Estate of Stevenson v. Hollywood Bar and Cafe, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91SA266,91SA266
• Citation: 832 P.2d 718
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Allen T. STEVENSON, Deceased, and Amanda Snow, a minor by her next friend, Elizabeth Talovich, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The HOLLYWOOD BAR AND CAFE, INC., d/b/a The Hollywood Bar, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 718

832 P.2d 718

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Allen T. STEVENSON, Deceased,

and Amanda Snow, a minor by her next friend, Elizabeth Talovich, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The HOLLYWOOD BAR AND CAFE, INC., d/b/a The Hollywood Bar,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 91SA266.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

July 13, 1992.

The Branch Law Firm, Turner W. Branch, Albuquerque, N.M., David C. Chavez, Los Lunas, N.M., Harding & Ogborn, Denise K. Young, Denver, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Fossum, Hatter & Green, P.C., Michael F. Green, Cortez, for defendant-appellee.

Justice KIRSHBAUM delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Appellants, the Estate of Allen T. Stevenson and Stevenson's minor daughter Amanda Snow, by her next friend and natural mother, Elizabeth Talovich, appeal the trial court's judgment dismissing their wrongful death claims against appellee, The Hollywood Bar and Cafe, Inc. (Hollywood Bar). ¹ The trial court ruled that the appellants' claims were barred by the statutes of limitations contained in sections 12-46-112.5(3)(a)(II) and 12-47-128.5(3)(a)(II), 5B C.R.S. (1991). ² We affirm.

I

The appellants initiated this civil action on May 7, 1990. The complaint alleged in pertinent part that on May 23, 1988, the Hollywood Bar sold liquor to Stevenson and Ryan Lee; that at the time the Hollywood Bar knew or should have known that both Stevenson and Lee were minors and were intoxicated; that the conduct of the Hollywood Bar constituted negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence; and that such conduct caused the wrongful death of Stevenson later that date when an automobile driven by Lee in which Stevenson was a passenger was involved in an accident.

The Hollywood Bar filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting, inter alia, that the appellants' claims were barred by the one-year statutes of limitations contained in sections 12-46-112.5(3)(a)(II) and 12-47-128.5(3)(a)(II), 5B C.R.S. (1991). ³ In responding to the motion, the plaintiffs conceded that their claims were not filed within the time periods established by the two statutes. They asserted, however, that those statutes violated the open courts guarantee of article II, section 6, of the Colorado Constitution; the prohibitions against special legislation established by article II, section 11, and article V, section 25, of the Colorado Constitution; and the Colorado constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The trial court rejected the appellants' arguments and granted the Hollywood Bar's motion. Appellants now appeal the trial court's judgment. ⁴

II

The appellants concede that their claims were filed more than one year after the date of Stevenson's death, and further concede that the one-year statutes of limitations contained in sections 12-46-112.5(3)(a)(II) and 12-47-128.5(3)(a)(II) are applicable to their claims. The appellants informed the trial court that they filed their claims on the basis of their conclusion that the two statutes of limitations were constitutionally invalid. ⁵ The statutes here challenged are presumed to be constitutional, and the appellants assume the burden of establishing the invalidity of such legislation beyond a reasonable doubt. Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946, 949 (Colo.1991); Dove v. Delgado, 808 P.2d 1270, 1273 (Colo.1991); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 214 (Colo.1984).

III

A

The appellants argue that the statutes of limitations here challenged impermissibly restrict their right of access to the courts and in effect deprive them of remedies for Hollywood Bar's tortious conduct. We disagree.

Article II, section 6, of the Colorado Constitution provides in pertinent part as follows:

Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character; and right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay.

Colo. Const. art. II, § 6. If a right accrues under the law, this constitutional provision ensures the availability of a judicial forum to effectuate that right. Sigman v. Seafood Ltd. Partnership I, 817 P.2d 527, 533 (Colo.1991); Dove v. Delgado, 808 P.2d 1270, 1275 (Colo.1991); O'Quinn v. Walt Disney Prods., 177 Colo. 190, 195, 493 P.2d 344, 346 (1972); Goldberg v. Musim, 162 Colo. 461, 469, 427 P.2d 698, 703 (1967).

Statutes of limitations do not bar the filing of claims, but rather establish time limitations within which specified claims may be filed. Such statutes are designed to promote justice, discourage unnecessary delay and forestall the prosecution of stale claims. Dove, 808 P.2d at 1274; State Bd. of Medical Exam'rs v. Jorgensen, 198 Colo. 275, 279, 599 P.2d 869, 872 (1979). A statute of limitations does not unduly restrict the right of access to the courts unless the time period established therein is so limited as to amount to a denial of justice. Dove, 808 P.2d at 1273. See Oberst v. Mays, 148 Colo. 285, 292, 365 P.2d 902, 905 (1961). We have recognized that the General Assembly has the primary authority to determine what period of time should be considered reasonable. Dove, 808 P.2d at 1273; Oberst, 148 Colo. at 292, 365 P.2d at 905.

The one-year period of time adopted by the General Assembly in sections 12-46-112.5(3)(a)(II) and 12-47-128.5(3)(a)(II), 5B C.R.S. (1991), is not unreasonably limited in duration. Similar time periods are provided for numerous other classifications of civil actions. See § 13-80-103(1)(a), 6A C.R.S. (1987) (establishing one-year periods of limitations for tort actions of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, libel and slander). While other options were available to the General Assembly, its decision to establish a one-year period within which to file a claim against liquor licensees for tortious conduct in serving, selling or providing alcoholic beverages does not constitute a denial of justice to persons acquiring such claims.

B

Appellants next argue that the two statutes of limitations grant immunities to liquor licensees in violation of article II, section 11, and article V, section 25, of the Colorado Constitution. We disagree.

Article II, section 11, of the Colorado Constitution provides in pertinent part, that "[n]o ... law ... making any irrevocable grant of special privileges, franchises or immunities, shall be passed by the general assembly." This particular constitutional provision prohibiting the establishment of irrevocable grants of special privileges, franchises or immunities has generally been invoked by parties asserting that particular legislation grants entities perpetual and exclusive authority to receive compensation from public funds for the provision of services or supplies. See In re Interrogatory Concerning House Bill 91S-1005, 814 P.2d 875, 884-85 (Colo.1991); Public Service Co. v. City of Loveland, 79 Colo. 216, 226, 245 P. 493, 497 (1926); City of Leadville v. Leadville Sewer Co., 47 Colo. 118, 130-31, 107 P. 801, 804 (1909). See also Thomas v. City of Grand Junction, 13 Colo.App. 80, 84, 56 P. 665, 667 (1899); City and County of Denver v. Denver Tramway Corp., 23 F.2d 287, 300-02 (8th Cir.1927), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 616, 49 S.Ct. 20, 73 L.Ed. 539 (1928); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Denver Tramway Co., 3 F.2d 285, 300-01 (D.Colo.1924). The statutes of limitations here challenged by their terms do not grant liquor licensees any perpetual or exclusive privilege or franchise, and merely condition rather than prohibit the filing of claims. In re Interrogatory, 814 P.2d at 885. See Schafer v. Aspen Skiing Corp., 742 F.2d 580, 582 (10th Cir.1984). ⁶

Article V, section 25, of the Colorado Constitution provides in pertinent part that "[t]he general assembly shall not pass local or special laws ... granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever."

A statute that is general and uniform in its operation upon all similarly situated entities or persons does not constitute local or special legislation as contemplated by article V, section 25. Sigman, 817 P.2d at 533; Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946, 952 (Colo.1991); Curtiss v. GSX Corp. of Colorado, 774 P.2d 873, 876 (Colo.1989); City of Montrose v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 732 P.2d 1181, 1191 (Colo.1987); McCarty v. Goldstein, 151 Colo. 154, 158, 376 P.2d 691, 693 (1962). The statutes of limitations established by sections 12-46-112.5(3)(a)(II) and 12-47-128.5(3)(a)(II), 5B C.R.S. (1991), apply uniformly to all licensees who sell, serve or provide alcoholic beverages, including fermented malt beverages. They therefore do not constitute special legislation in violation of article V, section 25, of the Colorado Constitution unless the basic classification of liquor licensees is itself constitutionally impermissible. In re Interrogatory, 814 P.2d at 885-86; Poudre Valley Rural Elec. Ass'n v. City of Loveland, 807 P.2d 547, 553 (Colo.1991). Uniform application of a statute establishing unreasonable or arbitrary classifications would not satisfy constitutional requirements. See In re Interrogatory, 814 P.2d at 886.

The appellants assert that liquor licensees cannot be considered a constitutionally valid class under rational relationship analysis. We disagree.

It must first be observed that liquor licensees constitute a readily identifiable group or class because of the nature of the product with which they deal. Members of such class voluntarily join it and pay fees to retain the authority commensurate with such membership.

The appellants do not challenge the statutory or regulatory framework defining liquor licensees as a class. Rather they suggest that the distinction drawn between liquor licensees and other tortfeasors is not rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest. We have recently recognized the validity of the General Assembly's interest in preventing injuries from negligence arising in the context of the provision, sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages. Sigman...