Board of Trustees of Woodstock Academy v. Freedom of Information Commission

• Citation: 181 Conn. 544,436 A.2d 266
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 22 July 1980
• Parties: BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF WOODSTOCK ACADEMY et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

Page 266

436 A.2d 266

181 Conn. 544

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF WOODSTOCK ACADEMY et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 13, 1980.

Decided July 22, 1980.

Donald W. Strickland, Hartford, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Constance L. Chambers, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Meriden, with whom, on the brief, was Mitchell W. Pearlman, Gen. Counsel, Hartford, for appellee (named defendant).

Martha Stone, West Hartford, with whom was Donna D. Morris, for appellees (defendants Ernest M. St. Jean et al.).

Before COTTER, C. J., and BOGDANSKI, PETERS, HEALEY and PARSKEY, JJ.

COTTER, Chief Justice.

The plaintiffs Woodstock Academy, its board of trustees and its officers appeal from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Bernstein, J., sustaining a decision of the defendant freedom of information commission that Woodstock Academy was a "public agency" within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act (hereafter the FOIA). Since the FOIA subjects only public agencies to its disclosure requirements; General Statutes § 1-19(a); this case presents, as a matter of first impression, the significant question of what may constitute a "public agency" for purposes of the FOIA.

The defendants Ernest St. Jean, Vernon Fuerst and Robert Peabody, in their private capacities as public taxpayers in the town of Woodstock and as representatives of the Woodstock taxpayers association, filed a complaint with the freedom of information commission after the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the defendants' request for the present and past financial operating records of Woodstock Academy. After a series of hearings the commission determined that the Woodstock Academy was subject to its jurisdiction because it was a public agency within the meaning of the FOIA and that the information sought by the defendant citizen group constituted public records. The commission then directed the plaintiffs to comply with defendants' request. Upon appeal from these rulings, the trial court affirmed the decision of the commission.

The sole issue raised by the plaintiffs on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in concluding that the defendant freedom of information commission acted legally in determining that Woodstock Academy is a "public agency" within the meaning of General Statutes § 1-18a(a).

I

The trial court's finding, read in the light of the memorandum of decision, reveals the following: Woodstock Academy, which is located in the town of Woodstock, was established by special corporate charter of the Connecticut state legislature in 1802. The charter, as amended by the legislature in 1933, provides that the academy's sole purpose is to operate a school for the inhabitants of the town and the vicinity. ¹ Since Woodstock has no public high school of its own, the town's board of education, pursuant to General Statutes § 10-33, ² designates, on an annual basis, Woodstock Academy as the facility to provide educational services for the town's secondary school children. Virtually all of the school children of Woodstock who seek a free secondary education attend the academy; pupils from the towns of Pomfret and Eastford are also enrolled in the academy. Consequently, the town of Woodstock, as required by General Statutes § 10-34, ³ annually pays the entire tuition fees of those pupils who reside in the town and attend the academy from funds procured by public taxation. Thus, Woodstock utilizes the statutory scheme developed by the legislature in General Statutes §§ 10-33 and 10-34 to fulfill the state constitutional mandate that a free public education at the secondary school level be provided to all children residing in Connecticut. Conn.Const., art. VIII. See Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 598-99, 402 A.2d 763.

Woodstock Academy receives 95.32 percent of its operating expenses from tuition payments received from the boards of education of the towns of Woodstock, Pomfret and Eastford; Woodstock alone contributes three-fourths of the academy's operating costs. A private endowment fund of the academy also makes a contribution toward the annual maintenance of the school. Under the provisions of the special corporate charter, all the property and affairs of the academy are under the management and control of a privately elected board of trustees. The only persons eligible to vote for the election of trustees are individuals, twenty-one years of age or older, who have attended the academy and have completed with credit at least one school year's work.

In addition to the substantial funding it receives from local towns, the academy also avails itself of other benefits provided by the state. The academy is certified by the state department of education as required by General Statutes §§ 10-33 and 10-34, thereby allowing its teachers to apply for retirement credit pursuant to General Statutes § 10-183b(14). Under General Statutes § 10-282, Woodstock Academy is eligible to receive state assistance for its building projects. Pursuant to General Statutes § 10-277(b), the pupils attending Woodstock Academy from Woodstock can receive free transportation to and from school.

II

The scope of judicial review of the freedom of information commission's decision that Woodstock Academy is a public agency within the meaning of the FOIA is delineated in General Statutes § 4-183(g). This court, in reviewing the trial court's decision sustaining the action of the commission, must determine whether the agency acted illegally, arbitrarily or in abuse of its discretion and whether its decision was supported by the evidence. See Robinson v. Unemployment Security Board of Review, 181 Conn. 1, 4-5, 434 A.2d 293; Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 500, 400 A.2d 726.

The Connecticut Freedom of Information Act; Public Acts 1975, No. 75-342; General Statutes §§ 1-15 et seq.; provides, inter alia, for disclosure of "all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency." General Statutes § 1-19(a). General Statutes § 1-18a(a) defines "public agency" as: "any executive, administrative or legislative office of the state ... and any state or town agency, any department, institution, bureau, board, commission or official of the state or of any city, town, borough, municipal corporation, school district, regional district or other district or other political subdivision of the state, and also includes any judicial office, official or body but only in respect to its or their administrative functions."

This court has frequently noted that where the language used by the legislature is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction by the courts and statutes will be applied as their words direct. E. g., Muha v. United Oil Co., 180 Conn. 720, 730, 434 A.2d 293; Anderson v. Ludgin, 175 Conn. 545, 552, 400 A.2d 712. From the words employed in § 1-18a(a), it is not at all certain whether a "hybrid governmental/private" entity; Rocap v. Indiek, 539 F.2d 174, 176 (D.C.Cir.); such as Woodstock Academy, is to be considered a state or town agency or "an institution ... of the state or of a city, town ... or other political subdivision." The precise question posed by this case-whether a nominally private corporation which serves a public function may be considered a public agency for purposes of the FOIA-is one on which § 1-18a(a) sheds no clear light.

Where the words of a statute fail to indicate clearly whether the provision applies in certain circumstances, it must be construed by this court, and such statutory interpretation is undertaken in light of the statute's purpose, its legislative history and the circumstances surrounding its enactment as well as its language. Board of Education v. Connecticut State Board of Education, 179 Conn. 694, 700-701, 427 A.2d 846; Schwarzschild v. Binsse, 170 Conn. 212, 216, 365 A.2d 1195.

We have recently stated that the "Freedom of Information Act expresses a strong legislative policy in favor of the open conduct of government and free public access to government records." Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 324, 435 A.2d 353. At the time of its unanimous passage by the General Assembly, the act was noted for making "sweeping changes" in the existing "right to know" law so as to "mark a new era in Connecticut with respect to opening up the doors of city and state government to the people of Connecticut." 18 S. Proc., Pt. 5, 1975 Sess., p. 2323; 18 H. R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1975 Sess., p. 3907. The general rule under the act is disclosure. Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, ---, 435 A.2d 353. As Representative Martin B. Burke, who sponsored the bill which was enacted, expressly stated on the floor of the house, the intent of the act "is to make every public record and every public meeting open to the public at all times with certain specified exclusions." 18 H. R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1975 Sess., p. 3907.

The individual defendants contend that, in light of its legislative history and its purpose to provide for expansive disclosure to the public, the Freedom of Information Act's definition of "public agency" should be broadly construed. However, although the FOIA embodies a policy in favor of public access to records of public agencies, it is that access alone that has been construed broadly. See Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra. The fact that the disclosure is of records of a public agency is assumed in the legislative history of the FOIA. See, e. g., 18 H.R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1975 Sess., p. 3911. ⁴ Nonetheless, a policy of liberal access to public records would necessarily be thwarted if "public agencies" were given a narrow construction, and thus the defendants' contention is somewhat persuasive. ⁵

On occasion we have held that considerable weight is given to an enforcing agency's construction of the statute where the language is ambiguous and the legislative history is not completely enlightening. Anderson v....