Archstone Palmetto Park, LLC v. Kennedy

• Decision Date: 29 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. 4D12–4554.,4D12–4554.
• Citation: 132 So.3d 347
• Parties: ARCHSTONE PALMETTO PARK, LLC, and City of Boca Raton, a Florida Municipality, Appellants, v. Kathleen KENNEDY, James M. Sullivan, Peter S. Barbour, Douglas R. Bloch, Darold R. Hurlbert and John A. Clarke, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

132 So.3d 347

ARCHSTONE PALMETTO PARK, LLC, and City of Boca Raton, a Florida Municipality, Appellants,

v.Kathleen KENNEDY, James M. Sullivan, Peter S. Barbour, Douglas R. Bloch, Darold R. Hurlbert and John A. Clarke, Appellees.

No. 4D12–4554.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Jan. 29, 2014.

Gerald F. Richman and Manuel Farach of Richman Greer, P.A., West Palm Beach, and Charles L. Siemon and J. Michael Marshall of Siemon & Larsen, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellant Archstone Palmetto Park, LLC.

Jamie A. Cole and Daniel L. Abbott of Weiss Serota Helfman Pastoriza Cole & Boniske, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, and Diana Grub Frieser, City Attorney, Boca Raton, for appellant City of Boca Raton, a Florida Municipality.

Ralf Brookes, Cape Coral, for appellees.

Trela J. White and Jennifer G. Ashton of Corbett, White and Davis, P.A., Lantana, for Amicus Curiae, The Palm Beach County League of Cities, Inc.

Jane West, St. Augustine, for Amicus Curiae, Florida Coalition for Preservation.

SCHIFF, LOUIS H., Associate Judge.

On occasion, the Legislature provides explicit guidance as to its intent and how a statute is to be applied for a specific case. This is one such instance. We reverse the declaratory judgment in favor of the appellees, which interpreted a 2012 amendment to section 163.3167(8), Florida Statutes, as requiring the City of Boca Raton to submit a development order to public referenda. Read properly, the 2012 amendment served to reaffirm the longstanding prohibition on referenda for development orders while grandfathering in specific charter provisions permitting referenda in place as of June 1, 2011.

Factual Background

In February 2012, the City of Boca Raton adopted Ordinance 5203, which amended a previously-approved development order by, among other things, setting additional development approval requirements for a four-acre parcel of land owned by appellant Archstone. Although Ordinance 5203 was styled as an amendment, the parties stipulated that it was a “local government development order.”

One month after the ordinance's passage, the appellees, a group of Boca Raton residents, collectively filed a petition, pursuant to Section 6.02 of the City's charter, seeking a citywide referendum to determine whether Ordinance 5203 should be repealed. Although not specifically addressing development orders, Section 6.02 ¹ conferred upon the City's residents a general power of referendum with regard to the passage of city ordinances, providing as follows:

The qualified voters of the city shall have the power by petition to require reconsideration by the council of any adopted ordinance or resolution, and if council fails to repeal an ordinance or resolution, to approve or reject it at a city election ....

At the time the appellees initiated their petition, section 163.3167(8), Florida Statutes (2011) (“the 2011 Amendment”), barred referendum proceedings for all development orders. As became effective on April 6, 2012, however, the Legislature amended section 163.3167(8) (the “2012 Amendment”) to permit local governments to “retain[ ] and implement[ ]” charter provisions that were in effect as of June 1, 2011, and provided “for an initiative or referendum process in regard to development orders.” § 163.3167(8), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added).

Unsure of the 2012 Amendment's impact, the City brought suit in the circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that development orders, such as Ordinance 5203, were not statutorily subject to referendum. One week later, Archstone, as the owner of the parcel subject to Ordinance 5203, intervened in the action as a co-plaintiff. Through their pleadings, the appellants collectively argued the City was powerless to process the appellees' referendum petition since the 2012 Amendment's “grandfather” clause applied only to a charter's “express” referendum provision, and “the City has never had a referendum process that specifically applied to development orders.”

Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered an order denying the appellants' motions while granting that of the appellees. In its order, the trial court found that, through the passage of the 2012 Amendment, “the Legislature intended for the referendum process to be permitted for Development Orders, where ... the City Charter provided for this prior to June, 2011.” Accordingly, since Section 6.02's general provision “for the referendum process on any Ordinances” impliedly included development orders, the trial court reasoned “the 2012 Amendment support[ed] the referendum process in th[e instant] case.”

To support its ruling, the trial court traced section 163.3167(8)'s legislative history, recognizing the 2012 Amendment was enacted to grandfather in previously permitted charter provisions rendered invalid under the 2011 Amendment's blanket prohibition. Nevertheless, the trial court interpreted the statute's inclusion of the phrase “development orders” to evidence the Legislature's intent to expand the referendum process to all general charter provisions, such as Section 6.02, which inferentially, although not directly, apply to development orders. Additionally, given this expansive view, the trial court interpreted the 2012 Amendment as overruling this Court's decision in Preserve Palm Beach Political Action Committee v. Town of Palm Beach, 50 So.3d 1176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), which questioned the efficacy of subjecting development orders to referendum.

The appellants challenge the trial court's interpretation as contrary to the Legislature's intent. Specifically, they argue the 2012 Amendment did nothing to disturb the previous bar on referendum for development orders, since its express purpose was to satisfy a contingent settlement agreement by grandfathering in a municipality's limited charter provision. As an issue of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. See Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Fla.2006), cert. denied,549 U.S. 1216, 127 S.Ct. 1268, 167 L.Ed.2d 92 (2007).

“Referendum is the right of the people to have an act passed by the legislative body submitted for their approval or rejection.” City of Coral Gables v. Carmichael, 256 So.2d 404, 411 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In Florida, the availability of the referendum is constrained to those situations where “the people through their legislative bodies decide it should be used.” Fla. Land Co. v. City of Winter Springs, 427 So.2d 170, 172–73 (Fla.1983) (footnote omitted). In this regard, Article VI, section 5(a) of the Florida Constitution provides that “referenda shall be held as provided by law,” with the phrase “as provided by law” equating to “as passed ‘by an act of the legislature.’ ” Holzendorf v. Bell, 606 So.2d 645, 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (quoting Broward Cnty. v. Plantation Imports, Inc., 419 So.2d 1145, 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)); Grapeland Heights Civic Ass'n v. City of Miami, 267 So.2d 321, 324 (Fla.1972) (defining “law” as used in the Florida Constitution as “enact[ed] by the State Legislature”). Thus, as applied to this case, the appellees' right to referendum is effectively tied to the reach of the 2012 Amendment.

Legislative History

“Legislative intent is the polestar that guides the interpretation and constructionof a statute.” Anderson v. State, 87 So.3d 774, 777 (Fla.2012). “Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look behind the statute's plain language for legislative intent.” Beyel Bros. Crane & Rigging Co. of S. Fla., Inc. v. Ace Transp., Inc., 664 So.2d 62, 64 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (citing City of Miami Beach v. Galbut, 626 So.2d 192 (Fla.1993)). “However, when a statute is unclear or ambiguous as to its meaning, the Court must resort to traditional rules of statutory construction ....” Murray v. Mariner Health, 994 So.2d 1051, 1061 (Fla.2008). In conducting such analysis, “courts are permitted to consider subsequently enacted legislation in determining the meaning of a statute,” Edward T. Byrd & Co. v. WPSC Venture I, 66 So.3d 979, 983 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (citing Martin Daytona Corp. v. Strickland Constr. Servs., 941 So.2d 1220, 1224 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)), particularly where the “amendment was enacted soon after a controversy regarding the statute's interpretation arose.” McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts, 928 So.2d 1204, 1210 (Fla.2006) (citing Lowry v. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 473 So.2d 1248, 1250 (Fla.1985)).

To discern the Legislature's intent in enacting the 2012 Amendment, first we must navigate the statute's history. The limitations placed upon referenda for development orders originated in 1995, when the Legislature enacted section 163.3167(12), Florida Statutes (1995), which provided as follows:

An initiative or referendum process in regard to any development order or in regard to any local comprehensive plan amendment or map amendment that affects five or fewer parcels of land is prohibited.

Applying this statute, this Court decided Preserve Palm Beach Political Action Committee v. Town of Palm Beach, 50 So.3d 1176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), rev. denied,63 So.3d 750 (Fla.2011). Preserve Palm Beach involved the determination as to whether a proposed charter amendment constituted a development order, and thus was statutorily barred from referendum. In finding section 163.3167(12) to apply, this Court noted “ ‘the due process problems associated with subjecting small property owners to public referendum votes when they would otherwise be entitled to a quasi[-]judicial hearing and review procedures.’ ” Id. at 1179. Furthermore, we questioned the wisdom of subjecting a development order to referendum, stating:

The right of the people to vote on issues they are entitled to vote on is one of utmost importance in our democratic system of government. But there are issues—such as the right of a small landowner to use his property subject only to government regulations—which should not be determined by...