Gittens v. State

Decision Date16 June 1986
Citation132 Misc.2d 399,504 N.Y.S.2d 969
PartiesDarius GITTENS, Claimant, v. STATE of New York, Defendant. Timothy ANDERSON, Claimant, v. STATE of New York, Defendant. Jerome ADAMS, Claimant, v. STATE of New York, Defendant. Vincent LAHEY, Claimant, v. STATE of New York, Defendant. Carlos PIZARRO, Claimant, v. STATE of New York, Defendant.
CourtNew York Court of Claims

Darius Gittens, Timothy Anderson, Jerome Adams, Vincent Lahey, and Carlos Pizarro pro se.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. by Reynolds E. Hahn, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State of N.Y.

DONALD J. CORBETT, Jr., Judge.

Claimants herein seek to recover damages from the State of New York for their allegedly wrongful, unjust and/or illegal confinement in their cells (keeplock) related to disciplinary action initiated pursuant to the rules and regulations of the State of New York for Correctional Services (7 NYCRR 250 et seq.).

The claims herein fall within three distinct factual situations, each of which provoke essentially similar analysis. Situation I, encompassing the claim of Darius Gittens, concerns a prison inmate who had been keeplocked pursuant to 7 NYCRR 251-1.6(a), and who thereafter on the disposition resulting from his disciplinary hearing [7 NYCRR Part 253] had the charges against him dismissed and was released to the general population. This claimant was keeplocked for a total of five days and seeks damages for what he characterizes as false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Situation II, encompassing the claims of Timothy Anderson, Jerome Adams and Vincent Lahey, concerns inmates who were keeplocked pursuant to 7 NYCRR 251-1.6(a), who thereafter had various penalties imposed upon them after their disciplinary hearings [7 NYCRR Part 253] and who, after exhausting administrative remedies including unsuccessful appeals at superintendent's hearings [7 NYCRR Part 254], commenced proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78 in the Supreme Court, whose order nullified the hearings, expunged from the inmates' records references to the said disciplinary proceedings, and restored certain lost privileges such as "good time" credit. These inmates bring claims for false imprisonment or wrongful confinement and malicious prosecution, and seek damages, inter alia, for lost wages and incentive bonuses, lost work assignments, loss of certain exercise periods 1, and cruel and inhuman punishment. Situation III, set forth by Carlos Pizarro, concerns an inmate who was keeplocked pursuant to 7 NYCRR 251-1.6(a) and had a penalty imposed after a disciplinary hearing [7 NYCRR Part 253] consisting, inter alia, of a total of ten days in keeplock. Claimant contends that he remained in keeplock for nineteen days, that is, nine days more than the penalty imposed. His claim alleges false imprisonment for his wrongful confinement of these nine days, without disputing the first ten days in keeplock status.

The State of New York, in lieu of an answer, moves the court to dismiss each claim herein pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) and (7), on the ground that the defendant has not waived its sovereign immunity regarding its governmental function to administer its correctional facilities and upon the further ground that an inmate incarcerated in a State correctional facility has no cause of action, in the absence of intentional, malicious and/or illegitimate actions or conditions which are "barbarous" or The gravamen of these claims whether couched in terms of false imprisonment, wrongful confinement, segregated confinement, or other synonymic expressions 2, relates to confinement in keeplock and not to a Special Housing Unit [7 NYCRR 300.2(b) ], or a Segregation Unit [7 NYCRR 300.2(c) ]. There has been significant debate as to the relative restrictiveness of these confinements, with some courts urging that confinement in a segregated cell does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment [Wilkinson v. Skinner, 34 N.Y.2d 53, 59, 356 N.Y.S.2d 15, 312 N.E.2d 158] and other courts contending that keeplock, while milder, is not significantly different from other forms of punishment which constitute substantial deprivation [McKinnon v. Patterson, supra, 568 F.2d 930, 936-8], or even theorizing that keeplock could be more confining than special housing if accompanied with the loss of shower, exercise and other privileges [Powell v. Ward, 487 F.Supp 917, 925, mod. 2nd Cir., 643 F.2d 924, cert. den. 454 U.S. 832, 102 S.Ct. 131, 70 L.Ed.2d 111].

"shocking to the conscience", for the choice of his place of confinement.

In each instance herein the inmates were confined to their own cells for short periods of time. All confinements, however, were in full compliance with the rules and regulations governing implementation of standards of inmate behavior [7 NYCRR Parts 250-254]. 3 In each claim the claimant was given prompt and timely notice of the purported misbehaviors; each was keeplocked before his hearing in accordance with 7 NYCRR 251-1.6(a) [Matter of Bowe v. Smith, supra, 119 Misc.2d 453, 455, 465 N.Y.S.2d 391; cf. Matter of Jermosen v. Smith, 66 N.Y.2d 1024, 499 N.Y.S.2d 391, 489 N.E.2d 1293]; each was given a timely disciplinary hearing [7 NYCRR 251-5.1; see, Powell v. Ward, 392 F.Supp. 628, mod. 2nd Cir., 542 F.2d 101] and in Situations I and II the charges against the inmate were either dismissed at the disciplinary hearing or in Supreme Court because the written misbehavior report did not sustain the charge, whereupon the disciplinary proceeding was nullified and the misbehavior report [7 NYCRR 251-3.1] expunged, but with no reason therefor given. [see, e.g., Matter of Bradley v. Coughlin, supra, 115 Misc.2d 373, 376, 453 N.Y.S.2d 1021].

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

All claimants herein have denominated their claims as ones which sound in false imprisonment and recite the requisite elements that: 1) the defendant intended to confine them; 2) the claimants were conscious of the confinement; 3) the claimants did not consent to the confinement and 4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged. [Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310, cert. den., sub nom., Schanbarger v. Kellogg, 423 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 277, 46 L.Ed.2d 257]. Most troublesome is the fourth element, that is, that the confinement was not otherwise privileged.

It can be said that the more restrictive confinement was privileged to the extent that it was under color of law or regulation, specifically in accordance with regulations [7 NYCRR 251-1.6(a) ]. 4 And certain personal freedoms and conveniences are inherently sacrificed when a Wilkinson v. Skinner, supra, is not to be read to the contrary, as the court easily dismissed any notion that the conditions of confinement there (in solitary confinement) could be considered so "barbarous" or "shocking to the conscience" as to fall within the aegis of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribing cruel and unusual punishment [id., 34 N.Y.2d at 60, 356 N.Y.S.2d 15, 312 N.E.2d 158]. Reading the instant claims with the strongest possible inferences in the claimants' favor, I find that they fall woefully short of such actionable conditions of confinement. 5

loss of liberty is occasioned by a lawful incarceration [cf. Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 84-85, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 399 N.E.2d 1188 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting) ].

The plaintiff in Wilkinson, supra, succeeded because he sufficiently pleaded that he had been subjected to punitive segregation for no legitimate reason and without the rudimentary protections of due process. Here the claimants, save Pizarro, were given the reasons for their confinement in keeplock, all in accordance with rules and regulations which do provide an adequate measure of due process.

In fact, it appears that the defendant has readily responded to the then existing regulatory imperfections [Wilkinson v. Skinner, supra, at 62-3, 356 N.Y.S.2d 15, 312 N.E.2d 158] by subsequently strengthening minimal due process requirements which corrections officials must follow in inmate disciplinary confinements [see amendments filed June 13, 1983, particularly 7 NYCRR 251-5(a) ]. More importantly, as the Court of Appeals cogently noted, injunctive relief should be granted more readily and will often be the only appropriate remedy [Wilkinson, supra, at 62, 356 N.Y.S.2d 15, 312 N.E.2d 158]. The claims at bar amply demonstrate the availability of such remedies.

Accordingly all claims herein which allege false imprisonment are dismissed.

CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS UNDER § 1983

In actuality, all the claims herein can be read to imply violations of due process rights under the Constitution of the United States. The Court of Claims does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear such claims, being a court of limited statutory jurisdiction. A civil rights suit seeking monetary relief for violations of due process rights alleging the loss of federally guaranteed liberty interests under U.S.Code, tit. 42, § 1983 can be heard in the federal courts, which are unencumbered by such jurisdictional strictures. [cf. Matter of Thomas v. New York Temporary State Comm., 83 A.D.2d 723, 442 N.Y.S.2d 632, affd. 56 N.Y.2d 656, 451 N.Y.S.2d 708, 436 N.E.2d 1310; also see Brody v. Leamy, 90 Misc.2d 1, 23, 393 N.Y.S.2d 243; Drake v. State of New York, 126 Misc.2d 309, 482 N.Y.S.2d 208.]

The State of New York has not waived its sovereign immunity for monetary damages here [Court of Claims Act § 8], even though equitable or injunctive relief through CPLR article 78 may be available in Supreme Court. And note that monetary damages are not available in civil rights claims as incidental to the primary equitable relief sought in the article 78 proceedings [CPLR 7806; Correction Law 24, subd. 2; Finkelstein v. Capuano, 2nd Cir., 792 F.2d 275; also see Leisner v. Bahou, 97 A.D.2d 860, 469 N.Y.S.2d 255, appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 985, 475 N.Y.S.2d 282, 463 N.E.2d 623, lv. denied 62 N.Y.2d 940, 479 N.Y.S.2d 214, 468 N.E.2d 52, cert....

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