Carr v. City of Lansing, Docket No. 240869.

Decision Date22 January 2004
Docket NumberDocket No. 240869.
Citation259 Mich. App. 376,674 N.W.2d 168
PartiesGlen CARR and Cara Carr, Personal Representatives of the Estate of Corey Carr, Deceased and Glen Carr, Next Friend of Jalen Stinson, Minor, Plaintiff-Appellees, v. CITY OF LANSING, Defendant-Appellant, and Loanna Grub and Ronald Jakubiak, Defendants.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Fieger, Fieger, Kenney & Johnson, P.C. (by Geoffrey N. Fieger, Alex J. Remick, and Victor S. Valenti), Southfield, for the plaintiffs.

Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. (by Mary Massaron Ross, Camille T. Horne, and David K. Otis), Detroit, for the city of Lansing.

Before: SMOLENSKI, P.J., and MARKEY and WILDER, JJ.

MARKEY, J.

On January 26, 2000, a serious automobile accident occurred at the intersection of Saginaw Street (M-43) and Fairview Street in the city of Lansing. The accident caused the death of a thirteen-year-old seventh-grader, and seriously injured a three-year-old child, both of whom were passengers in the "at-fault" vehicle, which ran a stop sign for traffic traveling south on Fairview Street. Plaintiffs claim defendant city of Lansing is liable because a tree obstructed the view of the stop sign as motorists traveled south on Fairview. Defendant city of Lansing (hereafter defendant) appeals by leave granted two orders denying its motion for summary disposition: one on April 2, 2002, denying defendant's claim of governmental immunity, and one on April 4, 2002, denying defendant's motion based on the contention that defendant did not have jurisdiction over the street location where the accident occurred. We conclude that the trial court clearly erred by finding the city had jurisdiction over the intersection and erred as a matter of law by denying defendant's motion for summary disposition because governmental immunity barred tort liability. MCR 2.116(C)(7); Nawrocki v. Macomb Co. Rd. Comm., 463 Mich. 143, 182 n. 37, 615 N.W.2d 702 (2000). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant.

Plaintiffs accuse defendant of negligence and gross negligence, including a failure to design a safe roadway, failure to maintain a roadway in a safe manner, failure to set safe speed limits, placing stop signs in "low visibility areas which do not allow adequate time to stop," and failure to place stop signs in areas "where drivers can readily see them." Defendant moved for summary disposition contending that it was protected by governmental immunity and that it was not responsible because M-43 was a state trunk line highway and the intersection was under the jurisdiction of the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT). The trial court rejected defendant's jurisdiction argument because the stop sign was on Fairview, a street clearly within the city's jurisdiction. The trial court also denied defendant's motion for summary disposition based on governmental immunity relying on Ridley v. Detroit (On Remand), 246 Mich.App. 687, 639 N.W.2d 258 (2001), since vacated and remanded, 468 Mich. 862, 659 N.W.2d 228 (2003), in light of this Court's conflict-panel decision in Weaver v. Detroit, 252 Mich.App. 239, 651 N.W.2d 482 (2002).

This Court reviews de novo both a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition and questions of statutory interpretation involving the application of governmental immunity. Hanson v. Mecosta Co. Rd. Comm'rs., 465 Mich. 492, 497, 502, 638 N.W.2d 396 (2002); Baker v. Waste Mgt. of Michigan, Inc., 208 Mich.App. 602, 605, 528 N.W.2d 835 (1995).

The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Gladych v. New Family Homes, Inc., 468 Mich. 594, 597, 664 N.W.2d 705 (2003). Further, when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, no further judicial construction is permitted, and we must enforce the meaning plainly expressed. Id. MCL 691.1407(1) provides, in part: "Except as otherwise provided in this act, a governmental agency is immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function." The Legislature has defined "governmental function" as "an activity that is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, local charter or ordinance, or other law." MCL 691.1401(f). Because defendant is a municipal corporation and a political subdivision of the state, it is immune from tort liability while engaged in a governmental function unless an exception applies. MCL 691.1401(a), (b), and (d); Haliw v. Sterling Hgts., 464 Mich. 297, 302, 304, n. 7, 627 N.W.2d 581 (2001); Baker, supra at 605, 528 N.W.2d 835. At issue in this case is the "highway exception." Haliw, supra at 302, n. 4, 627 N.W.2d 581; MCL 691.1402(1). This Court must broadly apply governmental immunity and narrowly draw its exceptions. Hanson, supra at 498, 638 N.W.2d 396, citing Nawrocki, supra at 149, 615 N.W.2d 702, and Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567, 618, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984). "Consistent with this basic principle, `[n]o action may be maintained under the highway exception unless it is clearly within the scope and meaning of [MCL 691.1402(1)].'" Weaver, supra at 245, 651 N.W.2d 482, quoting Weakley v. Dearborn Hgts. (On Remand), 246 Mich.App. 322, 326, 632 N.W.2d 177 (2001).

When we apply these principles to the undisputed facts of this case, it is clear that MCL 691.1402a, added by 1999 PA 205, effective December 21, 1999, creates no liability for municipalities that would not otherwise exist. The 1999 legislation also amended subsection 2(1) to add "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in section 2a" immediately preceding the imposition of the duty of "each governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway" to maintain it "in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel." Section 2a is MCL 691.1402a. So, reading the plain language of the amendment, § 2a is an exception to subsection 2(1), the highway exception to the general rule of governmental immunity established in subsection 7(1). The obvious purpose of § 2a is to limit the liability municipalities would otherwise face to maintain sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, or other installations pursuant to MCL 691.1401(e) and subsection 2(1) by virtue of the exclusion of municipalities from the fourth sentence of subsection 2(1), which limits state and county liability to "the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel...." See Haliw, supra at 303, 627 N.W.2d 581, and Weakley, supra at 326, 632 N.W.2d 177. Moreover, by its plain terms, § 2a applies only to "a portion of a county highway outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel" (emphasis added), but only a state highway and a city street are involved in this case.

A governmental agency must have jurisdiction over a highway for it to be liable under the highway exception for breaching its duty to maintain a highway "in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel." MCL 691.1402(1); Sebring v. City of Berkley, 247 Mich.App. 666, 684, 637 N.W.2d 552 (2001). An agency has jurisdiction when it has control over the highway. Markillie v. Livingston Co. Bd. of Co. Rd. Comm'rs., 210 Mich.App. 16, 21-22, 532 N.W.2d 878 (1995). Where a state highway intersects a highway of one of its political subdivisions, the state controls the intersection, and therefore, has jurisdiction over it. Id. at 20, 532 N.W.2d 878, citing Lain v. Beach, 177 Mich.App. 578, 582, 442 N.W.2d 650 (1989). Because only one agency may have jurisdiction for purposes of liability under the highway exception, Sebring, supra at 684, 637 N.W.2d 552, citing Markillie, supra at 20, 532 N.W.2d 878, defendant did not have jurisdiction over the intersection where the accident occurred.

Review of the case law and the evidence submitted below confirms that the trial court clearly erred in its factual findings and conclusion of law. In both Sebring, involving the intersection of a city crosswalk and a state highway, and Markillie, involving the intersection of a county road with a state highway, an affidavit established the fact that the state had jurisdiction over the intersection. The only evidence plaintiffs submitted in opposition to the fact that the state controlled signage at the intersection was that defendant installed a second stop sign and a "stop ahead" warning sign after the accident. But the evidence plaintiffs submitted established that defendant took such action only after meeting with an MDOT traffic and safety engineer in conjunction with other action both MDOT and defendant proposed to take with respect to the intersection. So, defendant's placing a second sign was consistent with permissive authority under MCL 257.609(b). Thus, the trial court clearly erred as a matter of fact and as a matter of law by concluding defendant had jurisdiction over the intersection and signage controlling traffic there. MCL 257.609; Markillie, supra at 20, 532 N.W.2d 878; Lain, supra at 582, 442 N.W.2d 650.

The crux of plaintiffs' theory of liability is that defendant was negligent in failing to remove a tree obstructing the view of the stop sign controlling traffic traveling south on Fairview or in not providing a warning to motorists approaching the intersection from the north. But this Court held in Lain that one governmental agency has no duty under the highway exception to "post signs on its own road warning of possible dangerous conditions which are under the exclusive jurisdiction of another governmental entity...." Lain, supra at 582, 442 N.W.2d 650. Plaintiffs' reliance on Cox v. Dearborn Hgts., 210 Mich.App. 389, 534 N.W.2d 135 (1995), is misplaced because that case involved two intersecting streets that were both under the jurisdiction of the defendant ...

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