Woodruff v. Gitlow

• Decision Date: 02 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2012–67–M.P.,2012–67–M.P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Parties: Michael L. WOODRUFF v. Stuart GITLOW, M.D.

91 A.3d 805

Michael L. WOODRUFF

v.Stuart GITLOW, M.D.

No. 2012–67–M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 2, 2014.

Joseph R. Palumbo, Jr., Esq., Middletown, for Plaintiff.

Daniel E. Burgoyne, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice FLAHERTY, for the Court.

Does a physician who was hired by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to conduct an independent medical records review owe a duty of care to the subject of the review? In our opinion, under the situation presented in this case, he does not. The FAA engaged the defendant, Dr. Stuart Gitlow, to review the medical records of the plaintiff, Michael L. Woodruff, and to make a recommendation about the plaintiff's fitness to have his medical certificate reinstated. Woodruff had voluntarily surrendered his medical certificate to the FAA after a motor-vehicle accident that occurred in September 2008, and he sought reinstatement in 2009. Doctor Gitlow conducted his review of Woodruff's medical records and concluded that Woodruff fell within the FAA's regulatory definition for substance dependence. After the FAA denied the plaintiff's application, Woodruff filed suit in Superior Court, alleging that Dr. Gitlow was negligent in making his report and that the FAA had relied on Dr. Gitlow's conclusion to Woodruff's detriment. A justice of the Superior Court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and Dr. Gitlow filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with this Court, which we granted on September 10, 2012. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we quash the order of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel

The plaintiff has been a commercial pilot since 1988, working as a crop duster in Kansas and other states. In September 2008, Woodruff was involved in a motor-vehicle accident, after which he surrendered his second-class medical certificate at the request of the FAA. In addition to other requirements, the FAA requires that, to be eligible to pilot commercial aircraft, all pilots obtain and maintain a valid medical certificate. See14 C.F.R. § 61.3(c) (2014). After recovering from the effects of the 2008 accident, Woodruff sought reinstatement from the FAA.

After he had reviewed Woodruff's medical records, the FAA's chief psychiatrist, Dr. Charles Chesanow, concluded that Woodruff met the FAA criteria for alcohol dependence, which would necessitate treatment and recovery to the satisfaction of the Federal Air Surgeon before Woodruff could receive the medical certificate. Doctor Chesanow requested that the FAA refer Woodruff's medical records to Dr. Gitlow, a psychiatrist, to determine if he concurred with Dr. Chesanow's opinion. As a result, the FAA retained defendant as a medical consultant to review certain medical documents and opine whether Woodruff met the FAA's criteria for alcohol dependence.

In July 2009, the FAA provided Dr. Gitlow with portions of what were purported to be plaintiff's hospital, medical, and driving records, along with FAA forms that had been filled out by Woodruff. When he was later deposed, Dr. Gitlow testified that the records that he had received were only a “fraction” of plaintiff's entire file, that he did not physically examine Woodruff, and that he made his conclusions based solely on the documents that the FAA had provided to him.¹ After reviewing the documents, Dr. Gitlow submitted his analysis to Dr. Chesanow on August 10, 2009. In it, Dr. Gitlow ultimately concurred that Woodruff was substance dependent as that condition is defined by the FAA regulations.

On November 24, 2010, plaintiff filed suit in Superior Court, alleging that Dr. Gitlow's evaluation had been negligently performed and that his report caused the FAA to deny Woodruff's application to renew his medical certificate. Woodruff further alleged that because he failed to regain his medical certificate, he was unable to resume working as a crop duster. On October 19, 2011, after both sides had engaged in discovery, Dr. Gitlow filed a motion for summary judgment in which he argued that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law for two reasons. First, Dr. Gitlow argued that he did not owe Woodruff a duty of care, and second, Dr. Gitlow maintained that he had immunity because his report was protected by this state's Anti–SLAPP statute pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9–33–1.

After hearing argument from the parties on January 3, 2012, a justice of the Superior Court denied Dr. Gitlow's motion for summary judgment. The trial justice concludedthat there was a material issue of fact “as to what Dr. Gitlow's relationship, if any, was to the plaintiff in the context of this so-called records review.” ² The trial justice conceded that the parties did not have a direct physician-patient relationship and that Dr. Gitlow had not physically examined Woodruff, but he nonetheless determined that there was authority under the Restatement (Second) Torts § 552 (1977) to conclude that a duty might arise in situations like the one present here. On February 23, 2012, Dr. Gitlow filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to this Court, which we granted on September 10, 2012. In the order granting certiorari, we directed the parties to address whether, in this case, Dr. Gitlow, whom the FAA had hired to prepare a medical report, owed Woodruff a duty of care in the preparation of the report.³

Before this Court, defendant presses three arguments. First, Dr. Gitlow argues that the trial justice erred when he held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the parties' relationship. Second, Dr. Gitlow maintains that he did not owe Woodruff a duty of care to accurately reach or report the conclusions of his records review. Finally, defendant asserts that his statements to the FAA are protected by the Anti–SLAPP statute.

IIStandard of Review

“Our review of a case on certiorari is limited to an examination of ‘the record to determine if an error of law has been committed.’ ” State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419, 423 (R.I.2013) (quoting State v. Greenberg, 951 A.2d 481, 489 (R.I.2008)). “Questions of law * * * are not binding upon the [C]ourt and may be reviewed to determine what the law is and its applicability to the facts.” Huntley v. State, 63 A.3d 526, 530–31 (R.I.2013) (quoting State v. Shepard, 33 A.3d 158, 163 (R.I.2011)). We will reverse only when we find that the hearing justice committed an error of law. Id.

When we grant certiorari after a denial of a motion for summary judgment, “our review is governed by the same standard of review that applies to a grant of summary judgment.” Plunkett v. State, 869 A.2d 1185, 1187 (R.I.2005) (citing McKinnon v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 713 A.2d 245, 247 (R.I.1998)). “It is well established that this Court reviews a trial justice's decision to grant summary judgment de novo, ‘employing the same standards and rules used by the [trial] justice.’ ” Reynolds v. First NLC Financial Services, LLC, 81 A.3d 1111, 1115 (R.I.2014) (quoting Inland American Retail Management LLC v. Cinemaworld of Florida, Inc., 68 A.3d 457, 461 (R.I.2013)). Therefore, “if, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, [we conclude] that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,’ we will affirm the judgment.” Id. (quoting Cinemaworld of Florida, Inc., 68 A.3d at 461).

IIIDiscussion

AGenuine Issues of Material Fact

Before this Court, Dr. Gitlow first argues that the trial justice committed reversible error when he found that the extent of the relationship between Woodruff and Dr. Gitlow was a genuine issue of material fact and that, as a result, he was precluded from granting the motion for summary judgment. Doctor Gitlow contends that the facts of the case are not in dispute: the FAA retained Dr. Gitlow to review certain medical records and render an opinion as to whether Woodruff was chemically dependent; Dr. Gitlow based his opinion solely on the records the FAA presented to him; and Dr. Gitlow never physically examined Woodruff or had any contact with him whatsoever. Neither before this Court, nor in the Superior Court has Woodruff offered competent evidence to dispute Dr. Gitlow's statements of fact or even disagree with Dr. Gitlow's version of the facts. Generally, if the nonmoving party does not dispute the facts, we will determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Boucher v. McGovern, 639 A.2d 1369, 1374 (R.I.1994).

However, in this case, the trial justice determined that there was an issue of material fact surrounding whether a physician-patient relationship existed between the parties. “Rule 56(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a trial justice to grant a motion for summary judgment when no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved exists.” Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Dudley Service Corp., 605 A.2d 1325, 1328 (R.I.1992). The trial justice makes this determination after he reviews “the affidavits, pleadings, and other relevant documents in the case in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” Id. Because our standard of review is de novo, we also may scrutinize the record to determine the existence of genuine issues of material fact, and if we find none, we may reverse the trial justice's denial of the motion for summary judgment. Id.

Whether the establishment of a physician-patient relationship is a question of fact to be determined by the jury or a matter of law to be determined by the court is an issue of first impression for the Court. Our review of the approach taken by other jurisdictions reveals that the majority of jurisdictions have held that in medical malpractice and negligence cases, the existence of a physician-patient relationship is a question of fact for the jury. See Wolf...