Adams v. State

• Decision Date: 21 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-190.,02-190.
• Citation: 79 P.3d 526,2003 WY 152
• Parties: Allen Marty ADAMS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

79 P.3d 526

2003 WY 152

Allen Marty ADAMS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 02-190.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

November 21, 2003.

Representing Appellant: Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellant Counsel. Argument by Mr. Roden.

Representing Appellee: Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Tibbetts.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

LEHMAN, Justice.

[¶ 1] After trial, a jury convicted appellant Allen Marty Adams (Adams) of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1042 and 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2003) and delivery of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i).¹ Adams claims multiple errors arising from accomplice/co-conspirator testimony given at trial, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and prosecutorial misconduct. Upon review, we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Appellant sets forth the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the trial court err by failing to instruct the jury on the applicable law in Wyoming regarding accomplice/co-conspirator testimony, and by failing to give the jury a cautionary instruction regarding accomplice/co-conspirator testimony?

2. Did plain error occur when the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the law regarding accomplice/co-conspirator testimony, failed to either find as a matter of law that certain witnesses were accomplices/co-conspirators or submitting that question to the jury, and failed to give the jury a cautionary instruction regarding accomplice/co-conspirator testimony?

3. Did Appellant receive ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to request the trial court to give the jury instructions regarding testimony of accomplices and co-conspirators?

4. Was the evidence insufficient to convict Appellant of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and delivery of a controlled substance?

5. Was there insufficient evidence to support Appellant's convictions for the crimes charged and stated in the jury instructions and verdict?

6. Did plain error occur when the state solicited testimony that Ben and Brooke Leibee and Jayme Hartmann were convicted of offenses arising out of the circumstances leading to Appellant's trial, thus depriving Appellant of his right to a fair trial on its own merits?

FACTS

[¶ 3] On July 6, 2001, an amended information was filed alleging, in part, that between December of 1999 and June 27, 2001, Adams unlawfully conspired with Benjamin Tyson Leibee (Benjamin), Brooke Nichole Leibee (Brooke), Jayme Lynne Hartmann (Hartmann), and others to deliver methamphetamine and that Adams also unlawfully delivered methamphetamine to Benjamin in May of 2001. At trial, numerous witnesses testified, including both the Leibees, Hartmann, Leann Redfearn, Patrick Neuman, Amy Sundstrom, Diane Cherry, and Adams. Ultimately, the jury found Adams guilty of conspiring to deliver methamphetamine and delivery of methamphetamine as charged. This appeal followed.²

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 4] We stated in Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶¶ 4-7, 46 P.3d 298, ¶¶ 4-7 (Wyo.2002):

The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence issues is well established. We assess whether all the evidence presented is adequate to form the basis for an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. We leave out of consideration the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party which conflicts with the successful party's evidence, and afford every favorable inference to the successful party's evidence which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from that evidence. Even though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence presented, the jury has the responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did. Vanvorst v. State, 1 P.3d 1223, 1228 (Wyo.2000); Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1123 (Wyo. 1997); Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 480 (Wyo.1997).

It is also well established that a trial court has a duty to instruct a jury on the general principles of law applicable to the case at issue. A trial court is given wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the relevant issue, reversible error will not be found. Instructions must be considered as a whole, and individual instructions, or parts of them, should not be singled out and considered in isolation. Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, ¶ 8 (Wyo. 2001); Coburn v. State, 2001 WY 30, ¶ 9, 20 P.3d 518, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2001); Merchant v. State, 4 P.3d 184, 190 (Wyo.2000).

Jury instructions shall not be ruled defective absent a showing that the instructions confused or misled the jury as to the proper principles of law and prejudiced the defendant. Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1061 (Wyo.2000). Prejudicial error must be demonstrated, and prejudice will not be demonstrated unless the instruction confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of law. Wilson v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 916 (Wyo.2000). Further, a failure to instruct properly on an element of a crime does not constitute plain error where evidence of the defendant's guilt is overwhelming. Id.

Finally, this court will find that plain error exists when 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error, 2) there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, and 3) the party claiming error was denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him. Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 535 (Wyo. 2000); Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 969 (Wyo.1996).

See Vlahos v. State, 2003 WY 103, ¶¶ 36 and 42, 75 P.3d 628, ¶¶ 36 and 42 (Wyo.2003).

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

[¶ 5] Adams asserts that the evidence against him was insufficient because it came almost entirely from persons who could be characterized as accomplices/co-conspirators. Specifically, Adams maintains that a conviction cannot be founded upon the testimony of accomplices/co-conspirators unless that testimony is corroborated by other testimony presented at trial from a non-accomplice/non-conspirator.

[¶ 6] We recently addressed a very similar argument in Vlahos. Therein Vlahos claimed that the State relied exclusively on accomplice/co-conspirator testimony and such testimony was not sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy under Wyoming law. Vlahos also alleged that, even if all the witnesses were not accomplices/co-conspirators, the only witness whose testimony connected him with acts in furtherance of the conspiracy was unquestionably an accomplice/co-conspirator. Thus, Vlahos argued that insufficient evidence existed to support the conviction without other witnesses to corroborate the accomplice/co-conspirator's testimony.

[¶ 7] In Vlahos, after this court clarified the distinctions between an accomplice and a co-conspirator, it stated:

Wyoming law is that a conviction may be had upon the unsupported testimony of an alleged accomplice. Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 360 (Wyo.1996). Thus, in Wyoming as well as in other states that follow the common law, no corroboration of accomplice testimony is required, and a conviction can be sustained on such testimony alone if it is convincing and credible. Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 487 (Wyo. 1983); Filbert v. State, 436 P.2d 959, 960 (Wyo.1968). Application of this principle to the present facts leads to the conclusion that no corroborating evidence was required if the witnesses Mr. Vlahos refers to can be properly characterized as accomplices.

¶ 28. This court then continued to make an in-depth analysis of both in-state, as well as out-of-state, case authorities dealing with co-conspirator testimony and held

that independent evidence corroborating a conspiracy is not necessary when a coconspirator appears at trial and presents direct testimony of the conspiracy and the defendant's involvement therein. A coconspirator's in-court testimony is sufficient independent evidence to support a conspiracy conviction.

Vlahos, at ¶ 35. In reaching its conclusion this court cited as authority the case of United States v. Szabo, 789 F.2d 1484, 1487 (10th Cir.1986), which upheld a conspiracy conviction over the defendant's objection that it was based on co-conspirator testimony. In Szabo, at 1487 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895)), the court stated:

There is no constitutional requirement that such testimony be examined for trustworthiness before being placed before the jury. Rather, the Confrontation Clause, in its optimum application, envisions: "[A] personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief."

Therefore, this court clarified that evidence corroborating the co-conspirator's statement is necessary when out-of-court statements of a co-conspirator are utilized. Conversely, when in-court statements of a co-conspirator are involved, independent evidence of the conspiracy is not required.

[¶ 8] Adams identifies both the Leibees and...