Conway v. City of Imperial Beach

• Decision Date: 22 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. D021204,D021204
• Citation: 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 402,52 Cal.App.4th 78
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 549, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 818 William CONWAY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF IMPERIAL BEACH, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 402

60 Cal.Rptr.2d 402

52 Cal.App.4th 78, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 549,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 818

William CONWAY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF IMPERIAL BEACH, Defendant and Respondent.

No. D021204.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Jan. 22, 1997.

William Conway, in pro per, Worley, Schwartz, Garfield, & Rice and Robert C. Rice, San Diego, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

McDougal, Love, Eckis & Grindle and Lynn R. McDougal, El Cajon, for Defendant and Respondent.

NARES, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff William Conway filed suit for declaratory relief, injunction, damages and writ of mandate against defendant City of Imperial Beach (City). Conway appeals from the judgment entered after City's motion for summary adjudication was granted. After considering the evidence, a statement of undisputed facts, moving papers and argument, the court granted the motion on the ground that City was not obligated to obtain Coastal Commission approval of an interim ordinance, No. 92-864 (Proposition P), in order for it to be effective.

On appeal, Conway contends the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication in favor of City because Proposition P, according to the terms of the Coastal Act, was an amendment to City's local coastal program, and therefore City was required to obtain Coastal Commission certification prior to enforcing

the terms of Proposition P. We disagree, and affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND ¹

Conway is the owner of three properties located within the city limits of Imperial Beach. One property is located at 181 Ebony Street (the Ebony property), one at 272 Elm Street (the Elm property) and one at 580 Florida Street (the Florida property). The three properties are also within the coastal zone and subject to the provisions of the Coastal Act of 1976 (PUB. RESOURCES CODE , § 30000² et seq.) (Coastal Act or the Act). The Coastal Commission has certified City's local coastal program (LCP) for all properties within the coastal zone.

In 1991, before the passage of Proposition P, Conway's three properties were zoned R-HD, a multi-family zone which permitted a maximum density of one dwelling unit per 1,000 square feet of building site area. Conway began development plans for the three properties in 1991, applying to City for development permits. Conway was sent a letter on September 18, 1991, by the City Attorney, advising him of possible future changes to zoning ordinances affecting density and height requirements.

Conway thereafter was unable to obtain building permits to commence construction on any of his three properties following the passage of Proposition P. ³ , ⁴

Conway timely filed an application for an appeal on the question of whether he had achieved vested rights on any of his three properties. ⁵ After a hearing before City, City ruled Conway had not achieved vested rights on any of the properties because building On November 5, 1992, City attempted to transmit Proposition P to the Coastal Commission for certification under the "rapid and expeditious" procedure in the Coastal Act. (§ 30514, subd. (c).) The Coastal Commission rejected City's request because it was of the view that Proposition P was not a "minor" amendment qualifying for rapid and expeditious processing, and City was informed it would have to go through the formal amendment certification process. On November 12, 1992, Proposition P was returned without having been considered.

permits were never obtained and there had been no substantial expenditures incurred or construction performed in good faith reliance on the issuance of building permits.

On December 12, 1992, City determined, without the approval of the Coastal Commission, that Proposition P was effective, and enforcement throughout City began December 14, 1992. Construction and processing on projects City deemed to conflict with Proposition P was halted, and explanatory letters were sent to affected property owners, including Conway.

On January 29, 1993, City received notice from the Coastal Commission that Proposition P must be submitted for certification prior to becoming effective. City, after public hearings, adopted a resolution transmitting Proposition P to the Coastal Commission as an amendment to the LCP. On April 10, 1993, the Coastal Commission, after public hearings on City's application, approved Proposition P (with a minor change) as an amendment to City's LCP.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 11, 1993, Conway filed a complaint for declaratory relief, injunction, damages for violation of civil rights and a petition for writ of mandate against City. The complaint alleged that City's enforcement of Proposition P without prior certification by the Coastal Commission was in violation of the Coastal Act and had prevented Conway from securing vested rights by precluding the grant of building permits to Conway to commence substantial construction on his three properties. City filed its answer to the complaint on April 16, 1993, denying Conway's allegations.

On November 12, 1993, Conway and City filed motions for summary adjudication. Conway's motion sought summary adjudication of his first cause of action, for declaratory relief. City's motion sought summary adjudication as to the first cause of action, as well as Conway's fifth (improper initiative) and eighth (injunction) causes of action.

On December 10, 1993, the trial court denied Conway's motion for summary adjudication, and granted City's motion, finding:

"The Court interprets the law and the stipulated facts in the manner which supports both the clear intent of the voters in passing Proposition 'P' and the clear intent of the California Legislature in enacting the Coastal Act [citation], and concludes that Defendant ... CITY OF IMPERIAL BEACH was not obligated to obtain Coastal Commission approval of the interim Ordinance 92-864 initiative know as Proposition 'P,' as claimed in Plaintiff['s] ... First, Fifth and Eighth Causes of Action, in order for Proposition 'P' to be effective upon enactment."

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have recently set out the applicable standard of review:

" ... [T]he applicable standard of review on appeal in this case is de novo or independent review. There were no credibility issues at trial and the court decided only the limited question of law [we now review]. As an appellate court, we 'conduct independent review of the trial court's determination of questions of law.' (Stratton v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1083, 258 Cal.Rptr. 721.) Interpretation of a statute is a question of law. (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856; California Ins. Guarantee Assn. v. Liemsakul (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 433, 438, 238 Cal.Rptr. 346; Los Angeles County Safety Police Assn. v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1378, 1384, 237 Cal.Rptr. 920.) Further, application of the

interpreted statute to undisputed facts is also subject to our independent determination. (Rudd v. California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 948, 951, 268 Cal.Rptr. 624.)" (Harbor Fumigation, Inc. v. County of San Diego Air Pollution Control Dist. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 854, 859, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 874)

APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES

1. Statutory Construction

This case is one of first impression. There are no reported decisions on how the coastal planning process prescribed by the Coastal Act relates to the ability of local governments to adopt urgency interim ordinances under Government Code section 65858. ⁶ Thus, our resolution of the question before us depends on application of the rules of statutory construction.

"To resolve whether defendant's interpretation of the relevant statutes is correct, we are guided by familiar canons of statutory construction. '[I]n construing a statute, a court [must] ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.' (People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 246, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 893 P.2d 1224.) ... If ... the terms of a statute provide no definitive answer, then courts may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. (See Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 744, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 650, 889 P.2d 970.) 'We must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.' (People v. Jenkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 246, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 893 P.2d 1224.)" (People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 906 P.2d 1232. See also Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1060, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 906 P.2d 1057.)

As we have recently stated, "it is our duty ... to construe the true meaning of [the statutes at issue] ... and to harmonize [them] with the entire statutory scheme of which [they are] a part. (Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 917, fn. 15, 80 Cal.Rptr. 89, 458 P.2d 33.)" (Sea World, Inc. v. County of San Diego (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1406, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 194, fn. omitted.)

In this case, involving an apparent conflict between two statutes, the principle of paramount importance is that of harmonious construction, by which we must attempt to give effect to both statutes if possible:

"... [O]ur task here is ... to determine whether ... there is any possible construction that will harmonize two ... provisions of equal dignity. As we demonstrate ..., a harmonious construction of the two provisions does exist and we therefore must adopt that harmonizing construction." (City and County of San Francisco v. County of San Mateo (1995) 10 Cal.4th 554, 570-571, fn. 8, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 896 P.2d 181.)

"Moreover, where the language of a statutory provision is susceptible of two constructions, ...