Woodworth v. Woodworth, Docket No. 62204

• Decision Date: 05 August 1983
• Docket Number: Docket No. 62204
• Citation: 337 N.W.2d 332,126 Mich.App. 258
• Parties: Michael G. WOODWORTH, Plaintiff-Appellant Cross-Appellee, v. Ann M. WOODWORTH, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 332

337 N.W.2d 332

126 Mich.App. 258

Michael G. WOODWORTH, Plaintiff-Appellant Cross-Appellee, v. Ann M. WOODWORTH, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.

Docket No. 62204.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Nov. 8, 1982.

Decided June 6, 1983.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 2, 1983.

Released for Publication Aug. 5, 1983.

Michael G. Woodworth, in pro. per.

Abood & Abood, P.C. by Diane L. Bernick, Lansing, for defendant-appellee, cross-appellant.

Before T.M. BURNS, P.J., and BEASLEY and HANSEN, ^* JJ.

T.M. BURNS, Presiding Judge.

On January 6, 1982, the parties' divorce was finalized. Both parties appeal as of right.

The parties were married on June 27, 1970, after plaintiff had graduated from Central Michigan University with a bachelor's degree in secondary education and defendant had graduated from Lansing Community College with an associates degree. They then moved to Jonesville, where plaintiff worked as a teacher and coach for the high school and defendant worked as a nursery school teacher in Hillsdale. In the Fall of 1973, they sold their house, quit their jobs, ¹ and moved to Detroit, where plaintiff attended Wayne State Law School. Three years later, they moved to Lansing where plaintiff took and passed the bar exam and accepted a job as a research attorney with the Court of Appeals. Plaintiff is now a partner in a Lansing law firm.

For all intents and purposes, the marriage ended on August 25, 1980, when the parties separated. The following summarizes each party's earnings during the marriage:

                YEAR  PLAINTIFF                   DEFENDANT
                ----------------------------------------------------------------
                1970  $ 2,591  Jonesville HS      $ 1,422  Nursery School Teach
                               teacher/coach      $ 2,549  Grant Company (clerk)
                1971  $ 7,989  Teacher            $ 4,236  Teacher
                      $   410  St. Anthony Ch.    $   280  St. Anthony Ch
                               (instructor)                (instructor)
                1972  $ 9,691  Teacher            $ 2,525  Teacher
                1973  $ 6,557  Teacher            $   986  Bank Teller
                1974  $ 2,483  Legal Aid          $ 6,572  Bank Teller
                               (student lawyer)
                1975  $ 2,588  Legal Aid          $ 1,050  Bank Teller
                               (student lawyer)   $ 8,191  Dept/Social Services
                                                           (case worker)
                1976  $ 6,342  Court of Appeals   $10,276  Dept/Social Services
                               (attorney)                  (case worker)
                1977  $12,493  Court of Appeals   $ 1,586  Dept/Social Services
                               (attorney)                  (case worker) 2
                      $ 5,595  Asst. Pros.  Atty
                1978  $21,085  Asst. Pros.  Atty.  $-0-
                1979  $27,247  Asst. Pros.  Atty.  $-0-
                1980  $ 2,057  Asst. Pros.  Atty.  $-0-
                      $30,000  Private Practice
                ----------------------------------------------------------------
                

The basic issue in this case is whether or not plaintiff's law degree is marital property subject to distribution. The trial court held that it was, valued it at $20,000, and awarded this amount to defendant in payments of $2,000 over ten years. ³ Plaintiff contends that his law degree is not such a marital asset. We disagree.

The facts reveal that plaintiff's law degree was the end product of a concerted family effort. Both parties planned their family life around the effort to attain plaintiff's degree. Toward this end, the family divided the daily tasks encountered in living. While the law degree did not preempt all other facets of their lives, it did become the main focus and goal of their activities. Plaintiff left his job in Jonesville and the family relocated to Detroit so that plaintiff could attend law school. In Detroit, defendant sought and obtained full time employment to support the family.

We conclude, therefore, that plaintiff's law degree was the result of mutual sacrifice and effort by both plaintiff and defendant. While plaintiff studied and attended classes, defendant carried her share of the burden as well as sharing vicariously in the stress of the experience known as the "paper chase".

We believe that fairness dictates that the spouse who did not earn an advanced degree be compensated whenever the advanced degree is the product of such concerted family investment. The degree holder has expended great effort to obtain the degree not only for him--or herself, but also to benefit the family as a whole. The other spouse has shared in this effort and contributed in other ways as well, not merely as a gift to the student spouse nor merely to share individually in the benefits but to help the marital unit as a whole.

This conclusion finds support in Vaclav v. Vaclav, 96 Mich.App. 584, 293 N.W.2d 613 (1980), and Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich.App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978), lv. den. 402 Mich. 946 (1978), which held that an advanced degree is an asset which could be considered in a property settlement. In addition, other jurisdictions have allowed the spouse who did not earn an advanced degree to recover: In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis.2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc.2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn.1981); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okl.1979); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Daniels v. Daniels, 90 Ohio L.Abs. 161, 20 Ohio Ops.2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio App.1961).

We are aware that numerous other cases have held that an advanced degree is not a marital asset and may be considered only (if at all) in determining alimony: In re Marriage of Sullivan, 134 Cal.App.3d 634, 184 Cal.Rptr. 796 (1982); ⁴ Lesman v. Lesman, 88 App.Div.2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J.Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (1982); Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ariz.App.1971); In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97 Ill.App.3d 1023, 53 Ill.Dec. 397, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981); In re Marriage of McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind.1980); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.Civ.App.1980); Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d 487 (N.D.1978); Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 1357 (1972); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal.App.2d 786, 78 Cal.Rptr. 131 (1969).

However, we reject the reasons given in these cases to support their conclusions. The cases first contend that an advanced degree is simply not "property":

"An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not encompassed by the broad views of the concept of 'property'. It does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous education, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of that term." Graham, supra, 194 Colo. 432, 574 P.2d 75.

Yet whether or not an advanced degree can physically or metaphysically be defined as "property" is beside the point. ⁵ Courts must instead focus on the most equitable solution to dissolving the marriage and dividing among the respective parties what they have.

"[T]he student spouse will walk away with a degree and the supporting spouse will depart with little more than the knowledge that he or she has substantially contributed toward the attainment of that degree." Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10 Cal.West L.Rev. 590 (1974).

In DeLa Rosa, supra, 309 N.W.2d 758, the Minnesota Supreme Court added:

"[O]ne spouse has foregone the immediate enjoyment of earned income to enable the other to pursue an advanced education on a full-time basis. Typically, this sacrifice is made with the expectation that the parties will enjoy a higher standard of living in the future."

Where, as in this case, the family goal of obtaining the law degree was the purpose of the substantial contribution and sacrifice, both the degree holder and his or her spouse are entitled to share in the fruits of the degree. The trial judge recognized as much:

"Here the plaintiff quit his job and entered law school. The defendant secured employment so plaintiff could become a professional with far greater earning capacity than he had, which would benefit him and their children. To permit this, upon divorce, to benefit only the party who secured the professional degree is unconscionable."

The next argument is that a marriage is not a commercial enterprise and that neither spouse's expectations are necessarily going to be met after the divorce:

"I do not believe that a spouse who works and contributes to the education of the other spouse during marriage normally does so in the expectation of compensation." Sullivan, supra, 184 Cal.Rptr. 801 (Kaufman, P.J., concurring).

Furthermore:

"They do not nor do they expect to pay each other for their respective contributions in any commercial sense. Rather, they work together, in both income and nonincome producing ways, in their joint, mutual and individual interests.

"The termination of the marriage represents, if nothing else, the disappointment of expectations, financial and nonfinancial, which were hoped to be achieved by and during the continuation of the relationship. It does not, however, in our view, represent a commercial investment loss. Recompense for the disappointed expectations resulting from the failure of the marital entity to survive cannot, therefore, be made to the spouses on a strictly commercial basis which, after the fact, seeks to assign monetary values to the contributions consensually made by each of the spouses during the marriage.

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"If the plan fails by reason of the termination of the marriage, we do not regard the supporting spouse's...