallegos v. People, 161 Colo. 158, 420 P.2d 409 (1966) ("feloniously" when used in an indictment or information is equivalent to the word "willfully" and its use satisfies requirements of pleading essential elements of the crime); Williams v. People, 26 Colo. 272, 57 P. 701 (1899) ("feloniously" in an information has the same legal import as "willfully"); cf. McConnell v. People, 73 Colo. 99, 213 P. 674 (1923) (information stating that an act was committed "unlawfully and feloniously" sufficient to charge that the accused knowingly and willfully committed the offense). In relatively simple offenses, such as offenses which do not require a specific intent or do not include elements so technical in nature as to be beyond the understanding of persons of normal intelligence, the same factors used to determine the sufficiency of an information as a charging document may also be used to determine the adequacy of a guilty plea advisement.

An information is sufficient if it advises the defendant of the charges filed with sufficient particularity to permit the defendant to prepare an adequate defense and to protect the defendant from further prosecution for the same offense. People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980); People v. Albo, 195 Colo. 102, 575 P.2d 427 (1978). The information must describe the offense charged with such degree of certainty that a court may pronounce judgment upon conviction. See § 16-5-202(1)(d), 8 C.R.S. (1978); Crim.P. 7(b)(2); Compton v. People, 84 Colo. 106, 268 P. 577 (1928); see also Moore, 200 Colo 481, 615 P.2d 726. A properly advised guilty plea also allows a trial court to pronounce judgment, as a...